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Journal Articles Journal of Public Economic Theory Year : 1998

Condorcet cycles in bipartite populations

Hervé Crès
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Abstract

Simple majority voting between pairs of alternatives is used to aggregate individual preferences. The occurrence of Condorcet cycles is limited thanks to a principle of homogeneity on individual preferences. The restrictions induced on the domain of the latters are weak: among the n! possible orderings of n alternatives, more than one half are admissible within a domain. The resulting aggregated preference has then a neglectable probability of showing up cycles. We show moreover that the set of individual preferences can be 'naturally' partitioned into two such domains.
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Dates and versions

hal-03567702 , version 1 (12-02-2022)

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Yves Balasko, Hervé Crès. Condorcet cycles in bipartite populations. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1998. ⟨hal-03567702⟩

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