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The Politics of Delegation in the European Union

Abstract : Delegation of powers to supranational institutions, once a hallmark of European integration, is increasingly contested by national leaders as well as by the public opinion. At the same time, recent developments suggest that in turbulent times, the technique remains widely used. This article purports to explain this apparent paradox. It proposes a reading of the principal-agent principles that takes into account specificities of the EU system, such as the absence of a strong centre of power or the significant degree of mistrust that may exist among national governments. It argues that the competition between multiple principals may ultimately result in different models of delegation.
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https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02405022
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Submitted on : Wednesday, December 11, 2019 - 4:01:08 PM
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Renaud Dehousse. The Politics of Delegation in the European Union. 2013. ⟨hal-02405022⟩

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