Sanctions that signal: An experiment - Sciences Po Access content directly
Journal Articles Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Year : 2013

Sanctions that signal: An experiment

Roberto Galbiati
Karl Schlag
  • Function : Author
Joël van Der Weele
  • Function : Author


The introduction of sanctions provides incentives for more pro-social behavior, but may also be a signal that non-cooperation is prevalent. In an experimental minimum-effort coordination game we investigate the effects of the information contained in the choice to sanction. We compare the effect of sanctions that are introduced exogenously by the experimenter to that of sanctions which have been actively chosen by a subject who has superior information about the previous effort of the other players. We find that cooperative subjects perceive actively chosen sanctions as a negative signal which significantly reduces the effect of sanctions.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
2013-galbiati-schlag-weele-sanctions-that-signal-an-experiment.pdf (337.11 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-03461037 , version 1 (01-12-2021)



Roberto Galbiati, Karl Schlag, Joël van Der Weele. Sanctions that signal: An experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2013, 94, pp.34 - 51. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2013.08.002⟩. ⟨hal-03461037⟩
18 View
25 Download



Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More