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Good Securitization, Bad Securitization

Abstract : I use a simple banking model to study the circumstances under which excessive and inefficient securitization may occur. I first stress that increasing securitization rates that reduce banks' incentives to screen borrowers and thus lead to more defaults need not be inefficient. This may be an efficient response to higher gains from trade between banks and fixed-income markets in the presence of bank moral hazard. I then argue that if reaping such higher gains from trade induces a reduction in the informational efficiency of the securitization market, then there is room for excessive securitization. The model points at increased transparency and informational efficiency of the securitization market as key improvements for the future of the banking system.
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Preprints, Working Papers, ...
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Submitted on : Saturday, December 11, 2021 - 10:58:26 PM
Last modification on : Friday, March 25, 2022 - 3:34:49 AM


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Guillaume Plantin. Good Securitization, Bad Securitization. 2011. ⟨hal-03476052⟩



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