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Journal articles

Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets

Abstract : An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting - one share, one vote - and at-majority stable stock market equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at mostpercent of the shareholders. It is shown that a-majority stable stock market equilibrium exists ifwhereSis the number of states at the last date andJis the number of firms. Moreover, an example shows that-majority stable stock market equilibria need not exist for smaller’s.
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Submitted on : Friday, March 4, 2022 - 4:38:55 PM
Last modification on : Saturday, March 5, 2022 - 3:30:53 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-03598171, version 1
  • SCIENCESPO : 2441/10264

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Mich Tvede, Hervé Crès. Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets. Journal of Public Economic Theory, Wiley, 2005, 26 (4), pp.887 - 906. ⟨hal-03598171⟩

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