Europe faced with China’s Rise: of Shields and Swords?
Abstract
This paper begins by contextualizing European views of the rise of China in a broader historical context. It
addresses the claim, made both by European political leaders and by analysts, that Europe has been naïve, not
only from a geopolitical point of view but, above all from a geo-economic one. It is suggested that efforts to
socialize China into the liberal international order were based, not so much on naïve views of China but rather
on a realistic assessment of the capacities available to Europeans, and their overriding concern to advance
their economic interests. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 was a turning point: previously China was a place
for European investment for access to the Chinese market and a source of cheap imports. After 2008 China
itself had become an investor in Europe and this investment in central and Eastern Europe were seen as
creating a “Trojan horse.” Concomitantly, Beijing’s aggressiveness in its neighborhood, as well as President
Xi Jinping’s increasing authoritarianism (Hong Kong, Xinjiang, post-COVID-19) contributed to a reassessment
of ties with China. From this point Europeans began to put into place defensive mechanisms (shields). The
2019 Communication of the European Commission designating China not only as a “partner and (economic)
competitor” but also as a “systemic rival” expressed a paradigm shift in European thinking. Two years later,
the embrace of the Indo-Pacific as a theater for European action has put Europe into a more offensive posture
(swords) in non-military terms. Potentially, this has opened up both a new area of Transatlantic cooperation,
but also greater potential for disagreement.