Trade, wages, and collective bargaining
Résumé
Collective bargaining modify the impact of exports
and imports on wages? In a seminal paper, Calmfors
and Driffill (1988) show that, in firms covered by firm‑level
wage agreements, wages are better linked to productivity
than in firms covered by industry‑level agreements.
Gürtzgen (2009) lends support to these predictions using
data for German manufacturing firms.
Our study looks at data from individual French
firms on wages, exports/imports and collective
bargaining over the period 2005‑2009. Our sample
comprises more than 8,000 firms (among the largest
French exporters/importers) which account for over
two thirds of French exports and imports of manufactured
goods. Using micro‑econometric techniques, we examine
two questions: (i) do exporting and offshoring lead to higher
wages and, if so, is the effect heterogeneous across
workers? (ii) to what extent does wage bargaining shape
the effect of trade on wages?
International trade favours exports but also creates opportunities
for offshoring. This
Rue de la Banque
studies the impact of firm-level
trade activities on wages, as well as the role of collective bargaining.
Both exports and offshoring have a positive impact on wages, but
exports increase wages for all occupational categories, while the
impact of an increase in offshoring is stronger for executives.
The elasticity of wages with respect to exports and offshoring is
positive and is higher for firms with collective bargaining. However,
we find that collective bargaining reduces only moderately wage
inequalities induced by offshoring.
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