An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility

Alfred Galichon (1) , Scott Kominers (2) , Simon Weber (1)

1 ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po)
2 Harvard University [Cambridge]

We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework includes as special cases the classic fully- and non-transferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers, deadweight losses, and risk aversion. We characterize equilibrium and conditions for identification, and derive comparative statics.

Keywords: Sorting; Matching; Marriage Market; Becker-Coase Theorem; Intrahousehold Allocation; Imperfectly Transferable Utility

Domains: Humanities and Social Sciences; Economics and Finance

Alfred Galichon, Scott Kominers, Simon Weber. An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility. 2014. ⟨hal-03460155⟩