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– 'LET'S BEAT CRIME TOGETHER': Corporate Mobilizations for Security in Karachi

LAURENT GAYER AND SOPHIE RUSSO

Abstract

The Citizens-Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) was launched in 1990 by a group of Karachi-based industrialists, with the aim of improving police performance and restoring public order in Pakistan's major business hub. Over the years, CPLC members developed a unique informational capital as well as analytical and operational skills, which were recognized as a form of expertise by law enforcement agencies and contributed to the entrenchment of the organization into the security state. This corporate mobilization for security, understood as a form of collective action organized by entrepreneurs for the protection of their lives, properties and economic activities, imposed its writ in the city's industrial zones. The expert system of the organization was then repurposed toward the surveillance of factory workers, the defense of industrial order and the regulation of circulatory flows across the estates. By engaging with the growing body of work on the new military urbanism through the lens of the risk-theory literature on policing, the article aims to contribute to ongoing debates about the transformations of labor relations and urban citizenship under a new regime of securitization fed by ever-thicker chains of interdependence between capital and coercion.

Introduction

> 'Crime by its ceaseless development of new means of attacking property calls into existence new measures of defence, and its productive effects are as great as those of strikes in stimulating the invention of machines.'
> Marx (1993: 53)

Even in Karachi, Pakistan's largest metropolis and a city reputed for its no-holds-barred style of policing, police work is only marginally about breaking doors and cracking skulls. An admirer of Chaudhry Aslam Khan (1967–2014), Karachi's most famous 'encounter specialist'[1] of the past decades, and under whose command he began his career in the force, Shahriyar Mirza* (not his real name)[2] was constantly reminded of this reality in his new posting as senior superintendent of police (SSP) in charge of Karachi's District South, where the most affluent residential neighborhoods of the city are concentrated. Like every police officer of his rank, Mirza kept his office open to prominent citizens, who in this privileged part of town came in abundance. This relational work was not to his liking and he longed for a posting that would allow him to resume more exhilarating activities of crime fighting. Himself a resident of the area, and heir to a renowned family of senior bureaucrats, Mirza just grinned and bore it. On

1 In India and Pakistan, 'encounter specialists' are police officers with a reputation for their unconventional methods and their propensity to use extrajudicial violence against suspected criminals.

2 All the names of our respondents followed by an asterisk (*) have been changed out of respect for their anonymity. We have only retained the names of a few public personalities, who agreed to speak on the record.

This article is the outcome of the authors' respective investigations in Karachi, for her master's thesis in the case of Sophie Russo and for his Habilitation à diriger des recherches (HDR) in the case of Laurent Gayer. Successive field trips to Karachi, between 2016 and 2018, were funded by the Fondation nationale des sciences politiques and the Centre de recherches internationales (CERI-Sciences Po). The authors would like to thank the anonymous IJURR reviewers as well as the participants in the workshop 'Challenging the police in the large metropolis', held at CERI in May 2018, for their comments on earlier versions of the text.

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a hot and humid afternoon in August 2018, he had invited us for another of those informal conversations that we had been having over the course of several years. As was usual in these circumstances, our discussion was frequently interrupted by visitors who came to present their grievances without any apparent concern for our presence or that of other supplicants in the room. At some point, an elderly man whose sartorial elegance betrayed his economic status entered the office and presented his case. He claimed that his maid had been 'kidnapped' by her own parents, who resided in the north of the country, to coerce her to marry against her will. The visitor informed SSP Mirza that he had been in touch with the family over the phone in order to negotiate the young woman's release—so far without success. Following this intervention, he had started noticing suspicious people roaming around his house and he believed that his maid's family was trying to intimidate him so that he would stop interfering. Fearing that the situation could quickly escalate, he requested the police to intervene and offered his cooperation. 'You see, I'm a former member of CPLC [Citizens-Police Liaison Committee] and I have taped all my phone conversations with the kidnappers', he claimed. Fearing that his visitor might launch a complaint with his superiors if he did not oblige, Mirza promised that he would send some of his men to the house to look into the matter.

This banal interaction is revealing of the self-representation of a section of the city's economic elite as auxiliaries of the public police, as well as of the practical sense that they had developed in the course of their law enforcement missions—a form of reasoning forged through and for action (Bourdieu, 1977). The nursery of these amateur detectives was the Citizens-Police Liaison Committee (CPLC), an organization launched in 1990 by a group of Karachi-based businessmen and philanthropists, with the aim of improving police performance and restoring public order in Pakistan's major business hub at a time when the city struggled with chronic political turmoil, sectarian violence and street crime. This article focuses on the trajectory of this 'twilight institution' caught in an ambiguous process of 'being and opposing the state' (Lund, 2006). Over time, CPLC members developed unique databases as well as analytical and operational skills, which were recognized as a form of expertise by law enforcement agencies and contributed to the entrenchment of the organization, its resources and its personnel into the security state. The CPLC's motto—'Let's beat crime together'—epitomized its subscription to public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the field of policing, although the relations between these partners against crime remained mired in mistrust.

This case study of the CPLC provides us with an opportunity to revisit Marx's (1993) argument on crime as a driving force of capitalism, inspiring new technologies of control and their constant updating. In this light, we ask the following question: what have been the 'productive effects' of crime, and more generally of urban turmoil, for Karachi's industrial capitalism and its politics of order? We argue that one such key effect was the rise of a *corporate mobilization for security*, which we define tentatively as a form of collective action organized on a sustained basis by entrepreneurs for the protection of their lives, properties and economic activities, with or without the collaboration of professional law enforcement agencies. As exemplified by the trajectory of the CPLC, such mobilizations make a deep imprint on their urban environment by contributing to the emergence of a 'controlled city' in which the forces of capital and the security apparatus coalesce to produce a new regime of citizenship, where the latter is no longer granted by right but by permit (Marcuse, 2006: 923). We argue that a key mechanism shaping this new urban form is the emergence of risk-oriented policing—a contested terrain of intervention where corporate interests, management techniques and worldviews intermesh but also occasionally clash with the security state's own take on 'risk' discourse. By engaging with the growing body of work on the new military urbanism (Graham, 2010) through the lens of the risk-theory literature

on policing (Ericson, 1994; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997), we explore how this tensile relationship between capital and coercion reshapes urban citizenship under a new regime of securitization.

While the government of Karachi's populations has been extensively remodeled by such projects of securitization over the past decades, courtesy of successive 'clean-up operations' against crime and terrorism, these developments have been studied primarily in the context of residential enclaves (Graham and Kaker, 2014; Kaker, 2014), recreational compounds (Anwar and Viqar, 2014) and unplanned settlements designated by the security state as potential threats to the orderly city (Anwar, 2013). By contrast, the militarization of urban space and the new technologies of control which have emerged in territories earmarked for industrial activity have remained neglected—with the consequence that emerging combinations between capital and coercion in these economic clusters, as well as their peculiar instantiation of the urban, have gone virtually unnoticed. As the case of the CPLC illustrates, while corporate mobilizations for security partake in the new military urbanism, they have their own idiosyncrasies, being imbued with businessmen's specific perceptions of risk and their attendant risk-management techniques. Contrary to Ericson and Haggerty's assertion (1997), we also argue that the increased surveillance of populations does not make coercion redundant.

Our argument draws on press records, personal observations and interviews with CPLC members, backers and observers. These interviews were carried out by the authors in Karachi between 2016 and 2018, some of them jointly and others individually. They focused primarily on the sociogenesis of the CPLC, an organization which despite its universalistic claims has been embedded into the city's so-called business community since its origins and which, as a result, has been giving voice to this fearful elite's urban malaise. By and large, CPLC members were cooperative with us and felt confident enough to discuss their policing activities in detail, including their most sensitive aspects—such as their complicity in extrajudicial killings. The conviction of these businessmen that they are within their rights—even when they violate the law to enforce their own brand of order—as well as the sense of impunity provided by state patronage, certainly contributed to this confidence. Significantly, all the interviews with CPLC members (whose names have been changed throughout this article) were taped with the knowledge and approval of our respondents, who were guaranteed anonymity despite the fact that they rarely requested it. During successive field trips, we also engaged with law enforcement officials, industrialists and residents of Karachi's 'labor colonies' affected by various CPLC projects. These discussions shed light on the chains of interdependence inscribing the CPLC into a citywide security apparatus transcending the public/private divide without abolishing it altogether.

This article is divided into four further sections. We first review the relevant literature on the relationship between the business sector and policing bodies, and show that the notion of 'corporate mobilization for security' is a useful analytical contribution to this field of study. In the following two sections, we turn to the case of the CPLC. We begin by exploring the imprint of risk-oriented policing on this 'twilight institution', as well as its contribution to law enforcement and to the public management of security in Karachi more generally. We then argue that, starting in 2013, the CPLC has also played a key role in transforming the governance of the city's industrial areas. Interlocking with businessmen's concern for the defense of industrial order, risk discourse fostered an exclusionary form of urban citizenship that denied factory workers the right to free mobility and exposed them to both state and corporate violence. We conclude with some remarks about the coexistence of this risk-oriented approach toward urban security with a more coercive enforcement of the dominant economic and political order, both within and outside the confines of the law.

Corporate mobilizations for security, risk management and the struggle for the city

Rather than focusing on in-house or contract-based forms of corporate security, which provide individual firms with customized forms of protection, we are mainly concerned here with corporate mobilizations for security, which we tentatively defined above as sustained collective action on the part of entrepreneurs for the protection of their lives and economic assets, with or without the collaboration of the state. While it has become commonplace among scholars of policing to emphasize the contribution of 'commercial bodies' to its pluralization over the past few decades (Jones and Newburn, 2006: 1), this literature tends to reduce this phenomenon to the global expansion of the private security industry or to the channeling of financial resources by entrepreneurs to security providers (Shaw, 2002: 34; Williams, 2016: 134–36). This frame of reference misses the possibility that businessmen could become directly involved in law enforcement missions and infuse them with a distinctly corporate outlook. In other words, the corporate world may act not only as a 'provider' of security through its economic resources, but also as 'auspices' that 'explicitly and self-consciously take upon themselves the responsibility for organizing their own protection' (Bayley and Shearing, 2001: 3).

These mobilizations take the form of potentially long-lasting projects, which often involve the recruitment of 'violent entrepreneurs' (Volkov, 2002) but also tend to entail the creation of perennial structures promoting cooperation with the police and the development of new security technologies. The CPLC is not unique in this regard. Over the past decades, similar business-led policing initiatives have sprung up in cities affected by chronic violence. This has been the case in particular in the industrial centers of Mexico. Prominent businesspeople in Guadalajara actively partook in crime-fighting missions on the ground (Martinez Trujillo, 2019), and industrialists in Monterrey developed innovative technologies of crowdsourcing for order maintenance (Conger, 2014; Ley and Guzmán, 2017). However, the handful of works devoted to these initiatives have yet to engage with their distinctly corporate character. To the extent that the economic elite participates in their formation and operation, the numerous business improvement districts established in cities around the world since the late 1980s would also gain from being analyzed as corporate mobilizations for security. Studies of such projects systematically emphasize their promotion of business interests and their contribution to the neoliberalization of urban space (Ruteere and Pommerolle, 2003; Miraftab, 2007; Didier *et al.*, 2013). In this case as well, however, the imprint of corporate dispositions and threat-reducing strategies on security initiatives has received scant attention. By the same token, the retroactive effects of security work and technologies on corporate practices have been lost to these various strands of scholarship. For its part, the fast-expanding literature on urban securitization has yet to take notice of these corporate contributions to the new military urbanism. This is all the more regrettable given that, as our case study illustrates, such corporate mobilizations against crime have been inspiring spatial arrangements, surveillance technologies and legal conventions profoundly transforming contemporary security architectures and urban citizenship—in particular by challenging the rights to anonymity and mobility that have been the cornerstone of the modern urban experiment.

We contend that risk discourse and risk-management technologies are central features of contemporary corporate mobilizations for security. As mentioned in the introduction, we analyze the trajectory of the CPLC in light of Ericson and Haggerty's (1997) seminal work on the influence of risk discourse on policing practices in the 'risk society' (Beck, 1992). From their point of view, this discourse proceeds through an 'institutional construction of knowledge' that rests on 'representational frameworks' such as 'classifications and categories that stand for objects, events, processes, and states of affairs in the world' (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 83). Risk discourse, then, 'is socially organized through the institutional defining of dangers and devising of

technologies of inscription to deal with those dangers' (*ibid.*: 85). Scholarship dealing explicitly with the impact of risk discourse on urban security arrangements remains scarce and restricted to Western countries' reaction to perceived terrorist threats (Coaffee, 2003). Studies of the urban global South tend to focus on the proliferation of risks and analyze 'social risk positions' (Beck, 1992: 23) rather than risk discourse and technologies per se (in the case of Karachi, see Anwar *et al.*, 2020). In this article we attempt to fill this gap. We argue that the CPLC played an important role in promoting risk discourse in Karachi and that, as a result, the specific dangers identified and the technologies developed not only reflected the fears of local industrialists but also bore the imprint of industrial firms' risk-management practices. Our case study thus suggests that the corporate sector does not necessarily transfer its risk concerns to the police (by requesting 'character certificates' for prospective employees, for instance), as argued by Ericson and Haggerty (1997), but that it may give shape to its own security-oriented institutions, which in turn reshape urban environments.

Corporate solutions for police inaction: The CPLC's risk-oriented policing

At the time of the creation of Pakistan, in 1947, the port city of Karachi remained a trading center with little industry. The first large-scale manufacturing unit, the Dalmia Cement Factory, opened in 1925 and long remained the only one of its kind (Ahmed, 1994: 1). The industrialization of the city picked up during the so-called decade of development (1958–68), which saw mercantile groups freshly emigrated from India make a shift from the cotton trade to the textile industry and then to other sectors (banking, insurance, etc.). While this entrepreneurial class remained little organized during the first decades of the industrialization process, the socialist-inspired reforms and the social conflicts that characterized the years in power of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971–77) brought it together as a 'class for itself'. The most prominent business families were hard hit by Bhutto's nationalization program, and those industrialists or large-scale merchants who strove to maintain their business ventures in Pakistan started investing more time and resources in collective action, through professional associations and the local chamber of commerce and industry (Kochanek, 1983). When the security situation started deteriorating across the city from the late 1980s onward, this entrepreneurial class could thus rely on a growing realization of its common interests, as well as on strong structures of mobilization. However, this business coalition, bringing together merchant and industrial capital, was never as influential as when it articulated its corporate interests in the language of 'citizenship'—even as it weaponized this category and emptied it from its universalist signification to collapse it into a risk discourse pitting law-abiding citizens against dangerous classes and illegal aliens.

The original mandate of the CPLC, as projected by members of the organization and the largely supportive media, consisted in attending to the grievances of 'harassed citizens' bearing the brunt of police apathy, high-handedness and corruption (Mustafa, 1995). Since its creation in 1990, the organization has had a distinctly elite membership and it primarily recruits among the mercantile groups (Memons and Gujarati 'trading castes' more generally) which have provided the bulk of the city's prominent merchants and mid-scale to large-scale factory owners (Papanek, 1974). By 1995, the 50 members of the organization were all businessmen and industrialists (Aziz, 1996). More specifically, all the key positions in the organization were occupied by petty industrialists—a group of factory owners at the head of a couple of production units at the most—based in the Sindh Industrial Trading Estate (SITE), Karachi's largest and oldest industrial area, located in the city's western outskirts.[3] Using the language

3 While the first CPLC chief, Nazim Haji, owned a company manufacturing plastic boxes and was at the time the chairman of the SITE Association of Industry, the CPLC joint chief, Jameel Yusuf, owned a small textile factory. The main architect of the organization's communication system and databases, Umar Siddiqui*, also owned a factory in Karachi's oldest trading estate, which manufactured guar gum.

of citizenship and constitutional rights, this intermediate elite articulated a critique of police inaction that was infused by a strong sense of alienation from the state as much as by a growing urban malaise. And despite this elite's framing of their critique in the universalistic and legalistic language of 'responsible citizenship' (Johnston, 1992: 137), the instruments that these industrialists developed to translate it into practice drew heavily on their corporate experience and know-how.

– Managing the police as a risk: The CPLC's mission to curtail police discretion

From the CPLC's inception, both the organization and its state sponsors adhered to a key feature of risk society: the conception of law enforcers themselves as a suspect population, prone to compromising the management of risk objects through their discretion and/or corruption, a situation which requires 'polic[ing] the police' by 'turn[ing] surveillance back on itself' (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 56). In the context of an increasingly polarized city torn apart by ethnic and sectarian rivalries, the active citizenship of CPLC members aimed to 'depoliticize' the police and revive its public service mission. For these petty industrialists seeing themselves as deserving taxpayers, the conditions in which the Karachi police exercised its discretion when registering complaints epitomized its 'politicization'—that is, its inclination to behave as an agent of political influence oblivious to the plight of 'ordinary citizens'. This perception was reinforced by the attempts of the political parties battling for supremacy in Karachi—the social-democratic Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) representing Urdu-speaking immigrants of Indian origin (Mohajirs)—to control police recruitment and postings. In addition to alleged collusions between the police and the criminal groups that emerged in the city in the wake of the Afghan Jihad (1979–89), these factors contributed to the dilution of police authority into a 'provisional' form through its constant constraining and compromising by unofficial power networks (Jauregui, 2016).

In order to revive the public service mission of the local police, CPLC members proceeded to curtail its discretion. The support of the then governor of Sindh, Fakhruddin Ebrahim, was decisive in this regard. As a representative of federal executive power in the province, the governor was perceived to be above the political melee. Moreover, as a retired Supreme Court judge, he was receptive to the 'depoliticization' agenda of the CPLC. Ebrahim offered to house the CPLC's headquarters on the premises of the Governor's House and was instrumental in the legalization of this hybrid institution. Under his mandate, the CPLC was provided a legal cover through an amendment to the police rules inherited from the colonial state. To this day, amended rule 1.21 of the Police Rules 1934 provides a variety of powers to the CPLC, such as collecting statistics on criminal cases, ensuring that first information reports (FIRs)[4] are duly registered, and finding out whether the police use 'dilatory tactics' during investigations or unlawfully detain a suspect. In addition, the status of 'justice of peace' granted to CPLC members arms them with judicial powers[5] and entitles them to overrule police decisions that they believe to be illegal.

This legal framework establishes the organization as a quintessential 'twilight institution' (Lund, 2006) in two ways. First, as citizens holding judicial powers, CPLC members exercise public authority at the juncture between state and society, thus blurring the boundary between the two. Second, and more importantly, the CPLC's

4 The FIR is an official document prepared by the police after receiving information about a cognizable offence—that is, a serious crime, such as murder, rape or theft, for which the police can make arrests without a warrant. It is the starting point of any investigation and on its basis charges may be brought against a suspect.

5 A legacy of the colonial period, the status of justice of peace may be conferred to 'prominent citizens' who then represent the state in a certain area (especially in remote regions with a limited presence of public institutions). These functions have been characterized as 'quasi-judicial' by the Supreme Court and are specified by article 22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (1898). They include the power to issue and verify identity documents, to make arrests and to request the support of any police officer on duty in the area.

legal framework makes explicit its 'gentle subversive purpose' (Lund, 2006: 687) of helping the police serve its functions while curtailing its discretion—in other words, of strengthening the state while challenging its authority. This tensile relationship, whereby non-state policing actors seek to assist the police while decrying both its inaction and malpractices, brings the CPLC under the ambit of what Tessa Diphoorn, following Lund, theorized as 'twilight policing': 'policing practices that … emerge from a dual process of collaboration and competition between state and nonstate bodies' (Diphoorn, 2015: 22). In the face of such hybrid security formations, we share Diphoorn's concern with the study of concrete practices rather than disembodied institutional logics (Diphoorn, 2015: 69–76). In the South African context that she studied, Diphoorn shows how social ties determine interactions between private security agents and police officers, ties which may be characterized by friendship or enmity. However, the CPLC's perception of police officers as risk objects to be controlled points to a different mode of interaction, which is mediated through technologies. And while these technologies do not erase interpersonal logics altogether, they do constrain them.

– The CPLC's adoption of risk-management technologies

From its inception, the CPLC avoided a head-on collision with the police. Instead, one of its first initiatives was to renovate derelict police stations in order to earn the confidence of police officers (Russo, 2017: 28). This trust relationship was reinforced by joint operations between the CPLC and law enforcement agencies on the ground, as well as by the gradual transformation of CPLC members into 'knowledge workers' who challenge the police into action through their rhetoric and technologies of risk management.

For the proponents of risk theory applied to the field of policing, police officers would be first and foremost 'knowledge brokers, expert advisors and security managers to other institutions', who 'produce and distribute knowledge for the risk management activities of security operatives in other institutions' (Ericson, 1994: 151). Corporate actors—including insurance companies, industries and certification firms—have been an integral part of this apparatus. Their respective instruments, standard operating procedures and professional operatives—what Ericson refers to as their 'expert systems'—shape the kind of knowledge provided by the police. In return, the police produce their own classifications and, as Manning (1988) suggests in his ethnography of 911 operators in the United States, the public police institution would amount to a 'coding system' ordering disorder through patterns orienting both action and organization. As a result of these interactions, 'the rationalities of risk and security from other institutions become part of the work of the police institution and vice versa' (Ericson, 1994: 154; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 17–18).

The rationalities of risk and security that form the CPLC's 'expert system' are infused with industrialists' experience of the city. As violent crime, ethnic clashes and political rivalries escalated across the city in the wake of the Afghan Jihad (Gayer, 2014), traffic disorders and the 'quiet encroachment of the ordinary' (Bayat, 2010) by the working poor became a source of growing anxiety among businessmen. The fear of crime that developed among Karachi's industrialists from the 1990s onward was fueled by their commuting routines between the residential areas of South Karachi and the industrial peripheries, which meant confronting dense traffic and driving through notoriously volatile neighborhoods. This fear took its roots in a peculiar 'phenomenology of density'—a cognitive and sensory engagement with the city as a disorderly and congested space, where the ordering presumptions of infrastructure and urban planning are constantly being put to the test and disrupted by the interventions of the multitude (Rao, 2007). Besides a feeling of alienation from an increasingly insensitive and predatory state, it is this malaise in mobility that prompted a section of Karachi's industrialists to organize collectively for their security, and which explains the focus of

the CPLC on the prevention and repression of crimes related to vehicular mobility and road insecurity. Specifically, the CPLC focused its efforts on two activities which became its trademark: anti-kidnapping operations and car-theft prevention.

Maqbool Karim*, who was instrumental in developing the CPLC's expertise in anti-kidnapping operations, recalls how during the early 1990s he started categorizing groups of kidnappers according to their threat level in order to deduce predictable patterns:

> I had the whole data [on kidnapping gangs]. And then I gave them colors, pink, blue, brown, red … Green, for mild, short-term ones. Blue, for fine, not very mild but mild ones. Red was for the ones who were really hard-core, you know … [Those] who take the risk of everything. And then the patterns started falling in place.[6]

We mentioned in the introduction CPLC members' obsession with data gathering, in the context of a complainant who systematically recorded his phone conversations with alleged kidnappers in order to provide this evidence to the police. Such methods extend well beyond the fight against kidnapping gangs, however, and aim to quantify other types of crime. Hence, Akbar Shahid*, who was in charge of the prevention of car theft at the CPLC until 2013, identified the recurrent features of this type of crime, from the peak hours of occurrence (at midday and around midnight) to the favorite vehicles of car thieves, both make-wise (Suzuki having a clear lead) and color-wise (thieves having a predilection for white cars).[7] The knowledge accumulated by the organization relied on its data-collection activities.

A significant portion of these data was extracted from FIRs provided by the police, such that the CPLC possesses a database of all criminal cases registered in the city since 1987. However, contrary to Ericson and Haggerty's (1997: 30) model—where the relations between the public police and their private partners tend to be structurally imbalanced to the benefit of the former—this exchange of information has conferred a strategic advantage to the CPLC, as the Sindh police only started digitalizing criminal records in 2015 and, to date, have no backlog extending further than this. All the records related to earlier cases remain handwritten and must be consulted manually, with no possibility of cross-checking. In addition to the CPLC's criminal records, the organization manages the most extensive and comprehensive data sets related to crime in the city, including a database of all convicted and under-trial inmates of Sindh's jails since 2009, and records of vehicles and cellphones stolen in Karachi since 1990.

The CPLC's data sets and its exclusive access to this sensitive information constitute a form of 'informational capital' (Amicelle, 2019) that allows the organization to act and speak with authority in the field of security. This public authority is actualized through various forms of collaboration at every stage of crime-busting operations: the CPLC is not only consulted during the preparation of many raids but is often requested to depute some of its technical staff during these operations. Besides its specific informational capital, the organization's appeal for many police officers lies in its distinct corporate flavor, which far from being a liability is regarded as a guarantee of professionalism. Thus, according to a former SSP for District Central, 'The CPLC is very well organized because it's a smaller organization. The police is a very big organization. So coming up, I mean finding records, for them [CPLC staff], is much much easier because they have people, they have hired very professional people, especially from the computer side'.[8]

6 Interview with Maqbool Karim*, former CPLC chief, Karachi, July 2016.
7 Interview with Akbar Shahid*, Karachi, August 2016.
8 Interview with Ahmed Sheikh*, former SSP for District Central, Karachi, August 2016.

Yet the CPLC's contribution to law enforcement goes beyond such technical assistance. More fundamentally, it has promoted a new culture of risk-oriented policing, particularly through its expertise in crime mapping and spatial analysis using GIS tools. This expertise, which developed in collaboration with foreign experts mandated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), allowed CPLC members to visualize the crime statistics extracted from FIRs and to distribute them across urban space. The maps and graphs prepared by the organization have been widely circulated among the police and in the local media, and they soon became 'prominent signifiers of the unruly city' by singling out certain neighborhoods and populations as threats to economic, moral and political order (Anwar, 2015). While allowing various publics to visualize the unruly city, these data and cartographic exercises served to promote the concept of proactive policing among law enforcement agencies. As is emphasized on the CPLC website, this knowledge has allowed the organization to develop crime patterns and to prepare 'comprehensive reports enabling stakeholders to take proactive measures'. And indeed, the same District Central police officer asserted that he carefully studies the daily crime reports sent to him by the CPLC and deploys his troops accordingly.[9] Such ideas about proactive policing reveal a self-conscious rethinking of security in terms of risks.

Beyond GIS mapping and its use by the police, the CPLC has attempted to teach risk management to Karachi's residents. As a page from an official brochure shows, it enjoined citizens to anticipate potential house robberies by listing their 'possessions' and even provided a ready-made form to that end (see Figure 1). Interestingly, the form is intended to be sent to the police in case of a robbery, which makes the CPLC a quintessential 'risk institution' shaping the forms of knowledge to be transferred to the public police.

Within the CPLC, the main promoter of risk thinking has been Umar Siddiqui*, a factory owner in his mid-40s who, as the head of the organization's IT department, has been developing its communication system, data-storage facilities and crime spatial analysis since the 1990s. Siddiqui acquainted himself with risk management in his corporate environment. As the owner of a guar gum factory in a joint venture with an American company, he has been regularly updating his technical and management skills for a business environment that he characterizes as increasingly complex. In order to update his company's computer system, he started taking courses in computer networking and software development, and in the process developed a keen interest in information technologies. He also started taking courses in risk management to meet the requirements of his American partners and customers in matters of food safety. In turn, this self-conscious sensibility to risks—which rests on the conviction that uncertainty can be reduced when organized into manageable objects (Power, 2007)—has infused his approach to crime control:

> Risk management teaches you how to quantify and mitigate each risk. Risk is equal to severity multiplied by probability. Then you take out each hazard. For instance, if you are on a road of Karachi, what is the probability, on a scale from zero to three [*sic*], that you're going to get robbed [of] your cell phone? And in case you do, what is the severity on a scale of one to three? … That is how you do law enforcement.[10]

Working as a security consultant in parallel with his main professional activity, Siddiqui has been putting this knowledge into practice by conducting risk assessments and physical surveys for schools and places of worship under threat from suicide bombers.

9 Interview with Ahmed Sheikh*, former SSP for District Central, Karachi, July 2019.
10 Interview with Umar Siddiqui*, head of the CPLC's IT department, Karachi, August 2018.



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Mark your possessions with your postcode

CITIZENS-POLICE LIAISON COMMITTEE
BEAT CRIME
SINDH GOVERNOR'S SECRETARIAT

followed by your house/flat number (or first two letters of house/ flat 'name'), and record the details on this card.

Complete the details for all of your possessions. If They are stolen or lost, it will help the police identify and recover them.

LOCAL POLICE Tel. #

Item	Make Description	Serial No.	Value	Position of 'Mark'
Video & tapes				
Home computer equipment				
Hi-Fi/Stereo				
Television				
Radio/s				
Camera & equipment				
Watches & clocks				
Antiques with photographs				
Jewelry with photographs				
Other valuables				
Kitchen electrical				
Kitchen electrical				

THE CITIZENS-POLICE LIAISON COMMITTEE (021)111-222-345

FIGURE 1 Form distributed in 1999 by the CPLC in anticipation of house robberies (photo by Sophie Russo)

Law enforcement officers acknowledge his expertise and believe that it has strengthened the operational capacities of both the police and the army's intelligence agencies.[11] This recognition indicates that, in Karachi, even relative proficiency in risk management is

11 Interview with a former SSP intelligence officer at the Department of Counter Terrorism of the Sindh police, Karachi, August 2018.

an efficient way of 'securitizing capital'—that is, of acquiring symbolic capital in the field of security through the combination of various other resources (Diphoorn and Grassiani, 2016: 435).

The CPLC thus displays another key feature of risk society as described by Ericson and Haggerty: 'a belief that the latest technologies will buy security: obtaining these technologies is seen as the "obvious", "natural" and "progressive" thing to do' (1997: 58). The recent adoption of biometrics as the preferred mode of identification by the CPLC indicates a further step in its adoption of the risk society's prime technological tools (Ceyhan, 2008)—a move that is again motivated by the members' distrust in the police and official databases. Thus, according to Umar Siddiqui, '80 to 90 percent of the people arrested don't have their CNIC [computerized national identity card] on them and the police don't bother to get it. Besides, convicted criminals are often sent to jail under a false identity, even if the CRO [Criminal Record Office] is supposed to collect fingerprints and check the identity details of every arrested person.' To remedy this situation, the CPLC installed an office in Karachi's Central Jail, where it collects prisoners' biometric data. Since 2000, the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) has been managing a registry of all the national citizens of Pakistan. If this public database plays a growing role in Pakistan's surveillance systems—both public and private[12]—Siddiqui considers it unreliable, as reports of fraud and corruption have tarnished the reputation of this institution meant to be the cornerstone of Pakistan's new surveillance society (Arqam, 2017). In other words, the uncertainties that mired the deployment of such technologies of surveillance and control, as well as the disorderly production of the legalistic regime of citizenship that accompanied them (Anwar, 2013: 416), have generated new anxieties among industrialists. In the eyes of CPLC members, this new regime of securitized citizenship thus sustained its own share of risks to be managed.

Siddiqui's fetishization of biometric data is rooted in the conviction largely shared in Pakistan, well beyond its economic elites, that the state is a fraudster producing fakes on a mass scale (Gayer and Kirmani, 2020). For Siddiqui, with its promise of 'governance through knowledge' (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 13), biometrics offers a solution to this dilemma: 'To me, you are just a binary number,' he says.[13] What he means is that biometric data revolutionize identification processes by making redundant a person's name—with all the possibilities of falsification inherent to it. For whom and for what purposes this system works, however, is a matter of controversy. It is to this ambiguity of the CPLC's truth-making devices that we turn in the next section.

The repurposing of CPLC expertise for the defense of industrial order

Bawani Chali is one of the many 'labor colonies' that grew organically around the factories of SITE in the course of industrial expansion and labor migrations during the 1960s. Its population is almost exclusively Pashtun, with the bulk of its residents tracing their roots to the Swat Valley in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A large chunk of the population remains employed in local industries, although a number of residents have shifted to trade and services by opening small shops or 'hotels' (popular restaurants). This locality borders SITE's industrial area and, according to local industrialists, was until recently a major 'crime den' providing sanctuary to gangs of 'snatchers', extortionists and kidnappers. In 2014, in response to this perceived threat, the SITE Association of Industry built a series of boundary walls restricting traffic between this settlement and industrial areas to pedestrians (in order to deter motorized criminals) or preventing it altogether. These boundary walls sometimes

12 Through its Verisys program, NADRA provides the financial sector with the possibility—against a fee—to verify CNIC data. In contrast, the consultation of CPLC databases is entirely free.

13 Interview with Umar Siddiqui*, Karachi, August 2018.

FIGURE 2 A boundary wall between the SITE industrial area and the working-class locality of Bawani Chali (photo by Laurent Gayer, 2016)

double as advertising space, with local industrialists hoping to partly cover the cost of their security system through its commercialization (see figure 2). At the few walls allowing pedestrian traffic, residents on their way to the industrial area must submit to security checks by the Rangers Security Guards (RSG), a 'private' security company registered by the paramilitary force of the Sindh Rangers in 2012. At the gates of these checkpoints, heavily armed RSG personnel randomly request CNICs. Although these are technically 'private' guards, residents of Bawani Chali and adjoining neighborhoods do not distinguish between them and the Rangers, who officially come under the authority of the Federal Interior Ministry but who are commanded by senior officers of the army (Gayer, 2010). The Rangers were called in at the end of the 1980s to help the police restore order in the city and, since then, have seen their workforce increase continuously, in parallel with their policing powers (Waseem, 2019). Since 2013, the Rangers have been leading anti-crime and anti-terrorism operations, through which they have strengthened their relationship with the local business community.

This recruitment of the Rangers for the protection of industrialists has reinforced the conviction of Bawani Chali's residents that public security has been turned into a commodity no longer accessible to them. As the union nazim (local representative) of Bawani Chali complained to us, 'He who pays the piper calls the tune' (*Jab aap kisi ko deta ho to woh aap ka hi manenge*).[14] While recent literature on the pluralization of policing, particularly in anthropology, tends to insist on the blurring effects of security arrangements (Diphoorn and Grassiani, 2019), the security system set up by SITE industrialists seems to have had the opposite effect for surrounding populations. From the perspective of those put under surveillance, this mixed economy of protection does not so much obscure the identity of security providers and their motivations as it

14 Interview with Akbar Shah Hashmi, Union Council (UC) *nazim* Bawani Chali, Karachi, August 2018.

clarifies power relations, particularly the coercive nexus between industrial elites and the security state.

– Corporate security and the control of working-class circulations

The SITE Self-Security System, which local industrialists refer to colloquially as the 'double S, double S', was developed in 2013–14 by the SITE Association of Industry in collaboration with the CPLC and the Rangers. This project sits at the intersection of two mutually reinforcing dynamics: the repurposing of CPLC expertise for the defense of industrial order, and the consolidation of a new military urbanism in the city over the course of the so-called Karachi operation launched in 2013. Through the 'double S, double S', local industrialists resorted to building and patrolling a cordon sanitaire to insulate productive spaces from the 'malign circulations' (Graham, 2012: 141) originating from surrounding labor colonies. Between 2013 and 2014, 16 boundary walls and 25 *chowki*s (checkposts) were built across the estate, while 143 CCTV cameras were installed on its main arteries and are currently being monitored by a joint team of Rangers and police officials at the control room installed in the premises of the SITE Association.

This redesigning of SITE's security architecture relied heavily on the CPLC's skills, data and technical experts. Using crime statistics produced by the organization, Umar Siddiqui prepared maps pinpointing crime 'hot spots' in the area, where he recommended that *chowki*s or boundary walls be built to prevent the entry of vehicles and pedestrians from working-class localities into industrial areas. This mapping exercise, which relied on the visualization and spatial distribution of risks across the area, was seen by local industrialists involved in the project as bringing 'legibility' (Lynch, 1960) to a threatening, unpredictable world with which industrialists remained unfamiliar despite its physical proximity. Indeed, these industrialists' sense of geography has been overdetermined by logics of production and their personal mobility across industrial space, which has led them to reject working-class localities outside the boundaries of the mental maps. Eijaz Ahmed*, the head of the SITE Association's subcommittee on law and order and an active member of the CPLC, explains:

> Maps are really important because there are lots of areas in SITE that we don't know by name. So if the map is in front of us, we can just pinpoint that area. For example, Pathan Colony is situated just behind Liberty Mill and Al Abid Mill. Without maps we don't have any idea where Pathan Colony is, [we do not know how far] its jurisdiction extends, from Liberty Mills till where.[15]

This mapping exercise set the foundations for the security architecture developed later on under the aegis of the CPLC, which formalized the boundaries between productive spaces and working-class residential areas while enforcing a strict control of traffic flows between them. Consistent with Graham's (2000) argument on the new military urbanism, this architecture specifically restricts the freedom of movement of the individuals considered security threats. Attempts at establishing domination through the control of circulations have characterized Karachi's urban planning since the early 1950s (Daechsel, 2011: 147). The specificity of the 'double S, double S' was that it mobilized simultaneously the resources of the state, the private sector and security actors with hybrid status—citizens with policing powers, and violent entrepreneurs with one foot in law enforcement and the other in private security—to enforce industrial order and contain the disruptive circulations of the poor. At first glance, this coercive architecture primarily seems to serve a corporate project of 'moving power' (Virilio, [1977] 2006), as it realizes the domination of industrial elites by reserving to them

15 Interview with Eijaz Ahmed*, head of the SITE Association's subcommittee on law and order, Karachi, July 2016.

the right to move freely while controlling the movements of the working classes. This power over movement and its pace singles out the dreaded figure of the motorized criminal striking suddenly before vanishing into the flow of traffic or the maze of *katchi abadi*s (informal settlements). Thus, the turnstiles installed at each gate to filter the flows of traffic between SITE and adjacent labor colonies directly target young men on motorcycles, whose mobility and velocity feeds the anxiety of the propertied classes. The violence of this 'moving power' did not escape the notice of residents of surrounding working-class neighborhoods. In their view, these walls are above all a 'calamity' (*taklif*) because they deprive the residents of these impoverished localities of their right to speed, lengthening daily trips to and from work and endangering the sick and the injured in need of emergency care.[16]

While addressing corporate fears through the 'extension of military ideas of tracking, identification and targeting into the quotidian spaces and circulations of everyday life'—a process deemed integral to the new military urbanism (Graham, 2010: 11)—the 'double S, double S' departs from Graham's template in significant ways. In the opposite direction, this coproduction of (in)security also induces the appropriation by (para)military forces of security hardware and surveillance technologies that were both financed and developed by corporate actors. Thus, the 'double S, double S' provided the Rangers with new monitoring tools of traffic flows in a strategic area, through the deployment of the RSG across the estate and the presence of several paramilitary soldiers at the Site Association control room. And, as we will now see, this security architecture was the premise of a larger project which, in the name of corporate surveillance, extended the gaze of the state toward industrialists themselves.

– The compulsive profiling of the workforce

The 'double S, double S' was only a first set of interventions toward the securitization of the SITE industrial area. It is currently being supplemented by new forms of knowledge production and risk management specifically oriented toward the profiling and surveillance of the workforce. Umar Siddiqui and Eijaz Ahmed are currently trying to generalize the labor-screening process by registering every person employed in SITE on a new database containing their personal details and biometric data (10-finger fingerprints). This repurposing of the CPLC's resources for a distinctly corporate project of surveillance resonates with a longer history of labor control in Karachi's estates, where a once militant workers' movement has been tamed by brutal episodes of state repression during the 1970s and 1980s and by labor informalization since the 1990s (Mallick, 2014; Ali, 2015). The profiling of factory workers finds historical antecedents in labor surveys conducted by some industrial firms as early as the 1960s (Raza, 1963: 69). Over the past decade or so it has been systematized in the larger firms. Such practices of profiling are multilayered. Since the 1980s, the casualization of labor has become widespread in all industries—including in the 'organized' sector. In a clear violation of labor laws, most employers resort to the so-called third party system of labor recruitment, through which recruiting agents (known locally as contractors, or *thekedar*s in Urdu) provide industries with cheap, casual workers who are not entitled to any form of social protection. Contractors will generally conduct their own investigation of job applicants by ensuring that they (and sometimes their relatives as well) have no criminal record and no links with political parties, religious groups or trade unions.[17] Within the largest groups, the 'admin' (the head of the administration department) or the security-in-charge will often conduct his own enquiry. Some of these corporate security professionals have past experience at the CPLC and may be inclined to use the organization's databases to check the criminal record of new applicants—following

16 Interview with Ahmad*, resident of Pathan Colony, Karachi, August 2018.
17 Interview with a contractor providing workers to several prominent firms in Korangi, Karachi, July 2016.

an official request which is generally granted.[18] This new data set will allow local industrialists to rationalize the profiling of job applicants and the workforce at large by cross-checking the information extracted at the workplace with the FIR and prison databases of the CPLC. In the course of time, this could allow the CPLC and industrial associations to prepare 'blacklists' available online to employers[19]—thus leading to the formalization of practices already in place in the city's estates, where corporate security professionals exchange information on troublesome workers to prevent them from gaining employment in another company after being fired for misconduct or pro-labor activism.

This profiling technology partakes in a 're-engineering of citizenship' characteristic of the new military urbanism. According to Graham, these policies, 'instead of legal or human rights and legal systems based on universal citizenship, … are founded on the profiling of individuals, places, behaviors, associations, and groups. Such practices assign these subjects risk categories based on their perceived association with violence, disruption or resistance against the dominant geographical orders sustaining global, neoliberal capitalism' (Graham, 2010: xv). The culture of risk management introduced by the CPLC in law enforcement is infused with the same logic, through its dedication to an ever more stringent profiling of those populations who, from the point of view of Karachi's fearful economic elites, constitute 'risk objects' (Power, 2007: 4) that ought to be kept under constant watch.

While sharing affinities with this global template of urban securitization, the CPLC's emerging project for industrial areas also carries forward its attempt to contain police discretion. CPLC members insist that the development of profiling technologies will merely increase the reliability of character certificates requested from any job applicant—which are issued by the district police office of the locality where the applicant resides—by adding a section that will be filled in by their organization. Again, this project is informed by the deep mistrust of local industrialists toward the state's emerging risk-management system, where NADRA and its attempts to reduce uncertainty through biometric identification play a central role. To a large extent, the CPLC's own profiling projects are a response to the uncertainties generated by the new surveillance bureaucracy.

This effort to rationalize the profiling of job applicants is not merely an attempt to put the old wine of labor control into the new bottle of digital surveillance. It also indicates a shift of local industrialists to forms of self-regulation characteristic of the risk society, which are fostered by the insertion of the most export-oriented firms into global chains of production and their own regulatory mechanisms. Thus, for Umar Siddiqui—who, we recall, owns a company partnering with an American firm—the process of 'value-adding to character certificates' should help firms like his conform to the US Customs Services' requirements for certification by the Customs and Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT), and in the process gain or retain access to the American market.

The new database currently being built by the CPLC in partnership with the SITE Association will also expand the web of surveillance to industrialists themselves by singling out factory owners engaging in illicit practices perceived to be at odds with the securitization agenda of the military. And while this was not the original intention of their architects, these private technologies of surveillance once again facilitate the extension of the state's gaze. Far from being a monopoly of the working poor, informality—for lack of a better word—has been a staple of Karachi's industrialists, particularly in the textile and garments sector. While the leniency of state authorities

18 Interview with a former CPLC employee, currently heading the security department of a prominent pharmaceutical firm based in Korangi, Karachi, July 2016.
19 Interview with Umar Siddiqui*, Karachi, August 2018.

has been essential to the reproduction of this ‘irregular capitalism’ (Gayer, 2019), the illegalities of the industrial sector have occasionally sparked tensions between the holders of industrial capital and law enforcers. The advent of a new citizenship regime in Pakistan in the course of the 2000s, partially displacing issues of belonging centered on religion with a more legalistic and exclusive definition of citizenship (Anwar, 2013), has been fertile ground for such friction. Indeed, the logic of profit maximization has sometimes worked against the imperative of securitization, especially regarding the security state’s concern with legibility and its collapsing of the category of the illegal alien—and, by extension, of the undocumented worker—into that of the terrorist (Anwar, 2013). This was made explicit during an interview with the director general of the Rangers, Major General Bilal Akbar, in 2016:

> There are two categories of labor: laborers with documents, and then there is a cheaper option—laborers without documents, such as Burmese, Bengalis, Afghans, Tajiks, Uzbeks … So we talked to people and said, ‘Don’t do this: I can provide you an outer perimeter of security. My force can patrol your streets, but criminals are working in your factories, you have to behave in a more responsible manner. Your margins of profit will go down but you will be more secure. I don’t want to get into a factory and at every corner there’s a terrorist who’s run away from Bajaur [a former ‘tribal area’ and a stronghold of the Pakistani Taliban] and working there. I don’t want to do that. You have to throw them out and we’ll cap … we’ll apprehend him’.[20]

However, while showing concern for certain corporate illegalities, the security state has turned a blind eye to others, such as systematic violations of labor laws and safety regulations (Human Rights Watch, 2019). This ‘differential administration of illegalities’ (Foucault, [1975] 1995: 272) is also manifest in the field of security, as CPLC members negotiated the formation of industrial enclaves regulated by extralegal violence.

– Corporate formations of violence and the new military urbanism

The security architecture built in the city’s estates during the past few years bears testimony to these negotiations. We saw earlier how obstacles to free circulation crystallized the hostility of the working classes toward the ‘double S, double S’ while epitomizing the employers’ moving power. These obstacles also played a decisive part in the formation of industrial ‘permissive spaces’ (Cooper-Knock, 2017) in the city’s estates. Barriers and palisades occupy a special place in the troubled history of Karachi. Since the 1990s, each anti-terrorist operation has been an opportunity for the state to reaffirm its sovereignty through performances of ‘legitimate’ violence, and this reconquest is systematically made visible through the dismantling of the fortifications and roadblocks obstructing circulation in contested neighborhoods. In the early days of Operation Clean-up (1992–94), which was meant to eradicate the politico-military apparatus of the MQM, the army opened Mohajir localities to traffic by tearing down the walls and gates erected by the party. More recently, the anti-terrorist operation launched in 2013 on orders of the Supreme Court and led by the Rangers involved the dismantling of the barriers installed at the entrance to the fiefdoms of the various groups fighting for control of the city. The application of this directive, theoretically covering any obstacle to movement installed by non-state actors, was left to the discretion of the paramilitaries. Determined to restore their road supremacy and to make the whole of Karachi an open city, where the authority of the state would no longer be undermined by the existence of ‘no-go areas’, the Rangers showed unprecedented impartiality by systematically razing the defenses of all criminal gangs and political parties (barriers, concrete blocks, gatehouses,

20 Interview with Major General Bilal Akbar, DG Rangers, Karachi, July 2016.

FIGURE 3 Main checkpost at the entrance to the CPLC neighborhood care project in Korangi's sector 24 (photo by Laurent Gayer, 2017)

sandbags, etc.). However, they were much more accommodating toward industrialists, who were allowed to derogate from the directives of the Supreme Court to control access to factories. In the industrial estate of Korangi, for instance, the Rangers authorized the CPLC to install barriers on the main axes as well as on the secondary roads of the sectors included in so-called neighborhood care projects. These securitized enclaves are under the surveillance of CPLC 'controllers' and their armed guards, who are being encouraged to shoot 'snatchers' and other suspected criminals on sight (see figure 3).

Habituation to extralegal methods of problem solving, impunity and a deep sense of entitlement overlap in these corporate formations of violence. This was made clear to us in 2016 during a conversation with Amir Jalal*, a building contractor overseeing various CPLC projects in the Korangi industrial area, who proudly showed us pictures of suspected thieves recently killed or maimed by 'his' guards, which he kept in his smartphone as war trophies.[21] Such performances of corporate violence are a legacy of the CPLC's attempts to 'fix' the failings of the judicial system through extrajudicial means. Its members' inclination toward rough justice developed over the course of anti-kidnapping operations that they conducted with the police and the army in the early 1990s and which, as we saw earlier, played a decisive role in the entrenchment of the organization in Karachi's security apparatus. During these raids, the leaders of kidnapping gangs were systematically shot dead so that they couldn't reveal the tricks used by the CPLC to track them down.[22] CPLC members also believed that the rights enshrined in the constitution and procedural laws had deviated from their primary purpose, to the extent that they ended up protecting criminals rather than law-abiding citizens. Human rights organizations could sermonize all they wanted about the necessity to respect 'due process'; in truth, justice was better served outside the

21 Interview with Amir Jalal*, a Korangi-based member of the CPLC, Karachi, July 2016.
22 Interview with a former CPLC member involved in these anti-kidnapping operations, Karachi, August 2016.

framework of the law.[23] This rejection of the liberal regime of rights and the aspiration to 'repair' it through violence is certainly not unique to Karachi's corporate actors. Similar trends have been observed over the past decades in cities of the global South troubled by the fear of crime, from within South Africa (Hornberger, 2013; Smith, 2015), Ghana (Tankebe, 2013), Brazil (Caldeira, 2001) and South Asia (Eckert, 2005; Belur, 2010; Jauregui, 2015; Tankebe and Asif, 2016).

Unlike most adversaries of the rights regime, however, Karachi's industrialists did not outsource their project of rough justice to the police or private vigilantes. After contributing to the normalization of police punitive work, they negotiated their own forms of extralegal punishment with law enforcement agencies as a contribution to the securitization of the city and its economy. The coexistence of this punitive project with a more risk-oriented approach toward security provides a denial to Ericson and Haggerty's assumption that, in risk societies, the logic of surveillance—understood as the production of knowledge on populations that is useful for governing them—would make coercion 'obsolete' (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 41).

Conclusion

It does not take only entrepreneurs organizing for self-defense to make a *corporate* mobilization for security. The trajectory of the CPLC and its 'expert system' invites us to elaborate further our initial definition. While industrialists have been overrepresented among CPLC members from the beginning, these amateur detectives projected themselves as concerned citizens determined to 'fix' a deficient police force and, more generally, a failing criminal justice system. While mobilizing the universalistic language of citizenship, they also promoted a conception of security as a common good. If this citizen group gradually took on a corporate character, it was primarily through its incorporation of technologies, skills and worldviews that were gaining prominence in local industrial firms at the time, particularly in the most export-oriented ones. The second movement of corporatization of the CPLC took place around 2013–14 and followed an opposite direction, with the expert system of the organization being repurposed toward the surveillance of factory workers and the defense of industrial order. This process was invigorated by Karachi's new urban militarism, with some sections of the security state encouraging industrialists to assist them by helping and self-regulating themselves. In this sense, the repurposing of the CPLC's resources for a full-blown, self-assumed corporate mobilization for security was partly a state-made project.

In line with Marx's argument on the 'productive effects' of crime for the development of capitalism's architecture of domination, the mobilization of Karachi's industrialists against police deficiencies and its embedding into a distinct form of military urbanism have led to a series of architectural, legal, coercive and informational innovations. These developments have significantly altered conceptions and practices of citizenship in Karachi by indexing residents on categories of risks. The dismantling of universal citizenship into a fragmented regime of risk management has created new insecurities for the city's alleged 'dangerous classes' as they attempt to live and work in Karachi. Denying the right to free motion of the working classes in order to control their 'malign circulations' has been key to the urban citizenship instantiated by this new military urbanism. The new urban arrangement has turned freedom of movement into a corporate privilege, proclaiming the domination of capital through an asymmetry of mobility. This enforcement of industrial order through the control of urban space and circulations resulted in the formation of industrial enclaves regulated by extralegal violence, including on the part of private guards recruited for the protection of industrial assets. The CPLC's overseeing of such public displays of corporate violence

23 Interview with a former chief of the CPLC, Karachi, August 2016.

demonstrates that the risk management of urban environments and their spaces of production, far from making the use of force redundant, may prove fertile ground for new arrangements of capital and coercion.

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