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Stable and Extremely Unequal

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Abstract

We highlight the tension between stability and equality in non transferable utility matching. We consider many to one matchings and refer to the two sides of the market as students and schools. The latter have aligned preferences, which in this context means that a school's utility is the sum of its students' utilities. We show that the unique stable allocation displays extreme inequality between matched pairs.
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Dates and versions

hal-03936184 , version 1 (12-01-2023)

Licence

Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives - CC BY 4.0

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-03936184 , version 1

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Alfred Galichon, Octavia Ghelfi, Marc Henry. Stable and Extremely Unequal. 2021. ⟨hal-03936184⟩
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