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## Diverging Pathways: How Pre-Migration Selectivity and Initial Legal Status Shape Immigrant Outcomes in France

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## Diverging Pathways: How Pre-Migration Selectivity and Initial Legal Status Shape Immigrant Outcomes in France<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

*Drawing on a unique, large-sample survey from France, Trajectories and Origins (TeO), this article aims to disentangle the effects of migrants' initial legal status from their pre-migration characteristics on five outcomes: family income, unemployment, neighborhood income disadvantage, segregation and self-rated health. Findings show that outcomes vary by legal status, but that most of these disparities disappear once pre-migration variables are accounted for. Still, we find net effects of legal status for some categories. Asylum seekers tend to face greater disadvantage in terms of family income and segregation, while students report higher family income and lower neighborhood income disadvantage. Migrants with worker status or a French spouse permit also tend to experience less neighborhood income disadvantage and segregation. Yet interactions between legal status and country of origin show that these effects are not constant across groups. Sub-Saharan Africans and migrants from other non-European countries are the most strongly impacted by disadvantaged status.<sup>2</sup>*

**Keywords:** Immigration; Legal status; Immigrant integration.

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## Introduction

As soon as migrants cross the border from country of origin to country of destination, receiving states sort newcomers along legal lines of demarcation based on residency status. These legal distinctions upon arrival grant or deny rights and opportunities and determine access to citizenship and socioeconomic resources, with potentially long-reaching implications for immigrant integration. Certain legal statuses allow migrants to enter the labor market immediately (i.e. work permits), while others provide a faster track to citizenship (i.e. marriage permits). These classifications further shape the degree of inclusion and reception that immigrants encounter in their receiving society and the state. Asylum seekers may be more favorably received and granted access to specific social benefits, while those who migrated for family reunification purposes may be viewed with suspicion and subjected to stronger state control (Bellot 2015; Lochak 2006).

This system of civic stratification (Morris 2003) forges categorical distinctions between groups based on initial contexts of reception, with potentially durable implications for migrants' trajectories in their country of destination (Safi, forthcoming). However, empirical studies have seldom considered the long-term role of initial legal status for immigrant integration. One difficulty is linked to data availability. Most studies investigating the effects of legal status rely on data that measure current status and outcomes simultaneously, confounding the causal link between the two. A further impediment is related to immigrant selectivity. Immigrants' initial legal status in their country of destination is highly determined by pre-migration characteristics formed in their countries of origin. Moreover, these pre-migration characteristics such as education, income, and language skills go on to shape migrants' ability to climb up the socioeconomic ladder in the receiving country (Borjas 1987, Feliciano 2006; Ichou 2014; Pong and Landale 2012). However, previous empirical research has rarely disentangled the role of specific, individual-level pre-migration characteristics from the effects of initial status.

This article draws on a unique, large sample data source from France, the Trajectories and Origins (TeO) survey, to explore the role of legal status upon arrival on immigrants' socioeconomic outcomes. TeO includes rare information on the type and timing of migrants' first residency permit, a wide range of pre-migration variables and a variety of current outcomes. Three main questions guide the analysis: First, do immigrants' integration outcomes, including their income, unemployment, neighborhood income disadvantage, segregation and self-rated health status, vary by the first legal permit obtained? Second, are these variations simply a reflection of pre-migration characteristics and selection, or do differences linked to legal status persist even when taking these factors into account? And finally, do all migrants' trajectories vary by status, or is this only true for certain origin groups? Findings show that outcomes vary by initial legal status, but that most of these disparities disappear once pre-migration variables are accounted for. Still, we find net effects of legal status for some categories. Asylum seekers tend to face greater disadvantage in terms of family income and segregation, while students have higher income and lower neighborhood income disadvantage. Migrants with worker status or a French spouse permit also tend to experience less neighborhood income disadvantage and segregation. Yet interactions between legal status

and country of origin show that these effects are not constant across groups. Sub-Saharan Africans and migrants from other non-European countries are the most strongly impacted by disadvantaged status.

We make three significant contributions to the literature on legal status stratification and immigrant integration. First, while past studies of immigrant adaptation in France have focused on the significance of naturalization (Bertossi 2010; Fougère and Safi 2009), our study is one of the first to consider how legal categories beyond citizenship shape immigrant outcomes in France and examine these effects across multiple ethnic groups and dimensions of immigrant integration. Second, our study considers not only how immigrants' initial legal status shapes their integration, but also how this initial categorization may operate net of the pre-migration characteristics that shape immigrants' selection into their initial statuses. Finally, we show that while immigrants' pre-migration characteristics remain significant for their post-migration outcomes, migrants' initial legal status continues to have durable effects net of pre- and post-migration demographics controls. We theorize that immigrants' initial legal status defines administrative and legal pathways in their integration process, carry tangible social connotations, and set migrants upon diverging socialization tracks.

## **I. Initial legal status**

Nation states exercise control over entry, rights, and citizenship through the implementation of residency laws and legal status categories, generating a system of civic stratification by differentially allocating rights, resources, and membership (Brubaker 1992; Lockwood 1996; Morris 2003). Previous studies of the effects of civic stratification on immigrant outcomes have overwhelmingly focused on migrants' legal status at the time the outcome is measured. These studies largely find that citizens are advantaged relative to noncitizens, and that undocumented and temporary-status immigrants face many disadvantages, particularly in the dimensions of socioeconomic attainment and health. Citizenship may lessen the labor market discrimination faced by immigrants from poorer or more stigmatized backgrounds, signaling to employers' higher levels of integration and intentions of long-term residence (Bloemraad and Sheares 2017). As a result, naturalization can lead to better employment outcomes, particularly among those likely to be disadvantaged in the labor market, such as immigrants with lower levels of education (Bertossi 2010; Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir 2002; Fougère and Safi 2009). However, immigrants who lack secure legal standing in their receiving states may face strong social stigma and threats of deportation, are ineligible for many public benefits, and are often barred from stable, legal employment opportunities to advance their socioeconomic situation. Thus, legally vulnerable immigrants often report lower levels of socioeconomic attainment and mobility, diminished access to healthcare, and high levels of stress induced by their legal precarity (Borjas 2017; Hall, Greenman and Yi 2019; Larchanqué 2012; Ortega et al. 2018).

However, an exclusive focus on migrants' *current* legal status fails to paint a full picture of how legal stratification affects immigrant integration. Immigrant outcomes may also be shaped by prior legal statuses. In particular, initial legal status may structure immigrants' preliminary access to resources and opportunities, with long-term implications for their

trajectories in their country of destination. For example, refugees may face a more welcoming context of reception and greater access to resettlement resources, while those entering with spousal permits are granted lower barriers to naturalization and long-term residence (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Weil 2001). Likewise, student and work statuses extend access to institutions and formal employment in the receiving state, but are temporary statuses that are conditional on continued academic and employment sponsorship (Tremblay 2005).

Evidence from past studies suggests that immigrants' integration outcomes may differ considerably by their initial legal status. In particular, immigrants entering with work or education-based permits report being advantaged relative to immigrants entering under other legal categories. Immigrants who migrate to the United States under employment visas report greater occupational mobility and higher wages relative to other entry status categories (Akresh 2006; Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith 2000; Massey and Malone 2002). Likewise, employment-based migrants to Australia have better self-reported health compared to other migrants, with refugees reporting the worst health outcomes (Chiswick, Lee, and Miller 2008). While the advantages reported by economic and student migrants may diminish over time (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1995), immigrants' status at entry may also have implications for the outcomes of their children in their countries of destination. The children of parents arriving under skilled work and business visas in Canada, or student and tourist visas in the United States, have higher rates of university completion relative to the children of immigrants arriving under refugee or unskilled work visas (Hou and Bonikowska, 2017; Lee 2018).

### **1.1. Immigrant selectivity**

Such disparities in outcomes by migrants' status at entry may be attributable to differential selection into initial legal statuses on the basis of various demographic and pre-migration characteristics. Relative to non-migrants in their countries of origin, immigrants tend to be younger, report better physical health, and have higher levels of education (Chiswick, Lee, and Miller 2008; Feliciano 2005). Likewise, immigrants differ greatly in demographic characteristics by status at entry. Women make up a higher percentage of those entering under spouse and family reunification visas relative to men, who make up a higher percentage of those entering under work visas (Donato et al. 2011). Furthermore, due to historical patterns in refugee flows and labor recruitment, and dynamic relationships between sending and receiving states, immigrants from some countries may be more heavily represented in certain categories of entry (Menjivar 2000; US Department of State 2019).

Immigrants also diverge in their pre-migration characteristics by initial legal status. Economic migrants are sponsored by employers in receiving states based on their skill set and work capacity demonstrated prior to migration. They frequently sign employment contracts prior to migration or have jobs awaiting them immediately upon arrival. Employment-based immigrants also tend to have higher levels of education and better language ability relative to other migrants (Akresh 2008; Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith 2000). Likewise, student migrants are allowed entry on the basis of their potential for educational attainment. They also come from more highly educated backgrounds in their country of origin and are more likely

to speak the language of their country of destination (Hou and Bonikowska 2017). Marriage migrants are also more likely to speak the language of the receiving country, have more social ties, and report greater exposure to their country of destination prior to migration (Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith 2000).

By contrast, family migrants and asylees are relatively disadvantaged in their pre-migration characteristics. While family migrants also have established social ties in their countries of destination prior to migration, they tend to report lower levels of educational attainment in their countries of origin and less transferable skills in the receiving labor market (Akresh 2008). Furthermore, refugees frequently depart under difficult and traumatic circumstances from their sending countries, with little preparation for migration (Torres and Wallace 2013). Receiving states also impose fewer integration, human capital, and health requirements for refugees relative to other immigrants (Chiswick, Lee, and Miller 2008). Thus, refugees may arrive with lower pre-migration socioeconomic and language attainment and poorer health outcomes relative to other immigrants. Finally, those who enter without legal documents or under irregular statuses frequently report low levels of pre-migration human capital and skill attainment (Massey and Malone 2002). However, they may be positively selected for health, particularly in order to undertake clandestine and physically grueling border crossings (Barcellos, Goldman, and Smith 2012).

## **1.2. Initial legal status or immigrant selectivity?**

Migrants who are “positively selected” (i.e., possess more advantaged sociodemographic characteristics prior to migration) may exhibit better integration outcomes in their countries of destination. Past studies of the effects of migrant selection have considered country of origin characteristics and immigrant parents’ education levels. Immigrants from countries with a higher Gross National Product, more open political system, and lower levels of income inequality have higher income in the United States relative to immigrants from poorer, less politically open, and more economically unequal countries (Borjas 1987). Likewise, immigrant parents’ higher educational attainment relative to non-migrants in their countries of origin is positively associated with their children’s educational attainment in receiving states (Feliciano 2006; Ichou 2014; Pong and Landale 2012).

Previous research has theorized that differences in pre-migration selectivity, such as having a job contract before migration or prior visits to the country of destination, may explain immigrants’ differential outcomes by their status at entry (Akresh 2008). However, these studies have rarely empirically examined the role of specific, individual-level pre-migration characteristics, instead using status at entry categories themselves as direct proxies for selection (Akresh 2008, 2006; Chiswick, Lee, and Miller 2008; Lee 2018). The few studies of initial legal status that have included additional indicators of immigrant selectivity have mainly measured selectivity through country or region of origin fixed effects (Chiswick, Lee, and Miller 2008; Hou and Bonikowska 2017; Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, and Smith 2000; Massey and Malone 2002), broad country of origin characteristics, such as Gross National Product (Borjas 1987; Hou and Bonikowska 2017), or limit examinations of individual-level selection characteristics to age at arrival and educational attainment (Chiswick, Lee, and

Miller 2008; Hou and Bonikowska 2017). Many other relevant indicators of pre-migration immigrant selectivity, including possessing a work contract before arrival, previous migration experiences and exposure to the country of destination, and pre-migration language ability, educational attainment, and marital status, have yet to be empirically examined in conjunction with of migrants' status at entry. We therefore do not know whether immigrants' legal status upon entry acts simply a proxy for their pre-migration characteristics and selectivity, or whether differences in migrants' integration outcomes persist even when taking into account pre-migration sorting into initial legal status.

## II. Legal status in the French context

Much of the research on immigrant selectivity and initial legal status has been conducted in the context of the United States, and little is known of how such mechanisms may play out in other receiving states. The oldest country of immigration in Europe, France's approach to its foreign-born population is assimilationist in line with its Republican egalitarian tradition (Noiriel 1992; Favell 1998). This model places strong emphasis on citizenship as a motor of immigrant integration. Foreigners are considered to become members of the nation through a process of acculturation by which they successfully become French, incorporating new values, traditions and norms while shedding any markers of ethnic or cultural distinctiveness. However, France has relatively low naturalization rates compared to other countries (Liebig and von Haaren 2011), meaning migrants may settle and remain noncitizens for the long-term on the basis of residency permits. In the colorblind French Republican tradition, where racial or ethnic distinctions are not formally recognized (Simon 2008), legal classifications related to residency permits and citizenship are a salient administrative tool and contribute to forging symbolic boundaries within French society (Lamont 1992, 1995). These categories also have a complex history due in particular to France's colonial history and convey not only legal rights but also ethnoracial connotations.

French research on legal categories focuses predominantly on citizenship categories and the determinants of citizenship acquisition (Carillo 2015; Mazouz 2017; Simon 2012). Less attention has been paid to residency status and its consequences for socioeconomic integration. Yet, by opening up initial rights and opportunities and creating inequalities based on reasons for migrating, the state's distribution of residency permits shapes later claims to national belonging and impacts immigrants' potential integration. Prior to arriving in France, migrants must first obtain visas to enter the country legally, which are generally valid for 3 months or up to one year. In the first few months of their stay and before their visa expires, migrants who wish to remain in France must apply for a residency permit (called *titres de séjour*) which enable legal settlement for a fixed period of time.

The legislation governing *titres de séjour* has varied considerably over the last decades (Vaudano and Dahyot 2019). Generally, these permits differ by duration, income and housing requirements, proof of integration, right to work and access to citizenship (d'Albis and Boubtane 2015). Some statuses are intended for short-term stays. This is true of student permits, which are granted for one year and are renewable for the period of study, but do not open rights to long-term settlement. Students have recently been granted the right to work part



time, but must justify enough resources to stay in France. Migrants with work permits are granted different duration rights based on the short-term or permanent nature of their employment contract. Persons entering France on the basis of family reunification permits must demonstrate adequate housing and sufficient income, and since the 2000s, proof of their cultural integration. Family migrants benefit from long-term residency rights and are allowed to work, although this right was not always guaranteed in previous decades. Despite tighter conditions in recent years, marriage permits most favorably open up the road toward citizenship with shorter eligibility requirements and lower rejection rates. Citizenship acquisition is considered a right for migrants who marry French citizens and is subject to an entirely different procedure (“naturalization by declaration”) than the standard track to citizenship (“naturalization by decree”). As concerns asylum seekers, the legislation has become increasingly strict in recent years as the number of persons seeking asylum has risen while the number admitted has dropped. Contexts of refugee reception have also varied considerably over time, from the more advantaged conditions governing the arrival of refugees from Southeast Asia in the 1970s to a less favorable context today (Bellot 2015; Spire 2007). Asylum seekers are currently not guaranteed the right to work upon arrival and must wait 6 months before applying for a work permit. However, they are provided some financial aid and may receive help finding temporary housing during the application process. Refugee status also may allow for faster access to citizenship, as they do not need to fulfill the 5-year residency requirement before applying.

In addition to objective differences relating to conditions and rights, some statuses may be viewed more or less favorably by the state. Workers may be seen as more desirable and with less suspicion than migrants coming to join their spouses or families, particularly since debates around immigration policy in the early 2000s increasingly pushed the distinction between “chosen immigration” (i.e. labor migration that benefits France and its economy) and “imposed immigration” (i.e. unwanted family reunification migrants and asylum seekers) (Lochak 2006).

Finally, it is noteworthy that initial legal status is tightly linked to country of origin. As EU citizens benefiting from free circulation within the Schengen area, European origin migrants who arrived in France after 1999 do not require a residency permit to live, work and study in France. Due to their status as former colonies, special rules have governed the residency permits granted to Algerians, Tunisians, Moroccans, and migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa. Some other countries also benefit from bilateral agreements that affect the legal context of reception of their emigrants to France.

### **III. Data and Measures**

We utilize data from Trajectories and Origins (TeO), a large-scale, diverse, and cross-sectional survey of the French population collected between 2008 and 2009 (Beauchemin, Hamel and Simon 2018). TeO surveyed 21,761 respondents aged 18 to 60, covering immigrants to France, children of immigrants, those born in overseas *départements* and their children, and those born in France to French-born, non-migrant parents. We limit our analyses to the 3,689 immigrant respondents in TeO who arrived at age 15 or older, and who reported

valid responses to questions regarding their legal status upon arrival and non-missing responses to our dependent and independent variables of interest.

### ***Outcome variables***

TeO contains detailed information on a variety of immigrant outcomes, including measures covering family income, unemployment status, spatial integration, and health status. *Family income* is divided into deciles according to the respondents' household monthly income. *Unemployment status* is a binary variable measuring whether or not the respondent is currently unemployed. We examine two spatial integration measures at the level of the French census block (*IRIS*), neighborhood income disadvantage and neighborhood percent immigrant. *Neighborhood income disadvantage* measures household income per capita in the neighborhood of residence, coded in deciles indicating 1 for the highest household income per capita neighborhoods and 10 for the lowest income neighborhoods. *Neighborhood percent immigrant* is measured in deciles (0-9), with higher values representing higher concentrations of immigrants in the respondents' neighborhood of residence. Finally, *self-rated health* is a binary variable measuring whether the respondent reported being in very good or good health, compared with being in average, bad, or very bad health.

### ***Key explanatory variable***

Our key explanatory variable of interest is the respondents' *first residency permit obtained in France*. The residency permit, or *titre de séjour*, is issued by the French police prefecture and gives migrants the right to settle legally in the country for a determined period of time. It is important to highlight that the residency permit is issued after arrival and is therefore distinct from the visa, which is issued prior to arrival and allows legal entry. To remain in France legally, migrants must apply for residency permits before the visa expires, typically within one year of arrival. TeO does not provide any information on the type of visa or whether the respondent arrived without a visa. Therefore, our data do not allow us to distinguish between respondents who entered the country with a visa and subsequently applied for a residency card, and those who entered without a visa and later regularized their situation. TeO does however report the year in which the first permit was obtained. In addition to the type of first residency permit, our models control for *permit immediately upon arrival* to measure whether respondents obtained their residency permit within a year of arriving in France or in later years. This allows us to potentially capture effects related to the regularization of migrants who arrived with no visa.

We construct our measure of status upon arrival using TeO questions that ask for what reason their first permit was issued. Respondents were coded according to their stated reason for first residency permit: "Asylum," "Student," "Worker," "Marriage to a French citizen," or "Family reunification." We exclude from our analysis migrants who stated that they were exempt by law from applying for a permit (N= 345), or who reported "Don't know" (N=127), "Refused" (N=28), or "Other permit" (N=415) when asked the reason for their first permit. While respondents in these excluded categories (in particular those who reported "Don't know" or "Refused") may represent more legally vulnerable immigrants, including those who have yet

to obtain a residency permit at the time of the survey, it is impossible to accurately determine the legal status of these respondents. Thus, any findings using these categories would be difficult to interpret. Table 1 reports the distribution of the sample by first residency permit. The largest categories are work permit holders (31%), family reunification migrants (22%) and those entering on a French spouse permit (19%).

**Table 1: Sample by Legal Status**

	N	Weighted %
Asylum	623	12.09
Student	606	16.91
Worker	969	30.54
French spouse	709	18.95
Family reunification	782	21.51
Total	3689	100

### *Migrant selection variables*

TeO also covers a wealth of information on characteristics related to immigrant selection. We consider demographic characteristics including respondents' *gender*, and whether or not the respondent self-identifies as *Muslim*. Respondents' *region of birth* is a categorical variable coded as "North Africa," "Sub-Saharan Africa," "Southeast Asia," "Turkey," "Portugal," "Spain/ Italy," "Other European Union countries" and "Other." These represent the largest immigrant origin groups in France. We also consider immigrants' *previous migration experience*, a binary variable indicating whether the immigrant has ever lived outside of their country of birth for at least one year prior to their arrival in France. We examine whether respondents *visited France for less than a year prior to their arrival* using a binary indicator. In addition, we control for the respondents' *type of last job prior to migration*, coded as "Never worked prior to migration," "Worked an unskilled or unpaid job prior to migration," or "Other." *Highest level of education prior to migration* is coded as "Primary school or less" "Lower-secondary," "Higher-secondary," and "Higher education." We consider respondents' *marital status prior to migration*, a binary variable indicating whether the respondent reported being married prior to migration. We also examine an indicator variable measuring whether the respondent secured an *employment contract in France prior to migration*.

We also consider several measures of respondents' characteristics immediately upon their arrival in France. *French proficiency upon arrival* is coded into three categories, "Not at all," "Some French," "Very good comprehension and spoken French," and "All very good." We also consider respondents' *age at arrival* and whether the respondent lived in *temporary housing immediately upon arrival*, such as in a housing center for asylum seekers, a hostel for migrant workers, or accommodations temporarily lent to them by family or friends rather than a permanent or private dwelling.

***Current demographic characteristics***

Finally, we control for several variables reflecting respondents' demographic characteristics at the time of TeO interview. We examine respondents' *current French citizenship status* using a binary indicator measuring whether the respondent holds French citizenship at the time of the interview. Likewise, respondents' *current marital status* is a binary variable measuring whether the respondent reported being married at the time of TeO collection. *Current French proficiency* is a categorical variable coded as "Not at all," "Some French," "Very good comprehension and spoken French," and "All very good." We also examine respondents' *highest level of education* at the time of the survey, coded as "No diploma," "Junior of vocational high school," "Vocational or baccalaureate degree," and "University degree." Finally, *current employment status* is coded as "Employed," "Student," "Unemployed," "Retired/ Stay at home," or "Other."

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Initial Legal Status

	Asylum	Student	Worker	French spouse	Family reunification	No permit
<b>Outcomes</b>						
Income (deciles)	4.69	7.48	6.20	5.34	4.50	5.39
Unemployed	16%	9%	10%	14%	12%	12%
Neighborhood disadvantage scale (0-27)	18.75	15.06	16.12	17.56	19.48	17.96
Neighborhood percent immigrant (deciles)	8.12	7.70	7.61	7.45	7.96	8.04
Reported good health	70%	91%	70%	80%	72%	77%
<b>Migrant selection</b>						
Female	39%	46%	31%	72%	73%	43%
<b>Region of origin</b>						
North Africa	3%	33%	23%	38%	51%	33%
Sub-Saharan Africa	14%	16%	4%	10%	7%	15%
Southeast Asia	24%	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%
Turkey	11%	1%	4%	6%	14%	5%
Portugal	2%	1%	29%	2%	11%	9%
Spain/ Italy	0%	2%	6%	3%	1%	2%
EU27	7%	12%	21%	14%	3%	7%
Other	39%	34%	12%	27%	12%	27%
Muslim	21%	38%	26%	48%	67%	44%
Previous migration experience	21%	10%	13%	13%	5%	16%
Visit France before migration	5%	36%	31%	29%	13%	24%
<b>Type of work in CoA</b>						
Never worked	43%	66%	24%	30%	61%	36%
Unskilled or unpaid	10%	3%	25%	12%	15%	16%

<b>Other</b>	47%	31%	51%	58%	24%	48%
<b>Highest level of education before migration</b>						
<b>Primary school or less</b>	16%	1%	32%	12%	29%	21%
<b>Lower-secondary</b>	27%	3%	21%	19%	29%	20%
<b>Higher-secondary</b>	35%	13%	23%	34%	30%	37%
<b>Higher education</b>	21%	83%	24%	34%	12%	22%
<b>Married before migration</b>	37%	8%	31%	71%	67%	32%
<b>Employment contract before arrival</b>	1%	3%	30%	1%	1%	6%
<b>French proficiency on arrival</b>						
<b>Not at all</b>	47%	10%	34%	21%	31%	30%
<b>Some French</b>	40%	32%	44%	47%	49%	40%
<b>Very good comprehension and spoken</b>	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%	1%
<b>All very good</b>	13%	57%	21%	30%	18%	29%
<b>Age at arrival</b>	26.34	23.06	25.08	28.07	24.16	25.49
<b>Initial housing temporary</b>	39%	10%	18%	4%	6%	14%
<b>Current demographics</b>						
<b>French citizenship</b>	50%	48%	22%	42%	24%	36%
<b>Married</b>	79%	75%	79%	84%	82%	83%
<b>Current French ability</b>						
<b>Not at all</b>	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%
<b>Some French</b>	62%	11%	48%	42%	58%	43%
<b>Very good comprehension and spoken</b>	9%	6%	17%	12%	11%	12%
<b>All very good</b>	28%	83%	35%	46%	30%	45%
<b>Years in France</b>	18.11	16.86	22.05	11.79	16.21	17.69
<b>Education level</b>						
<b>No diploma</b>	32%	3%	32%	22%	41%	31%
<b>Junior or vocational high school</b>	25%	4%	30%	26%	37%	28%
<b>Vocational or regular bac</b>	22%	11%	14%	22%	11%	19%

<b>University</b>	21%	82%	24%	30%	11%	21%
<b>Current employment status</b>						
<b>Employed</b>	68%	81%	78%	58%	54%	74%
<b>Student</b>	1%	2%	0%	0%	1%	0%
<b>Unemployed</b>	16%	9%	10%	14%	12%	12%
<b>Retired/ stay at home</b>	11%	6%	6%	26%	32%	9%
<b>Other</b>	5%	1%	6%	1%	2%	5%
<b>Observations</b>	509	549	679	531	731	690

### 3.1. Plan of analyses

We present our analyses across three nested regression models for each outcome of interest (family income, unemployment status, neighborhood income disadvantage, neighborhood percent immigrant, and self-rated health). We compare all other migrants to family reunification permit holders, one of the largest entry status groups in France in recent decades (Noiriel 1992; d’Albis and Boubtane 2018). Model 1 presents the effects of immigrants’ legal status at entry prior to immigrant selection and current demographic controls. Model 2 expands on Model 1 to account for immigrant selection by including variables measuring respondents’ region of birth, gender, religious identification, previous migration experience, visits to France prior to arrival, type of last job prior to migration, highest level of education prior to migration, marital status prior to migration, employment contract prior to arrival, residency permit upon arrival, French proficiency upon arrival, age at arrival, and temporary housing upon arrival. Finally, Model 3 adds current demographic characteristics (citizenship status, marital status, French proficiency, and highest level of education at the time of the survey) to Model 2 to determine whether differences in outcomes by status at entry persist after accounting for all migrant selection and current demographic characteristics. We also apply interactions between initial legal status and immigrants’ region of origin to Model 3 to examine whether possessing a disadvantaged status at entry may impact certain immigrants more than others. We run ordinary least squares regressions when examining family income, neighborhood income disadvantage, and neighborhood percent immigrant, while we run logistic regressions to predict unemployment status and self-rated health. Results are presented as marginal effects tables or graphs to ease interpretation. Full model results are included in the Appendix.

## IV. Results

### *Migrant selection*

Descriptive comparisons in Table 2 suggest strong evidence of differential selection into immigrant legal status categories based on demographic, pre-migration and upon-arrival characteristics. In particular, those whose initial status was a student permit appear to be the most socioeconomically advantaged prior to and upon arrival in France, while those with asylum permits appear the least advantaged. Respondents with student permits are by far the most highly educated prior to migration. 81% of respondents in this category obtained higher education prior to arrival in France. By contrast, only 33% of those whose initial status was a spousal permit, the second mostly highly educated group, obtained higher education before entering France. Those who held work and family reunification permits reported the lowest levels of education prior to migration, with over half of respondents in both groups attaining lower secondary schooling or less. Likewise, student permit holders have the highest levels of French proficiency upon arrival. Only 11% of student permit holders reported speaking French “not at all” upon arrival in France, compared to 46% of asylum permit holders.



Those who held student permits were also the most likely to have never worked prior to migration (66%), and the least likely to have worked an unskilled or unpaid job (3%). By contrast, only 26% of those with work permits had not worked prior to migration, and 23% of them had worked in an unskilled or unpaid job. Only the work permit category had a substantial proportion of respondents with a work contract prior to arrival in France (24%). Student permit holders were also the least likely to have been married prior to migration (7%), compared to 66% of those whose first permit was for family reunification and 61% of those with spousal permits. French spouse and Family reunification permit holders were the least likely to reside in temporary housing immediately upon arrival (6% and 7%, respectively), while Asylum permit holders were the most (37%).

### *Socioeconomic integration*

**Table 3: Effects of Initial Legal Status on Socioeconomic Integration**

(Reference Category : Family Reunification)

	Family Income			Unemployment Status		
	Model 1	Model 2 <sup>i</sup>	Model 3 <sup>ii</sup>	Model 1	Model 2 <sup>i</sup>	Model 3 <sup>ii</sup>
<b>Asylum</b>	0.194 (0.208)	-0.500** (0.233)	-0.559*** (0.202)	0.0379 (0.0287)	0.0147 (0.0319)	0.0180 (0.0318)
<b>Student</b>	2.985*** (0.188)	1.291*** (0.224)	0.924*** (0.202)	-0.0319 (0.0224)	-0.0449 (0.0275)	-0.0402 (0.0277)
<b>Worker</b>	1.696*** (0.181)	0.260 (0.204)	0.202 (0.182)	-0.0219 (0.0214)	-0.0255 (0.0260)	-0.0278 (0.0254)
<b>French spouse</b>	0.837*** (0.193)	0.165 (0.193)	0.0576 (0.179)	0.0164 (0.0244)	0.00875 (0.0269)	0.0203 (0.0272)
<b>No permit</b>	0.888*** (0.184)	0.217 (0.190)	0.0407 (0.168)	-0.00235 (0.0223)	-0.0248 (0.0248)	-0.0195 (0.0246)
Observations	3,689	3,689	3,689	3,689	3,689	3,689

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

<sup>i</sup> Controlling for: region of birth, gender, religious identification, previous migration experience, visits to France prior to arrival, type of last job prior to migration, highest level of education prior to migration, marital status prior to migration, employment contract prior to arrival, French proficiency upon arrival, age at arrival, temporary housing upon arrival

<sup>ii</sup> Controlling for: region of birth, gender, religious identification, previous migration experience, visits to France prior to arrival, type of last job prior to migration, highest level of education prior to migration, marital status prior to migration, employment contract prior to arrival, French proficiency upon arrival, age at arrival, temporary housing upon arrival, current citizenship status, current marital status, current French proficiency, current highest educational attainment; current employment status, years resided in France

Table 3 presents the marginal effects of legal status at entry on immigrants' socioeconomic integration. Prior to controlling for selection and current demographic variables, those with student permits, work permits, and spousal permits all reported higher family income relative to those who first possessed family reunification permits. Upon the inclusion of selection controls however, this advantage relative to family reunification permit holders loses statistical significance for those entering with a work permit or French spouse permit, and is greatly reduced, but still statistically significant, for student permit holders. Likewise, net of selection controls, asylum permit holders, for whom there had been no statistically significant difference in family income with family reunification permit holders in Model 1, now report significantly lower family income relative to family reunification permit holders. Finally, in the full model with both selection and current demographic controls, the family income gap between asylum permit holders and family reunification permit holders persists, while student permit holders continue to report significantly higher family income relative to family reunification permit holders. By contrast, we find few statistically significant differences in the marginal effects of initial legal status on immigrants' probability of being unemployed at the time of TeO collection.

Table 1 of the Appendix demonstrate that immigrants' socioeconomic outcomes are significantly shaped by their pre-migration characteristics, even net of present-day demographics. Pre-migration work experience matters for immigrants' socioeconomic attainment: those who worked a salaried job in their country of ancestry report higher family income relative to those who have never worked or who worked an unskilled or unsalaried job. Likewise, immigrants who received higher education in their countries of origin, had an employment contract prior arrival, who had previously visited France, do not identify as Muslim, or who were unmarried prior to migration report higher family income. There are significant national origin disparities in family income. North African immigrants are disadvantaged relative to Southeast Asian, Turkish, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, other European Union, and other origin immigrants. Similar patterns linked to national origin are found for unemployment: relative to North African immigrants, Turkish, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, and other origin immigrants are less likely to be unemployed. Present-day unemployment rates are also higher for those who lived in temporary housing immediately upon arrival and who reported speaking no French upon arrival.

*Spatial integration***Table 4: Effects of Initial Legal Status on Spatial Integration**

(Reference Category : Family Reunification)

	Neighborhood Disadvantage			Neighborhood % Immigrant		
	Model 1	Model 2 <sup>i</sup>	Model 3 <sup>ii</sup>	Model 1	Model 2 <sup>i</sup>	Model 3 <sup>ii</sup>
<b>Asylum</b>	-0.725 (0.444)	0.411 (0.506)	0.522 (0.514)	0.161 (0.129)	0.243 (0.150)	0.274* (0.153)
<b>Student</b>	-4.417*** (0.389)	-1.922*** (0.451)	-1.513*** (0.459)	-0.264** (0.117)	0.0394 (0.144)	0.0885 (0.144)
<b>Worker</b>	-3.356*** (0.375)	-1.285*** (0.441)	-1.125** (0.441)	-0.348*** (0.111)	0.121 (0.131)	0.138 (0.133)
<b>French spouse</b>	-1.918*** (0.417)	-0.654 (0.412)	-0.595 (0.416)	-0.514*** (0.128)	-0.358*** (0.130)	-0.311** (0.128)
<b>No permit</b>	-1.518*** (0.383)	-0.516 (0.387)	-0.334 (0.389)	0.0785 (0.103)	0.230** (0.113)	0.265** (0.112)
Observations	3,689	3,689	3,689	3,689	3,689	3,689

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

<sup>i</sup> Controlling for: region of birth, gender, religious identification, previous migration experience, visits to France prior to arrival, type of last job prior to migration, highest level of education prior to migration, marital status prior to migration, employment contract prior to arrival, French proficiency upon arrival, age at arrival, temporary housing upon arrival

<sup>ii</sup> Controlling for: region of birth, gender, religious identification, previous migration experience, visits to France prior to arrival, type of last job prior to migration, highest level of education prior to migration, marital status prior to migration, employment contract prior to arrival, French proficiency upon arrival, age at arrival, temporary housing upon arrival, current citizenship status, current marital status, current French proficiency, current highest educational attainment; current employment status, years resided in France

The marginal effects of initial status on immigrants' spatial integration are shown in Table 4. Compared to those whose first permit was for family reunification, those with a student, worker, or spouse permit live in neighborhoods scoring lower on the neighborhood income disadvantage scale. However, the advantage reported by respondents with a spousal permit loses statistical significance after controlling for migrant selection variables. Meanwhile, the neighborhood income advantage reported by student and work permit holders relative to family reunification permit holders persists even after the inclusion of both selection and current demographic variables.

Furthermore, those with student, work, or spousal permits live in neighborhoods with significantly lower proportions of immigrants relative to those entering under a family reunification permit. Upon the inclusion of selection controls, however, only those whose first permit was for marriage to a French citizen continue to report living in neighborhoods with a

significantly lower proportion of immigrants, while those with asylum permits now report living in neighborhoods with a significantly higher proportion of immigrants. These effects remain after the inclusion of current demographic controls.

Net of present-day demographic controls, women, those who visited France prior to migration, who completed higher education in their sending states, who do not identify as Muslim, or who lived in stable housing immediately upon arrival report living in higher income neighborhoods. Likewise, North African immigrants report living in lower income neighborhoods relative to Southeast Asian, Turkish, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, other European Union, and other origin immigrants. Southeast Asian immigrants are also more likely to live in neighborhoods with higher concentrations of immigrants relative to North African immigrants, while Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, and other European immigrants live in neighborhoods with lower immigrant concentrations. Those who identify as Muslim, never worked in their country of origin, only completed primary school education or less prior to migration, received their residence permit after their year of arrival, or had very good speaking and comprehension of French upon arrival (relative to very good proficiency in all areas, including reading and writing French) likewise report living in more immigrant-dense neighborhoods.

### *Self-rated health*

**Table 5: Effects of Initial Legal Status on Self-Rated Health**

(Reference Category : Family Reunification)

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2<sup>i</sup></b>	<b>Model 3<sup>ii</sup></b>
<b>Asylum</b>	-0.0201 (0.0329)	-0.0687** (0.0350)	-0.0329 (0.0334)
<b>Student</b>	0.181*** (0.0242)	-0.000464 (0.0340)	0.00744 (0.0327)
<b>Worker</b>	-0.0287 (0.0282)	-0.0704** (0.0279)	-0.0246 (0.0261)
<b>French spouse</b>	0.0759*** (0.0294)	0.00865 (0.0256)	-0.00332 (0.0255)
<b>No permit</b>	0.0490* (0.0271)	-0.0183 (0.0246)	0.00857 (0.0232)
Observations	3,689	3,689	3,689

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1


<sup>i</sup> Controlling for: region of birth, gender, religious identification, previous migration experience, visits to France prior to arrival, type of last job prior to migration, highest level of education prior to migration, marital status prior to migration, employment contract prior to arrival, French proficiency upon arrival, age at arrival, temporary housing upon arrival

<sup>ii</sup> Controlling for: region of birth, gender, religious identification, previous migration experience, visits to France prior to arrival, type of last job prior to migration, highest level of education prior to migration, marital status prior to migration, employment contract prior to arrival, French proficiency upon arrival, age at arrival, temporary housing upon arrival, current citizenship status, current marital status, current French proficiency, current highest educational attainment; current employment status, years resided in France

Table 5 displays the marginal effects of status at entry on immigrants' self-rated health. Prior to the inclusion of selection and current demographic controls, respondents with a student or spouse permit were more likely relative to those whose first permit was for family reunification to report "good" or "very good" health. However, the health advantage exhibited by these respondents loses statistical significance with the inclusion of migrant selection variables. By contrast, a negative effect for those with an asylum or work permit emerges after holding constant migrant selection. Nevertheless, all differences between those with a family reunification permit and those with other legal categories as their first permit lose statistical significance when current demographic controls are added in Model 3. Male immigrants, those who arrived in France at younger ages, those who visited France before migration, and those from other European Union countries are more likely to report being in good health relatively to females, older immigrant, those who never visited France prior to migration, and North African immigrants.


#### *Differential effects of disadvantaged legal status*

**Figure 1: Marginal Effects on Disadvantaged Status on Income by Origin**



Our final analysis explores whether the effect of legal status is similar for all origin groups. Figure 1 plots the marginal effects on income from the model including an interaction between legal status and country of origin to our full models. We classify immigrants entering under family reunification or asylum as having a “disadvantaged” status. To obtain parsimonious interaction effects and statistical power, we grouped categories that showed similar patterns in prior analyses. Results show that not all groups are significantly impacted by legal status at entry. Negative effects of disadvantaged status on income are only found for migrants originating from Sub-Saharan Africa and other non-European countries. A similar pattern is observed for the spatial outcomes, illustrated in Figure 2. Migrants from other non-European countries live in lower income neighborhoods when they have a disadvantaged legal status compared to immigrants of the same origin with an advantaged legal status. Further, Sub-Saharan African origin migrants and those from other countries live in neighborhoods with higher immigrant shares. Interactions were also tested for the unemployment and health outcomes but did not produce significant results.

**Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Disadvantage Status on Neighborhood Disadvantage and Segregation by Origin**



## Conclusion

Immigrants’ initial legal status categories open up differential rights to work, study, reside, and petition for citizenship in their receiving states, with long term implications for their integration trajectories. However, immigrants are not randomly assigned to legal categories

upon entry, but are differentially selected into their initial statuses on the basis of pre-migration characteristics. Previous research examining the effects of immigrants' legal status upon entry on their integration trajectories have not given in-depth consideration to the pre-migration characteristics that shape selection into migrants' initial legal categories. As a result, we know little about whether the differential outcomes observed across immigrants' initial legal status are simply a reflection of their pre-migration characteristics and selectivity, or whether they persist net of pre-migration sorting into legal categories at entry.

This project takes the first step towards addressing this question using the Trajectories and Origins survey, a unique French data source covering both migrants' legal status upon entry and detailed information on their pre-migration characteristics. We find that while those entering France under student, worker, or spousal permits initially report better outcomes relative to those entering with family reunification, asylum, or no permit, much of these differences disappear or diminish with the inclusion of pre-migration selection variables. Immigrants who report better socioeconomic, spatial integration, and health outcomes in France tend to be more positively selected. They report having salaried work and higher levels of education in their country of origin, visiting France or having an employment contract prior to arrival, and being highly proficient in French or living in stable housing immediately upon arrival.

However, some initial status differences in immigrant outcomes persist even after controlling for both pre-migration characteristics and present-day sociodemographics, including French citizenship status, socioeconomic attainment, and French proficiency at the time of survey completion. Net of these controls, immigrants who enter under as students report higher family income, while immigrants entering as asylum seekers report lower family income relative to those entering France under a family reunification permit. Likewise, those who enter with student or worker permits report living in higher income neighborhoods. Relative to family reunification permit holders, those who possessed asylum permits live in areas that have a higher immigrant concentration, while those entering with a spousal permit live in areas that have a lower immigrant concentration. We found no significant association between initial legal status and migrants' unemployment or health outcomes.

How can we explain the persistent effects of immigrants' initial legal status? In theorizing the effects of naturalization for immigrant integration, Bloemraad (2017) argues that citizenship may promote immigrants' wellbeing through several mechanisms. Citizens may access exclusive status-based rights, resources, and benefits that may not be available to noncitizens, including the rights to vote in national elections and reside indefinitely in a state. Acquiring citizenship may imbue immigrants with social legitimacy and signal to other state residents the immigrants' integration and commitment to their host country. Furthermore, naturalization may matter for immigrant outcomes through shaping their human and social capital investments and socialization in their host countries. Below, we apply this framework to consider the rights-, meaning-, and socialization-based mechanisms through which immigrants' initial legal statuses may shape their integration outcomes in France.

Immigrants' initial residence permits define administrative and legal pathways in their integration process, creating a path-dependency with significant implications for their long-term outcomes. For example, while those who possess work permits are eligible to work immediately upon securing their permit, other migrants may face legal and bureaucratic hurdles to securing the right to employment in France. The administrative procedure for asylum seekers is long and migrants are not permitted to apply for a work permit prior to six months of arrival, likely rendering labor market integration more difficult (d'Albis and Boubtane 2018). Thus, the spatial income advantage reported by work permit holders relative to asylum and family reunification permit holders may be due in part to their ability to immediately integrate into the French labor market. Likewise, those who obtain residency permits for marriage to a French citizen enjoy unique naturalization privileges, including the option to naturalize "by declaration," shorter residency requirements, and lower rates of rejection. Such facilitated access to French citizenship may promote French spouse permit holders' residential integration with French natives that we find in this article.

However, our empirical findings do not completely mirror the status-based differences in migrants' access to rights and resources. In particular, we find that asylum seekers report relative disadvantage in their family income and spatial segregation outcomes net of pre-migration selection variables. On the one hand, this category may be relatively "legally privileged," as asylees may have benefited from specific integration programs and state aid, such as that granted to refugees from Southeast Asia who arrived in France in the 1970s. These migrants were accompanied by a favorable policy of reception and integration coordinated by both the state and humanitarian associations (Bellot 2015), benefiting from reception at the airport, temporary and later permanent housing as well the right to work immediately and indefinitely. However, the social stigma and meaning attached to asylum seekers in France has transformed over time, along with the rise of anti-foreigner sentiment, immigration restrictions, and changes in migrant flows starting in the 1980s, with more asylum seekers coming from African or Middle Eastern countries. Seen as less "desirable" or even "unassimilable" (mainly for those who are perceived as Muslims), these "new asylum seekers" make up the majority of the asylum permit holders analyzed in this article (nearly 80% of the asylum permit recipients in our sample arrived after 1980, and over 40% arrived after 1990). Furthermore, while education- and work-based residence permits do not guarantee long-term residence in France or a pathway to French citizenship, these statuses may signal a more favorably-received "chosen" status in contrast to the "imposed" status of family reunification and asylum seekers (Lochak 2006). These differential social connotations attached to migrant's status at entry may push asylum seekers into more segregated and disadvantaged neighborhoods and hinder their labor-market activities, while expediting the economic and residential integration of student and work-permit holders.

Furthermore, migrants' initial legal status may set them upon diverging socialization tracks, with implications for their long-term wellbeing. Migrants granted residence permits to marry French citizens may experience facilitated socialization into French culture, language, and society, reflected in their reduced spatial segregation (Iceland and Nelson 2010). Likewise, immigrants are typically granted student permits to pursue higher education in France, and thus gain exposure to privileged French institutions. Exposure to such institutions also



provides immigrants with opportunities to form advantageous social ties, particularly with regards to intermarriage with highly-educated French citizens and natives. For example, while only 7% of student permit holders in our sample are married prior to migration, 77% of these respondents are married by the time of the survey (Table 2). Further analyses (available upon request) show that among student permit holders married at the time of TeO collection, 77% had a French citizen spouse and 54% had a native-born spouse, the group with the second-highest proportion of marriage to a French citizen or native-born after spousal permit holders. By contrast, only 37% of married family reunification permit holders are married to a French citizen and 13% have a native-born spouse at the time of TeO collection. Finally, 57% of spouses of initial student permit holders had more than two years of higher education, compared to only 8% of spouses of family reunification migrants. Thus, migrants' initial legal categories funnel them into diverse institutions and social environments in their receiving state, with consequences for their socialization and integration.

Finally, a disadvantaged initial legal status matters more for some immigrant groups relative to others. Status distinctions did not appear to be as powerful for European immigrants. In contrast, Sub-Saharan African and other non-European origins with asylum or family reunification fared worse on socioeconomic and spatial outcomes relative to other categories. African immigrants and other visible minorities face high levels of discrimination in France (Beauchemin et al. 2010, Safi and Simon 2013). As Beaman (2017) argues, status citizenship often does not confer equal benefits of social membership upon the children of North African minorities in France, who may be denied "cultural citizenship" on the basis of ethnic boundaries. Just as status citizenship may signal social integration to employers (Bloemraad and Sheares 2017), possessing a disadvantaged legal status upon entry may be doubly stigmatizing for minority groups who already face social exclusion in France due to their ethnic background.

This study nonetheless presents some limitations that future research could aim to overcome. Migrants' initial legal status effects may reflect individual heterogeneity not captured by the pre-migration and immigrant selectivity variables included in our models, including migrants' motivations for migration. For example, while economic migrants largely base their decisions to migrate on their earning potential in the receiving state, family reunification migrants may be motivated by non-economic factors (Chiswick, Lee, and Miller 2005). These differences in motivations for migration may contribute to work-based permit holders neighborhood income advantage over family-reunification migrants, although we found no significant difference in family income between these groups net of controls. Likewise, we are unable to measure the political and economic circumstances in migrants' country of origin leading up their departure. Refugees and others experiencing forced migration may enter France having endured persecution and traumatic experiences in their sending state that influence their migration preparedness and experiences of psychological distress, with implications for their socioeconomic trajectories (Akresh 2008; Torres and Wallace 2013).

Moreover, while our research design allows for a temporal dimension as we measure the legal status upon entry and pre-migration characteristics on subsequent long-term socioeconomic outcomes, more research is needed to trace the sequence of events that explain this correlation.

Longitudinal data may thus focus on the role of post-migration trajectories by exploring how citizenship, experience of discrimination or intermarriage after arrival mediate the link between initial legal status and current outcomes. Finally, this article looks at the long-term effects of legal categories for migrants' trajectories, but extensions of this research could investigate whether parental legal status or citizenship acquisition goes on to impact second generation outcomes, favoring or inhibiting intergenerational upward social mobility.

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## Appendix

**Table 1: Initial Legal Status on Family Income**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>
<b>Legal status at entry (ref: family reunification)</b>			
Asylum	0.194 (0.208)	-0.500** (0.233)	-0.559*** (0.202)
Student	2.985*** (0.188)	1.291*** (0.224)	0.924*** (0.202)
Worker	1.696*** (0.181)	0.260 (0.204)	0.202 (0.182)
French spouse	0.837*** (0.193)	0.165 (0.193)	0.0576 (0.179)
No permit	0.888*** (0.184)	0.217 (0.190)	0.0407 (0.168)
<b>Immigrant selectivity</b>			
Previous migration experience		0.177 (0.151)	0.230 (0.142)
Visited France before migration		0.317** (0.134)	0.227* (0.123)
<b>Type of work in CoA (ref: salaried work)</b>			
Never worked		-0.402*** (0.126)	-0.262** (0.120)
Worked unskilled or unpaid		-0.406*** (0.156)	-0.259* (0.142)
<b>Highest education level in CoA (ref: higher education)</b>			
Primary school or less		-1.493*** (0.184)	-0.112 (0.248)
Lower-secondary		-1.438*** (0.160)	-0.357 (0.231)
Higher-secondary		-1.086*** (0.156)	-0.335* (0.192)
Married before migration		-0.189 (0.129)	-0.211* (0.118)
<b>French proficiency on arrival</b>			
Not at all		-0.662*** (0.187)	-0.174 (0.199)
Other		-0.205 (0.143)	0.0207 (0.152)
Very good comprehension and spoken		-0.823** (0.413)	-0.517 (0.393)
Age at arrival		-0.0373*** (0.00904)	-0.0333*** (0.00902)
Employment contract before arrival		0.623*** (0.188)	0.654*** (0.168)
Temporary housing		-0.491*** (0.151)	-0.406*** (0.135)
<b>Region of origin (ref: North Africa)</b>			
Sub-Saharan Africa		-0.274 (0.191)	-0.284* (0.167)
Southeast Asia		1.136*** (0.288)	0.936*** (0.253)
Turkey		0.517**	0.314

		(0.201)	(0.193)
Portugal		1.745***	1.401***
		(0.261)	(0.243)
Spain/ Italy		1.395***	1.286***
		(0.321)	(0.284)
Other European Union countries		1.303***	1.073***
		(0.259)	(0.224)
Other regions		0.623***	0.410**
		(0.200)	(0.183)
Female		-0.265**	0.0854
		(0.111)	(0.107)
Muslim		-0.716***	-0.620***
		(0.163)	(0.148)
<b>Socio-demographics at the time of outcome</b>			0.336***
French citizenship			(0.108)
Marital status			0.466***
			(0.127)
French proficiency (ref: very good speaking, comprehension, reading and writing)			
Not at all			0.171
			(0.634)
Other			-0.289*
			(0.148)
Very good comprehension and spoken			-0.141
			(0.175)
Years in France			-0.0166***
			(0.00551)
Highest level of education (ref: no degree)			
Junior or vocational high school			0.303**
			(0.129)
Vocational or Regular Baccalaureate			0.751***
			(0.200)
University			1.358***
			(0.241)
Current employment status (ref: working)			
Student			-2.759***
			(0.499)
Unemployed			-2.384***
			(0.142)
Not working			-1.469***
			(0.152)
Other			-1.691***
			(0.227)
Constant	4.499***	7.593***	6.423***
	(0.134)	(0.365)	(0.441)
Observations	3,689	3,689	3,689
R-squared	0.117	0.279	0.393

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 2: Initial Legal Status on Probability of Unemployment**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>
<b>Legal status at entry</b> (ref: family reunification)			
Asylum	0.313 (0.234)	0.125 (0.270)	0.157 (0.275)
Student	-0.336 (0.236)	-0.471 (0.287)	-0.429 (0.296)
Worker	-0.221 (0.212)	-0.247 (0.249)	-0.282 (0.254)
French spouse	0.144 (0.215)	0.0758 (0.233)	0.176 (0.235)
No permit	-0.0220 (0.208)	-0.240 (0.234)	-0.192 (0.238)
<b>Immigrant selectivity</b>			
Previous migration experience		0.303 (0.189)	0.367* (0.194)
Visited France before migration		0.162 (0.167)	0.155 (0.169)
Type of work in CoA (ref: salaried work)			
Never worked		0.0691 (0.152)	0.0594 (0.157)
Worked unskilled or unpaid		0.290 (0.192)	0.265 (0.192)
Highest education level in CoA (ref: higher education)			
Primary school or less		-0.139 (0.238)	-0.221 (0.348)
Lower-secondary		-0.0468 (0.205)	-0.0852 (0.320)
Higher-secondary		0.204 (0.176)	0.176 (0.270)
Married before migration		-0.317** (0.160)	-0.246 (0.166)
French proficiency on arrival			
Not at all		0.604** (0.241)	0.534* (0.279)
Other		-0.0294 (0.192)	-0.111 (0.226)
Very good comprehension and spoken		0.832 (0.558)	0.625 (0.513)
Age at arrival		0.0184* (0.0106)	0.0176 (0.0116)
Employment contract before arrival		0.254 (0.228)	0.259 (0.227)
Temporary housing		0.386** (0.164)	0.431** (0.168)
Region of origin (ref: North Africa)			
Sub-Saharan Africa		0.354 (0.224)	0.301 (0.232)
Southeast Asia		-0.568 (0.349)	-0.496 (0.365)
Turkey		-0.706*** (0.265)	-0.692** (0.272)
Portugal		-1.135***	-1.168***



		(0.372)	(0.383)
Spain/ Italy		-0.860	-0.979*
		(0.543)	(0.544)
Other European Union countries		-0.260	-0.301
		(0.323)	(0.323)
Other regions		-0.380*	-0.388*
		(0.216)	(0.219)
Female		0.103	0.0711
		(0.135)	(0.138)
Muslim		0.182	0.227
		(0.171)	(0.172)
<b>Socio-demographics at the time of outcome</b>			
French citizenship			-0.347**
			(0.144)
Marital status			-0.656***
			(0.154)
French proficiency (ref: very good speaking, comprehension, reading and writing)			
Not at all			-0.207
			(1.186)
Other			0.0888
			(0.204)
Very good comprehension and spoken			0.321
			(0.239)
Years in France			0.00506
			(0.00742)
Highest level of education (ref: no degree)			
Junior or vocational high school			-0.0677
			(0.185)
Vocational or Regular Bacculaureate			0.00255
			(0.260)
University			-0.00734
			(0.324)
Constant	-1.965***	-2.545***	-2.015***
	(0.160)	(0.425)	(0.565)
Observations	3,689	3,689	3,689

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 3: Initial Legal Status on Neighborhood Income Disadvantage**

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3
<b>Legal status at entry</b> (ref: family reunification)			
Asylum	-0.725 (0.444)	0.411 (0.506)	0.522 (0.514)
Student	-4.417*** (0.389)	-1.922*** (0.451)	-1.513*** (0.459)
Worker	-3.356*** (0.375)	-1.285*** (0.441)	-1.125** (0.441)
French spouse	-1.918*** (0.417)	-0.654 (0.412)	-0.595 (0.416)
No permit	-1.518*** (0.383)	-0.516 (0.387)	-0.334 (0.389)
<b>Immigrant selectivity</b>			
Previous migration experience		-0.452 (0.358)	-0.495 (0.355)
Visited France before migration		-1.066*** (0.303)	-1.039*** (0.300)
Type of work in CoA (ref: salaried work)			
Never worked		0.495* (0.290)	0.457 (0.291)
Worked unskilled or unpaid		0.575 (0.367)	0.459 (0.366)
Highest education level in CoA (ref: higher education)			
Primary school or less		2.032*** (0.429)	1.102* (0.608)
Lower-secondary		1.869*** (0.383)	0.931 (0.566)
Higher-secondary		1.260*** (0.336)	0.456 (0.473)
Married before migration		0.207 (0.285)	0.259 (0.285)
French proficiency on arrival			
Not at all		0.556 (0.396)	0.00440 (0.481)
Other		0.237 (0.307)	-0.0988 (0.381)
Very good comprehension and spoken		-0.0737 (0.848)	-0.577 (0.945)
Age at arrival		0.0601*** (0.0210)	0.0364 (0.0227)
Employment contract before arrival		0.106 (0.446)	0.109 (0.447)
Temporary housing		0.924*** (0.338)	0.836** (0.332)
Region of origin (ref: North Africa)			
Sub-Saharan Africa		0.681 (0.418)	0.527 (0.416)
Southeast Asia		-1.612*** (0.617)	-1.386** (0.615)
Turkey		-0.203 (0.448)	-0.216 (0.455)

Portugal		-3.246*** (0.602)	-3.042*** (0.606)
Spain/ Italy		-2.453*** (0.719)	-2.285*** (0.724)
Other European Union countries		-2.512*** (0.548)	-2.350*** (0.542)
Other regions		-1.727*** (0.439)	-1.605*** (0.438)
Female		-0.437* (0.252)	-0.569** (0.265)
Muslim		1.771*** (0.346)	1.618*** (0.345)
<b>Socio-demographics at the time of outcome</b>			-0.280
French citizenship			(0.268)
Marital status			-0.281 (0.301)
French proficiency (ref: very good speaking, comprehension, reading and writing)			
Not at all			-0.767 (1.779)
Other			0.480 (0.379)
Very good comprehension and spoken			0.269 (0.453)
Years in France			-0.0193 (0.0139)
Highest level of education (ref: no degree)			
Junior or vocational high school			-0.133 (0.326)
Vocational or Regular Baccalaureate			-0.475 (0.465)
University			-1.245** (0.569)
Current employment status (ref: working)			
Student			-0.208 (1.344)
Unemployed			2.120*** (0.311)
Not working			0.458 (0.368)
Other			0.916 (0.663)
Constant	19.48*** (0.253)	15.59*** (0.830)	17.59*** (1.116)
Observations	3,689	3,689	3,689
R-squared	0.058	0.191	0.207

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 4: Initial Legal Status on Neighborhood Percent Immigrant**

	(1) Model 1	(2) Model 2	(3) Model 3
<b>Legal status at entry</b> (ref: family reunification)			
Asylum	0.161 (0.129)	0.243 (0.150)	0.274* (0.153)
Student	-0.264** (0.117)	0.0394 (0.144)	0.0885 (0.144)
Worker	-0.348*** (0.111)	0.121 (0.131)	0.138 (0.133)
French spouse	-0.514*** (0.128)	-0.358*** (0.130)	-0.311** (0.128)
No permit	0.0785 (0.103)	0.230** (0.113)	0.265** (0.112)
<b>Immigrant selectivity</b>			
Previous migration experience		-0.0824 (0.100)	-0.0621 (0.0997)
Visited France before migration		-0.0936 (0.0951)	-0.101 (0.0943)
Type of work in CoA (ref: salaried work)			
Never worked		0.219*** (0.0839)	0.230*** (0.0836)
Worked unskilled or unpaid		0.0354 (0.104)	0.0200 (0.103)
Highest education level in CoA (ref: higher education)			
Primary school or less		2.032*** (0.429)	1.102* (0.608)
Lower-secondary		1.869*** (0.383)	0.931 (0.566)
Higher-secondary		1.260*** (0.336)	0.456 (0.473)
Married before migration		0.0149 (0.0826)	0.0574 (0.0829)
French proficiency on arrival			
Not at all		-0.0748 (0.127)	-0.0584 (0.144)
Other		0.0459 (0.0945)	0.0678 (0.114)
Very good comprehension and spoken		0.497** (0.220)	0.568** (0.236)
Age at arrival		0.0174*** (0.00561)	0.00926 (0.00621)
Employment contract before arrival		-0.181 (0.139)	-0.162 (0.138)
Temporary housing		-0.0746 (0.108)	-0.0674 (0.107)
Region of origin (ref: North Africa)			
Sub-Saharan Africa		0.233** (0.109)	0.155 (0.107)
Southeast Asia		0.295* (0.171)	0.326* (0.170)
Turkey		-0.0811 (0.146)	-0.133 (0.149)

Portugal		-0.453**	-0.475**
		(0.181)	(0.185)
Spain/ Italy		-0.400	-0.395
		(0.245)	(0.244)
Other European Union countries		-0.548***	-0.569***
		(0.179)	(0.180)
Other regions		0.0590	0.0467
		(0.120)	(0.119)
Female		-0.0468	-0.0108
		(0.0790)	(0.0831)
Muslim		0.254***	0.231**
		(0.0975)	(0.0966)
<b>Socio-demographics at the time of outcome</b>			-0.188**
French citizenship			(0.0822)
Marital status			-0.265***
			(0.0766)
French proficiency (ref: very good speaking, comprehension, reading and writing)			
Not at all			-0.202
			(0.593)
Other			0.0345
			(0.107)
Very good comprehension and spoken			-0.225
			(0.142)
Years in France			-0.00713*
			(0.00426)
Highest level of education (ref: no degree)			
Junior or vocational high school			-0.0152
			(0.0921)
Vocational or Regular Baccalaureate			-0.0530
			(0.138)
University			-0.109
			(0.178)
Current employment status (ref: working)			
Student			-0.571
			(0.453)
Unemployed			0.189**
			(0.0892)
Not working			-0.248**
			(0.118)
Other			0.0478
			(0.189)
Constant	7.961***	7.056***	7.723***
	(0.0745)	(0.249)	(0.318)
Observations	3,689	3,689	3,689
R-squared	0.017	0.066	0.081

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 5: Initial Legal Status on Reporting Good Health**

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>
<b>Legal status at entry (ref: family reunification)</b>			
Asylum	-0.0987 (0.160)	-0.421** (0.207)	-0.228 (0.227)
Student	1.299*** (0.192)	-0.00311 (0.228)	0.0544 (0.240)
Worker	-0.140 (0.137)	-0.430** (0.170)	-0.172 (0.182)
French spouse	0.422** (0.169)	0.0589 (0.175)	-0.0239 (0.183)
No permit	0.261* (0.145)	-0.119 (0.160)	0.0628 (0.170)
<b>Immigrant selectivity</b>			
Previous migration experience		-0.112 (0.143)	-0.0968 (0.153)
Visited France before migration		0.555*** (0.142)	0.482*** (0.147)
<b>Type of work in CoA (ref: salaried work)</b>			
Never worked		0.155 (0.127)	0.206 (0.134)
Worked unskilled or unpaid		0.0793 (0.151)	0.127 (0.162)
<b>Highest education level in CoA (ref: higher education)</b>			
Primary school or less		-1.435*** (0.182)	-0.278 (0.296)
Lower-secondary		-0.867*** (0.173)	-0.140 (0.281)
Higher-secondary		-0.642*** (0.158)	-0.283 (0.243)
Married before migration		-0.171 (0.117)	-0.194 (0.124)
<b>French proficiency on arrival</b>			
Not at all		-0.171 (0.180)	0.0836 (0.238)
Other		0.0965 (0.144)	0.238 (0.195)
Very good comprehension and spoken		-0.626 (0.480)	-0.385 (0.496)
Age at arrival		-0.0171* (0.00878)	-0.0545*** (0.00965)
Employment contract before arrival		-0.211 (0.177)	0.0202 (0.199)
Temporary housing		-0.0927 (0.138)	-0.0819 (0.147)
<b>Region of origin (ref: North Africa)</b>			
Sub-Saharan Africa		0.278 (0.177)	-0.0919 (0.196)
Southeast Asia		-0.313 (0.273)	-0.187 (0.301)
Turkey		0.337* (0.195)	0.0635 (0.212)
Portugal		-0.324	-0.427

		(0.236)	(0.270)
Spain/ Italy		-0.101	0.342
		(0.327)	(0.367)
Other European Union countries		0.654**	0.537*
		(0.263)	(0.276)
Other regions		0.319	0.136
		(0.198)	(0.223)
Female		-0.534***	-0.562***
		(0.109)	(0.121)
Muslim		-0.0766	-0.211
		(0.158)	(0.172)
<b>Socio-demographics at the time of outcome</b>			
French citizenship			-0.0302
			(0.120)
Marital status			0.0407
			(0.138)
French proficiency (ref: very good speaking, comprehension, reading and writing)			
Not at all			1.114
			(0.738)
Other			-0.406**
			(0.171)
Very good comprehension and spoken			-0.579***
			(0.202)
Years in France			-0.0617***
			(0.00644)
Highest level of education (ref: no degree)			
Junior or vocational high school			-0.105
			(0.136)
Vocational or Regular Bacculaureate			0.474**
			(0.210)
University			0.517*
			(0.286)
Current employment status (ref: working)			
Student			-0.160
			(0.544)
Unemployed			-0.678***
			(0.145)
Not working			-0.218
			(0.159)
Other			-2.691***
			(0.327)
Constant	0.967***	2.666***	4.449***
	(0.0989)	(0.355)	(0.507)
Observations	3,689	3,689	3,689

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



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