Persuading a Wishful Thinker

Victor Augias (1) , Daniel M A Barreto (2)

1 ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po)
2 Département d'économie

We analyze a model of persuasion in which Receiver forms wishful non-Bayesian beliefs. The effectiveness of persuasion depends on Receiver's material stakes: it is more effective when intended to encourage risky behavior that potentially lead to a high payoff and less effective when intended to encourage more cautious behavior. We illustrate this insight with applications showing why informational interventions are often ineffective in inducing greater investment in preventive health treatments, how financial advisors might take advantage of their clients overoptimistic beliefs and why strategic information disclosure to voters with different partisan preferences can lead to belief polarization in an electorate.

Mots clés: Non-Bayesian persuasion; Motivated thinking; Overoptimism; Optimal beliefs

Domaines: Economies et finances

Victor Augias, Daniel M A Barreto. Persuading a Wishful Thinker. 2022. ⟨hal-04066849⟩