HAL will be down for maintenance from Friday, June 10 at 4pm through Monday, June 13 at 9am. More information
Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments: Theory and Evidence from Russia

Abstract : External shocks may cause a decline in the productivity of fixed capital in certain regions of an economy. Exogenous obstacles to migration make it hard for workers in those regions to reallocate to more prosperous regions. In addition, firms may devise “attachment” strategies to keep workers from moving out of a local labor market. When workers are compensated in kind, they find it difficult to raise the cash needed for migration. This endogenous obstacle to migration has not yet been considered in the literature. The article shows that the feasibility of attachment depends on the inherited structure of local labor markets: attachment can exist in equilibrium only if the labor market is sufficiently concentrated. Attachment is beneficial for both employers and employees but hurts the unemployed and the self-employed. An analysis of matched household-firm data from the Russian Federation corroborates the theory.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadata

https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03595529
Contributor : Spire Sciences Po Institutional Repository Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, March 3, 2022 - 11:13:41 AM
Last modification on : Friday, March 25, 2022 - 3:57:49 AM

File

world-bank-econ-rev-2005-frieb...
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

Collections

Citation

Guido Friebel, Sergei Guriev. Attaching Workers through In-Kind Payments: Theory and Evidence from Russia. World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press (OUP), 2005, 19 (2), pp.175 - 202. ⟨10.1093/WBER/LHI012⟩. ⟨hal-03595529⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

0

Files downloads

3