Service interruption on Monday 11 July from 12:30 to 13:00: all the sites of the CCSD (HAL, EpiSciences, SciencesConf, AureHAL) will be inaccessible (network hardware connection).
Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

A Signaling Theory of Nonmonetary Sanctions

Abstract : It is a widely accepted conclusion of the economic literature on optimal law enforcement that nonmonetary sanctions should be introduced only when fines have been used up to their maximum extent. In this paper it is shown that when the sanctioning policy conveys information about the harmfulness of the sanctioned behavior, the use of nonmonetary sanctions can be optimal even when the monetary fine is not maximal. The argument is formalized in a model with rational but uninformed individuals, who know that the enforcer has better information about the harmfulness of actions but are uncertain about the true objectives of the enforcer.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Spire Sciences Po Institutional Repository Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Monday, March 14, 2022 - 3:01:45 PM
Last modification on : Friday, March 25, 2022 - 3:32:12 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Wednesday, June 15, 2022 - 6:42:51 PM


Files produced by the author(s)




Massimo d'Antoni, Roberto Galbiati. A Signaling Theory of Nonmonetary Sanctions. International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, 2007, 27, pp.204 - 218. ⟨10.1016/j.irle.2007.06.008⟩. ⟨hal-03608095⟩



Record views


Files downloads