

Spreading the Burden: How NATO Became a 'Nuclear' Alliance

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ABSTRACT

Common knowledge has it that the end of the Cold War allowed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to push the nuclear genie back into the bottle. But whilst NATO members have reduced the alliance's practical, military reliance on nuclear arms, their commitment to nuclear defence as a shared, symbolic enterprise has in fact grown increasingly explicit over time, with NATO declaring itself a 'nuclear alliance' in 2010. The following analysis develops two arguments. First, political responsibility for nuclear defence has shifted from individual member-states to the alliance as such; and, second, this development has been fuelled by member-states' recurrent need to deflect criticism and adapt to the strengthening of humanitarian and anti-nuclear norms. The pulverisation of responsibility for nuclear defence in NATO has enabled pro-nuclear actors to justify costly nuclear modernisation programmes as acts of 'alliance solidarity' whilst exercising rhetorical coercion over advocates of denuclearisation.

'NATO has always been a nuclear alliance', wrote Britain's defence secretary, Michael Fallon, in 2017.¹ According to North Atlantic Treaty Organization's current Strategic Concept, adopted at the alliance's high-level summit in Lisbon in November 2010, NATO will 'remain' a nuclear alliance for as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world.² Yet, NATO had in fact never described itself explicitly as a 'nuclear' alliance before 2010 – two decades after the end of the Cold War. Investigating the evolution of NATO's nuclear posture, this analysis traces the genealogy of NATO's organisational identity as a 'nuclear alliance' and the development and functions of the alliance's nuclear sharing practices. Whilst security concerns have of course helped shape NATO's policies, the allies' recurrent need to shift the responsibility for unpopular decisions and lighten the growing political burden of nuclear defence has been a powerful determinant of nuclear policy throughout most of the alliance's history.

Two opposing trends characterise the evolution of NATO's nuclear policy. The first remains well known and is frequently highlighted by NATO officials: since the height of the Cold War, NATO's nuclear-armed Powers

have greatly reduced the number of weapons in their possession and diminished the practical, military role of nuclear arms in the alliance's strategy and operational planning. Allied nuclear forces no longer point at specific adversaries. Britain has reduced its nuclear capability to what its leaders say constitutes the bare minimum for a 'credible deterrent', retaining four sub-marines as its only nuclear-weapon delivery platforms. Although it continues to maintain a limited nuclear bomber force in addition to a fleet of four nuclear submarines, France has also softened its posture. Measured by the sheer number of nuclear warheads it possesses, America has reduced its nuclear stockpile to about 15 percent of its peak size, and fewer than 200 of approximately 7,000 nuclear warheads the United States once stationed in Europe remain in place.³

Whilst the first trend indicates an attenuation of the nuclear aspect of North Atlantic security co-operation, the second points in the opposite direction. Since NATO's establishment in 1949, the alliance's collective endorsement of nuclear deterrence as a shared, symbolic practice has grown more explicit. Of course, the possibility that the United States would use nuclear weapons in allied operations always existed. Yet the nature and justification of the nuclear mission has varied considerably over time. In NATO's earliest years, nuclear weapons were in fact not even mentioned in the alliance's strategic Concepts, and 'strategic bombing' was designated an American responsibility. In time, however, the potential use of nuclear weapons became explicit in the alliance's overall strategy. And over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, NATO developed a set of voluntary nuclear sharing practices that allowed willing non-nuclear allies to assume roles in planning and preparations for nuclear war. Over time, the nuclear sharing regime came to encompass all non-nuclear allies in 'planning roles', with nuclear deterrence framed as a prerequisite for alliance solidarity. The trend culminated in 2010, when NATO for the first time adopted a strategic concept describing the organisation explicitly as a 'nuclear alliance'.

Both trends have been fuelled, in part, by the strengthening of humanitarian and anti-nuclear norms.⁴ Structural factors and economic incentives to reduce military expenditures after the end of the Cold War undoubtedly also powered the trend towards smaller stockpiles and less aggressive postures. But the strengthening of humanitarian and anti-nuclear norms during and after the Cold War played a key role in pushing NATO to adapt. The collectivisation of responsibility for retaining nuclear weapons has had two main consequences. First, the nuclearisation of NATO's organisational identity has allowed pro-nuclear actors to justify costly nuclear modernisation programmes and indefinite deployments as contributions to alliance 'solidarity' and 'cohesion'. Second, the nuclearisation of NATO's organisational identity has undercut the potential for intra-alliance resistance to nuclear

orthodoxy. Once defining NATO as a 'nuclear' alliance, pressure for denu-clearisation might seem as 'anti-NATO'.

One of the 'enduring theoretical puzzles of the nuclear age' is the will-ingness of certain nuclear-armed states to engage in alliances.⁵ After all, a popular realist view holds that the nuclear revolution made alliances obsolete 'because states with a robust nuclear deterrent would have less need for allies and because nuclear deterrence could not be credibly extended to other countries'.⁶ This view misses an important social factor: the perceived legitimacy of deterrence. Nuclear deterrence depends on not only the material ability to deploy weapons in the present, but also a continuing willingness to use and invest in costly and morally contested weapons of mass destruction. States eager to continue practicing nuclear deterrence, then, must be able to resist or bypass humanitarian and anti-nuclear norms should these grow strong enough to challenge the legitimacy and, by extension, practicability of nuclear use. Alliances can help nuclear-armed states in this regard by creating opportunities for shifting the perceived political or moral responsibility, pulverising individual obligation, and projecting alter-native norms and worldviews.⁷ For example, NATO's organisational commitment to nuclear deterrence provides Britain, France, and America with a degree of confidence that a significant number of states will vote in line with their preferences on key United Nations [UN] General Assembly resolutions dealing with nuclear weapons.

Drawing on American, British, Danish, German, and Norwegian policy-maker memoirs, as well official documents and the wider NATO discourse, this analysis tracks how NATO's nuclear posture has evolved in dialectic with anti-nuclear norms. The purpose of this exegesis is not to discuss normative questions of whether non-nuclear allies ought to support their patrons' nuclear policies or whether nuclearising NATO's organisational identity was morally or strategically prudent. Instead, its purpose is to assess the historical process by which NATO came to call itself a 'nuclear alliance' and explore its effects on contemporary nuclear policy. It shows how the creation of the rhetorical veto player of 'the nuclear alliance' has enabled states to counteract the development of anti-nuclear norms and debate. In so doing, it furthers nascent International Relations literature on strategic narratives and regimes of value in nuclear-weapon politics.⁸

Defying social mores is often difficult, even in pursuing an alleged greater good. In William Shakespeare's *Caesar*, the patricidal Brutus cannot bare to shoulder the responsibility of killing Caesar alone. To 'free himself both from the guilt and from the sheer physical horror of the murder', Brutus adopts two coping techniques⁹: First, he assumes a ritualistic and distanced attitude towards the murder, describing it in evasive, metaphorical terms. Second, he commands his co-conspirators to bathe their hands and swords in the slain dictator's blood. That way, the crowd will attribute the slaughter not to

specific individuals but to the group. In the play, the associates' sully-ing of their hands and sword-blades functions as both physical proof of culpability and a symbol of the spread of 'moral taint'.¹⁰ NATO members have adopted both of Brutus' moral relieving techniques to tackle the growing burden of nuclear defence. Pro-nuclear actors' ritualistic and euphemistic attitude towards nuclear weapons is well established. The prevalence of the rhetoric of 'nukespeak' – the 'use of metaphor, euphemism, technical jargon and acronyms to portray nuclear concepts in a "neutral" or positive way'¹¹ – has been thoroughly analysed by a number of scholars and will not be further explored here.¹² The focus here is on NATO's use of Brutus' second means of unburdening. NATO's nuclear sharing practices and organisational identity as a 'nuclear alliance' fulfils the same function as the Roman conspirators' dunking of their hands in Caesar's blood, that is, to pulverise the responsibility for contested actions.¹³ Shifting responsibility for nuclear policy onto the alliance as such enables governments to transfer blame and avoid difficult questions from non-governmental organisations [NGOs], opposition parties, reporters, and other potential critics.

The standard account of NATO's development of nuclear sharing practices is that increased nuclear co-operation and overseas deployment of nuclear hardware were necessary to assure allies of their security and deter the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe.¹⁴ After the Cold War ended, so goes the standard narrative, the United States continued stationing nuclear weapons in allied countries to provide non-nuclear allies with symbolic reassurance. For example, American nuclear weapons stationed in Europe offered a 'powerful political symbol of an extended deterrent commitment'.¹⁵ Without dispute, many non-nuclear allies, including states hosting American nuclear weapons, at different times have implored Washington to demonstrate its commitment to its allies' security, including through nuclear sharing. However, existing accounts have paid insufficient attention to what NATO's symbolic commitment to nuclear weapons might offer beyond security assurances to non-nuclear states. Expanding on the traditional account shows that NATO's commitment to nuclear deterrence as a shared, symbolic exercise functioned not only as a means of reassuring non-nuclear allies, but also as a means of legitimising and locking in contested policies.

NATO's founding document, the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, identifies the purpose of the organisation as safeguarding the 'freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law'.¹⁶ The year 1949 saw many prospective members engage in heated debates about the merits of alignment. One of the most hotly debated issues was the possibility that Francisco Franco's fascist Spain might in the future join the alliance. Many European socialists and social democrats deeply resented this possibility.¹⁷ The question of whether

NATO would have a shared nuclear strategy was much less salient. In fact, in the late 1940s, hopes still existed that a binding disarmament agreement might solve the nuclear predicament. The United States, the world's only atomic-armed state, had since 1949 been engaged in deliberations on disarmament and international control of the atom. In its first-ever resolution, the UN General Assembly had moved, by consensus, to establish a commission tasked with facilitating the 'elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction'.¹⁸ The North Atlantic Treaty did not mention nuclear or any other specific weapons.

On 6 January 1950, NATO's principal political decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council [NAC], adopted the alliance's first 'strategic concept', an authoritative policy document outlining NATO's overall strategy.¹⁹ Contrary to common assumptions, the 'Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic area' [DC 6/1] 'eschewed an atomic strategy'.²⁰ Earlier drafts outlined 'the prompt delivery of the atomic bomb' as an important capability for NATO to maintain, but this injunction was removed from the final draft on Danish insistence. Denmark's foreign minister, Gustav Rasmussen, argued that positive references to nuclear weapons would be unacceptable to the Danish people should the contents of the document be leaked. It was imperative, he held, that NATO refrain from using language 'that could be argued to stand in the way of an effective ban on nuclear war'.²¹ According to NATO's first Strategic Concept, the alliance's 'main principle' was 'common action in defense against armed attack through self-help and mutual aid'.²² To that end, each ally would 'contribute in the most effective form, consistent with its situation, responsibilities and resources, such aid as can reasonably be expected of it'.²³ The Concept did include one passage that might seem an implicit reference to the use of nuclear weapons. Through paragraph 7(a), the allies undertook to ensure 'the ability to carry out strategic bombing promptly by all means possible with all types of weapons', but added that it would be 'primarily a U.S. responsibility'.²⁴ The reference to 'all types of weapons' clearly included nuclear arms – the paragraph designed to appease the Danes and other sceptics without altering the Americans' actual plans – but stopped short of mentioning nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction explicitly – the United States then maintained nuclear, chemical, and biological weapon programmes.²⁵ Indicating that the allies sought to limit responsibility for strategic missions, it is also noteworthy that they described strategic bombing as 'primarily a U.S. responsibility'. Indeed, at the time, the Americans were eager to maintain their aerial and nuclear primacy and therefore ardent to discourage British and French efforts, in Washington's eyes, to duplicate the American bomber force.²⁶ NATO's first strategic concept, then, was consciously

designed to avoid spreading responsibility for strategic and, by implication, nuclear bombing onto the alliance.

Two eventful years after the adoption of the first Strategic Concept, NATO adopted a second. The allies reckoned that three reasons required a new doctrine. First, to incorporate lessons learnt in Korea – seven of NATO's 12 founding members joined the Korean War that broke out in June 1950. Second, to reflect changes to NATO's institutional architecture – General Dwight D. Eisenhower's appointment as NATO's first 'Supreme Allied Commander, Europe' in January 1951. Finally, to reflect the February 1952 accession to the alliance of Greece and Turkey. The NAC adopted 'The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic area' [MC 3/5] on 3 December 1952. Through MC 3/5, NATO reiterated its 'main principle' as 'common action' against aggression, to which each ally would contribute 'con-sistent with its situation, responsibilities and resources'.²⁷ Like three years before, the allies consciously avoided mention of nuclear weapons, whilst committing to ensure 'the ability to carry out strategic bombing promptly by all means possible with all types of weapons'. Despite Britain's substantial re-investment in the Royal Air Force and test of a first nuclear explosive device earlier in 1952, strategic bombing continued as 'primarily a U.S. responsibility'.²⁸

In the 1940s and early 1950s, American strategic discourse often represented nuclear weapons as 'powerful but not necessarily decisive weapons'.²⁹ Over time, however, and particularly after the introduction of thermonuclear arms in 1952, the uniquely destructive potential of nuclear weapons became evident. In addition, the diffusion of knowledge about radiation poisoning and other health effects associated with exposure to ionising radiation led nuclear weapons to be associated with poison gas and other morally and legally censured weapons.³⁰ As a result, John Foster Dulles, the American secretary of state from 1953 to 1959, grew wary that United States nuclear policy would lead European states to distance themselves from Washington – American bases in Europe would appear more as 'lightning rods' than as 'umbrellas'.³¹ American officers requested permission to use atomic weapons several times during the Korean War, but President Harry S. Truman was loath to authorise strikes. One of the key reasons was his 'fears of adverse world opinion'.³² Eisenhower, who succeeded Truman in 1953, had the same sense. In March 1953, Dulles accordingly told Eisenhower that since 'in the present state of world opinion we could not use an a-bomb, we should make every effort now to dissipate this feeling'. Eisenhower and Dulles consequently made it their aim 'to remove the taboo from the use of these weapons'.³³ From 1953 until about 1958, Dulles took the lead in a campaign to break down what he argued was a 'false distinction' between conventional and nuclear weapons.³⁴ An important step would be overtly to nuclearise NATO's strategic posture.

Despite their resistance to relying on nuclear weapons, certain NATO members, including Denmark, had been unable or unwilling to meet stated conventional force goals. In this context, those favouring the overt nuclearising of NATO's doctrine could argue that there was no longer any option but to rely explicitly on the bomb. Thus, on 17 November 1954, not long after West Germany's invitation to join the alliance, NAC approved a first strategic document that explicitly discussed the use of nuclear weapons by NATO forces.³⁵ Impelled by the State Department – reportedly keen to confirm the American-produced document as quickly and quietly as possible – a Paris meeting hurriedly adopted the new strategy. Despite the document's highly sensitive nature, junior members of the alliance were apparently not afforded sufficient time to consult parliamentary committees, party leaders, or even their heads of government.³⁶ While the document did not have the status of 'strategic concept', it was widely seen as authoritative. For the Canadians, the document 'seemed at one fell swoop to undercut whatever possibility existed within NATO for consultation in advance of the atomic sword being unsheathed, to increase greatly the potential of that sword being used, and to sideswipe Canada's own defence posture'.³⁷ According to 'The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Five Years' [MC 48], NATO would respond 'immediately' to Soviet aggression with a 'devastating counter-attack employing atomic weapons'.³⁸ Explicitly endorsing the use of nuclear weapons to defend the North Atlantic area, including the use of tactical ones to defend the central front of West Germany, MC 48 broke with the deliberate vagueness of the first two strategic concepts as well as the 'strategic guidance' document adopted by NAC on 9 December 1952 [MC 14/1]. Admittedly, the latter had taken a step further than the strategic concepts by commenting that Moscow surely must appreciate that should war come, the Soviet Union would be 'subject to strategic air attack with weapons of mass destruction'.³⁹ MC 48, however, dispensed with ambiguity, outlining a strategy of massive and early use of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Shortly after adopting MC 48, the Eisenhower Administration cabled London suggesting that the British help the Americans in convincing allies of the 'technical and moral justification of the tactical nuclear weapon'.⁴⁰

Adopted on 9 May 1957, NATO's third strategic Concept drew heavily on MC 48. Should the allies have general war forced on them, the new Concept maintained, 'NATO defense depends upon an immediate exploitation of our nuclear capability, whether or not the Soviets employ nuclear weapons'.⁴¹ Since NATO 'would be unable to prevent the rapid overrunning of Europe unless NATO immediately employed nuclear weapons both strategically and tactically', the allies should be 'prepared to take the initiative in their use'.⁴² The third Concept did not include the previous line about strategic bombing being 'primarily a U.S. responsibility', but equally did not expressly oblige

non-nuclear allies to take part in nuclear missions or preclude them from adopting sovereign nuclear policies. Whilst NATO had clearly adopted a military posture foreseeing the use of nuclear weapons, the allies refrained from expressly infusing that posture with moral or symbolic significance. Furthermore, there was still a clear sense amongst many allies that nuclear war remained the domain of the United States and, to a lesser extent, Britain.⁴³ Norway's prime minister, for example, acknowledged that NATO had adopted a position favouring nuclear defence, but did not believe thereby that NATO had become a 'nuclear power'.⁴⁴

What is now referred to as 'nuclear sharing' – including non-nuclear allies in preparations to use nuclear weapons – came into being over the course of the 1950s. Particularly important in this regard was NATO's high-level Paris summit in December 1957, at which the United States offered to station nuclear forces in a range of allied countries. Several factors drove the desire to deploy nuclear weapons on the European continent. First, Soviet missile and satellite launches in 1957 produced fears that a 'missile gap' had developed, and that the Soviets were about to assume a position of nuclear dominance. Second, the United States had just mastered the miniaturisation of nuclear warheads, meaning that the tactical use of weapons was gaining popularity as a defensive option. Third, American strategists were eager for the United States to diffuse its strategic culture – a grand strategic narrative that nuclear weapons were necessary and legitimate – throughout the alliance. Indeed, over the course of the 1950s, several elite commentators had argued that the United States should aim to draw its allies more firmly into the nuclear-deterrence enterprise. This, so went the argument, would dispel certain allies' squeamishness about nuclear war and ease nuclear planning. For example, Henry Kissinger argued earlier in 1957:

One of the chief tasks of United States policy in NATO, therefore, is to overcome the trauma which attaches to the use of nuclear weapons and to decentralize the possession of nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible. Nothing would so much dispel the mystery of nuclear weapons as their possession by the Continental powers. Nothing would do more to help restore a measure of consistency to allied military planning.⁴⁵

Wary that relying too heavily on American strategic nuclear forces would lead the Europeans to disassociate themselves from Washington, Dulles held similar views: the United States should actively talk up 'the tactical defensive capabilities inherent in small "clean" nuclear weapons'.⁴⁶

European reactions to the proposal of stationing nuclear weapons on their continent proved mixed (Britain had hosted American nuclear forces since 1950). Dutch, Belgian, and Greek leaders were moderately interested. Hungry for 'inclusion in the "inner councils" of the West', the Italians expressed agreement to host 'almost at once'.⁴⁷ Initially ambivalent, Konrad Adenauer, West

Germany's chancellor, became convinced by the Americans of the necessity to deploy nuclear arms to deter Soviet aggression.⁴⁸ In the wider West German defence establishment, several commentators were also adamant that German forces should not be mere 'foot soldiers' beneath the nuclear-armed 'knights' of Britain, the United States, and, soon, France.⁴⁹ It was thus not a case of nuclear deployments forced upon an unwilling European monolith. However, some European governments remained adamantly opposed to further nuclearisation. In particular, the Danish and Norwegian prime ministers, H.C. Hansen and Einar Gerhardsen, declared nuclear weapons non grata on their territories, at any rate during peacetime. In both nations, public opinion was staunchly anti-nuclear.⁵⁰

In a speech to NAC that made headlines in Norway, Gerhardsen called for commencing disarmament talks with the Soviet Union and suggested postponing the decision of whether to station nuclear weapons in non-nuclear countries.⁵¹ Gerhardsen's Labour Party had adopted a strong disarmament position earlier that year, pledging to work energetically for an immediate halt of all nuclear tests and rejecting the emplacement of nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil.⁵² Most of the allies reportedly responded positively to Gerhardsen's first suggestion – NAC agreed to initiate talks with the Soviets – but were unwilling to hold off the decision about deployment to willing non-nuclear allies. Realising that he was outnumbered, Gerhardsen was not inclined to veto the decision; if other allies wanted to host that would be their business.⁵³ In the words of Jens Otto Krag, a ranking member of the Danish cabinet at the time – he later became prime minister – the Scandinavians 'did not view it as right for their countries to accept the weapons' but would not 'place obstacles in the way of any necessary strengthening of the defence of the alliance'.⁵⁴ That said, although resisting nuclearisation in public, both the Danish and Norwegian governments quietly prepared to assist nuclear operations in times of war. For example, Norwegian authorities made preparations to receive nuclear weapons should the need arise, and Norwegian warplanes participated in several so-called SNOWCAT exercises – support of nuclear operations with conventional air tactics – in the late 1950s.⁵⁵

In Canada, the nuclear sharing agenda engendered an intense political drama. When it became public knowledge in 1960 that the surface-to-air missiles John Diefenbaker's Conservative government had agreed to deploy two years before would be fitted with American nuclear warheads, protests broke out across the country. Diefenbaker promptly changed his mind and decided not to accept the transfer of the warheads. For many Canadians, 'refusal' was the 'only effective protest against the acceptance of nuclear war as a tolerable consequence of national policy'.⁵⁶ But Ottawa's disinclination, in the words of the American ambassador, to 'dirtying Canadian hands and reputation with nuclear weapons' was deeply resented by Washington. Publically slating the Canadian stance, the American State Department was

reportedly instrumental in bringing about a crisis in confidence for the minority Diefenbaker government in 1963.⁵⁷ Pro-nuclear commentators in Canada and the United States marshalled an impressive array of – often-sexualised – slurs and images to undermine the incumbent government. Diefenbaker and his ministers faced accusations of ‘impotency’, ‘coquettish indecision’, and foolishly wanting to preserve Canada’s ‘nuclear virginity’.⁵⁸ To the John F. Kennedy Administration’s pleasure, Diefenbaker eventually lost power to Lester Pearson’s pro-nuclear Liberal Party. Taking office as prime minister in April 1963, Pearson immediately accepted American war-heads in spite of public protests.

The nuclear sharing agenda remained controversial in the 1960s. At a NATO meeting in December 1960, the American delegation aired the possibility of establishing a ‘multilateral nuclear force’ [MLF] under joint NATO command. Based at sea to minimise ‘anti-nuclear sentiment and demonstrations’,⁵⁹ such a force would give non-nuclear allies greater say in nuclear policy.⁶⁰ From Washington’s viewpoint, a multilateral force had two benefits. First, creating a nuclear force under joint NATO command might tip the scales in Bonn against building an independent West German bomb. The American government was eager to limit the number of nuclear-armed NATO members to three – France completed its first nuclear explosive test in 1960. Second, creating a multilateral nuclear force would satisfy a growing need to ‘share the burdens of strategic deterrence more equitably between the United States and her European allies’.⁶¹

Whilst there was clearly an appetite in certain European capitals to gain access to nuclear weapons, several NATO members remained deeply sceptical of MLF. The Danish, Canadian, Norwegian, and Portuguese governments all declared unequivocally against it, proclaiming they would not contribute either human or financial capital to a nuclear force.⁶² Increased emphasis on nuclear weapons would play badly with their domestic audiences. In a closed session of the Norwegian parliament, the foreign minister spelled out his government’s position clearly: ‘we do not wish to become a quasi-nuclear power’.⁶³ He felt so strongly that he would consider vetoing the establishment of an MLF were it put to a vote in Paris.⁶⁴ Conveniently, however, with the issue never pressed, the MLF never came to a vote.

The second half of the 1950s had seen increased popular and elite mobilisation against the arms race. For example, the 1955 anti-nuclear manifesto of Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein led in 1957 to the establishment of the Conference on Science and World Affairs in Pugwash, Nova Scotia. The peace and disarmament organisation Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom attracted thousands of new members and established new chapters across Europe and North America. The nuclear predicament became politically salient in a range of European countries, fostering loud political debate and the formation of new anti-nuclear coalitions and

parties.⁶⁵ In Britain, a Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament emerged in 1958; a noisy civil disobedience group, the Committee of 100, in 1960. In the United States, the Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy formed in New York City in 1957. Within a year, the group attracted tens of thousands of members and formed 150 national chapters. Another American peace group established around the same time, the Committee for Non-Violent Action, executed publicity stunts and acts of civil disobedience at nuclear labs and bases. A 1958 poll found that 70 percent of Americans favoured a multilateral treaty on nuclear disarmament.⁶⁶ Over the course of the late 1950s and first half of the 1960s, a number of popular books and films about nuclear war and its effects came out in Europe and America.⁶⁷

Partly as a substitute for the failed MLF project, NATO established a consultative forum on nuclear policy in 1966, initially called the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee, but later named the Nuclear Planning Group [NPG]. Chaired by the United States secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, the NPG provided a standing forum for discussion of all nuclear matters, including strategy, arms control, and disarmament. Again, concern that West German leaders were feeling left out of nuclear policy-making provided a key driver. However, the broad scope of the group's mandate meant that even nuclear-sceptic allies would want to take part. Members that had thus far declined to engage in nuclear sharing practices – Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and, joining in 1982, Spain – were thus pulled into the alliance's sharing arrangement in 'planning roles'.⁶⁸ This increased co-operation played a positive role as a means of 'moral' or 'political' burden sharing. In the words of a British strategist and defence official, there was 'significant value' in having non-nuclear allies share in the 'political, material, and moral burdens of nuclear effort'.⁶⁹ For an American defence scholar, the expansion of NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements 'would mean the allies sharing the immense political burdens associated with nuclear deterrence'.⁷⁰ According to another British view, the practice of nuclear sharing obliged the non-nuclear allies 'to "dip their hands in the blood" of preparing to use these weapons'.⁷¹

The alliance's fourth Strategic Concept, finalised in January 1968, reduced the military role of nuclear weapons in NATO's overall strategy. Less than confident that Washington would 'trade Chicago for Paris', let alone small villages in Norway or Turkey, European leaders had long questioned the credibility of 'massive retaliation'.⁷² There was also a growing sense that massive retaliation was both suicidal and immoral.⁷³ The 'flexible response' strategy enshrined by the 'Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation' [MC 14/3] sought to alleviate these concerns by placing greater emphasis on conventional defence. Another novelty of the 1968 Concept was increased emphasis on the threat of enemy propaganda and corresponding need for 'political cohesion' and

'alliance solidarity'. Since the mid-1950s, influential Western writers had expressed envy of the Eastern bloc's hierarchical organisation and supposed lack of scruples. Kissinger, for example, read the West's 'difficulties in foreign policy' as a symptom of an insistence on 'moral perfection'.⁷⁴ The debate on nuclear weapons within NATO 'has been inherently divisive', he lamented.⁷⁵ The 1968 strategic Concept accordingly urged political unity and resistance in the face of anticipated attempts by the Warsaw Pact to 'undermine Alliance solidarity and, in general, to weaken NATO and secure the with-drawal and dispersion of its military forces'.⁷⁶ In a time when Western European and American disarmament campaigns were often lambasted as extended arms of communist propaganda, the message of MC 14/3 seemed clear: NATO should stand firm and united against efforts by the communists and their internal and external outriders to roll back existing and future deployments.

The disarmament campaigns of the 1950s and early 1960s were to a significant extent appeased by the adoption of the Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1963 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968.⁷⁷ Over the course of the 1960s, internationalists shifted their focus to decolonisation, hunger in Africa, and the atrocities in Indochina. But by the late 1970s, the disarmament movement re-appeared in full force. The revival of the dis-armament movement came to expression through three key developments. A first major flashpoint was the 'neutron bomb affair' of 1977, involving shifting responsibility and blame over the United States' development and planned deployment to Europe of a new 'enhanced radiation weapon' or, alternatively, 'neutron killer warhead'.⁷⁸ Confronted with negative press about the manufacture of a sinister new weapon that would 'kill people but leave buildings intact', then United States president, Jimmy Carter, ordered a pause of the development and consulted his allies. West Germany appeared to be the only ally prepared to accept deployment, yet the Germans were unwilling to be the only recipient. After all, being the only European host would force West Germany to shoulder 'a special and odious burden within the alliance', introducing an 'intolerable political risk' for the incumbent government.⁷⁹ On the other side of the Atlantic, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security advisor, claims he had never seen the president 'quite as troubled and pained by any decision item'.⁸⁰ Carter had 'a queasy feeling about the whole thing' and 'did not wish the world to think of him as an ogre'. Carter and his advisors, therefore, resolved to 'press the Europeans to show greater interest in having the bomb and therefore willingness to absorb some of the political flak'.⁸¹ Nevertheless, the Europeans were unwilling to do so, ultimately leading to Carter's cancellation of the programme.

A second political flashpoint was the 'Euro-missile crisis' that also began in 1977. At issue was American deployment of additional missiles to Europe. The saga began when the West German chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, made

public his unease about the Soviets' rapid introduction of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles capable of reaching Western Europe, the SS-20. Schmidt wanted Carter to include these threatening new missiles in ongoing Soviet-American arms control talks that, until then, had only concerned the superpowers' intercontinental or 'strategic' nuclear weapons.⁸² Carter was sympathetic to Schmidt's concern. His solution, however, was in Schmidt's reckoning not to negotiate with the Soviets, but to 'balance' the European theatre by deploying American cruise missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to counter those of the Soviets. However, as with the neutron warhead, Schmidt was unwilling to accept the missiles unilaterally; any new deployments would have to be mandated by the alliance as a whole and then spread thinly across several states.⁸³ That way, as Brzezinski put it, the alliance would 'share the burden of deployment'.⁸⁴ However, as in 1957, Danish and Norwegian leaders were deeply sceptical and did not desist from expressing their concern in public.⁸⁵ Ultimately, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany accepted deployments on the condition that the new weapons would essentially function as bargaining chips for Soviet-American disarmament negotiations.

Still, public mobilisation against the Euro-missile deployments continued. Anti-nuclear rallies and marches drew increasingly large crowds. Across the North Atlantic area, NGOs, churches, labour unions, and individual members of the public added their voices to the call for disarmament. The aggressive rhetoric of Ronald Reagan's Administration, which took power in 1981, provided further impetus for protest. A new wave of films portraying nuclear war and its aftermath, including *Virus* (1980), *The Day After* (1983), and *Testament* (1983), hit theatres and television sets. Jonathan Schell's anti-nuclear *The Fate of the Earth*, first published as a series of articles in the *New Yorker*, then as a monograph in 1982, sold tens of thousands of copies, with translations into Danish, German, Greek, Portuguese, Turkish, and several other languages. At the UN, the delegations of India, Mexico, Sweden, and other states condemned both East and West for their apparent nuclear grandstanding. When the UN General Assembly's 'special session' on disarmament convened in 1982, 700,000 people, maybe as many as a million, rallied for a 'nuclear freeze' in Central Park. On several occasions over the course of the 1980s, Denmark and Greece made critical 'footnotes' to paragraphs in NATO communiques dealing with intermediate range missiles.⁸⁶ The complications and burden of nuclear defence appeared to be growing heavier.

A third major incident of the late 1970s and 1980s was the adoption by the New Zealand government – allied to the United States through the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty [ANZUS] – of anti-nuclear policies and legislation. New Zealand championed adoption of the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone, or 'Rarotonga' Treaty, and

made clear that American vessels carrying nuclear weapons were not welcome in New Zealand ports. According to Wellington, ANZUS was 'an alliance between 2 regional countries and a nuclear superpower', but not thereby 'a nuclear alliance'.⁸⁷ For Washington, New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance provided a small embarrassment and an important lesson. Although New Zealand's global influence was limited, the opposition of a committed ally to United States nuclear policies chipped away at the legitimacy of America's nuclear arsenal. If other allies followed New Zealand's lead, particularly as the Cold War was winding down, the scales of moral acceptability might shift further against the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons as an acceptable instrument of statecraft. The United States' termination of its security guarantee to New Zealand in 1986 was a signal to other allies not to question the nuclear policies of their patron.⁸⁸

No new strategic concept was adopted between 1968 and the end of the Cold War. In 1991, however, after German reunification and Soviet collapse, the alliance required a new direction. The Cold War being over, the allies were in position to continue the trend of reducing the military role of nuclear weapons in their defence. The drafters of the 1991 Strategic Concept – the first of its kind to be completely unclassified – described the circumstances that might lead to the use of nuclear weapons as 'even more remote' than before.⁸⁹ The 'fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces', it stated, was 'political'.⁹⁰ Probably at least partly as a response to the peace movement's revival in the late 1970s and 1980s, as well as the fallout over the ANZUS affair, the 1991 Concept expanded significantly on the 1968 Concept's themes of 'solidarity' and 'cohesion'.⁹¹ As James Steinberg, who would serve in the Bill Clinton and Barak Obama administrations, and Charles Cooper pointed out in a RAND report a year before, it was 'particularly important' for the United States that 'the European allies share the political burden' of preparing to use theatre nuclear forces.⁹² The 'Danish footnotes' to NATO communiques in the 1980s had been considered by some as 'a sign of division within the Alliance that might weaken the U.S. position in negotiations with Moscow' and 'encourage anti-nuclear protest movements in the West'.⁹³ In contrast to the 1968 Concept, which stressed solidarity and cohesion as general virtues, the 1991 Concept made explicit the nuclear dimension of alliance solidarity.

According to the 1991 Strategic Concept, 'the demonstration of Alliance solidarity' and 'common commitment to war prevention' required 'wide-spread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements'.⁹⁴ In the post-Cold War future, nuclear forces based in Europe were to provide 'an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance'.⁹⁵ The Concept thus presented nuclear weapons as

a material manifestation of transatlantic bonds between 'Europe' and 'North America'. The allies further agreed that alliance solidarity and unity were 'crucial prerequisites' for collective security:

The achievement of the Alliance's objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence. The presence of North American conventional and United States nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe.⁹⁶

Anti-nuclear advocacy of the type practiced by New Zealand in the mid-1980s would now be virtually impossible for NATO members to replicate.

In 1999, NATO finalised a sixth Strategic Concept. Adopted a month after the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to NATO, the new Concept described the circumstances that might lead to the use of nuclear weapons as 'extremely' remote.⁹⁷ The members proudly proclaimed that since 1991, they had taken 'a series of steps which reflect the post-Cold War security environment'. These included a 'dramatic' reduction of the types and numbers of sub-strategic forces; a 'significant relaxation of the readiness criteria for nuclear-armed forces'; the 'termination of standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans'; and the untargeting of specific countries.⁹⁸ At the same time, however, the alliance's shared commitment to nuclear deterrence was as strong as ever. The Strategic Concept made clear that a credible alliance posture and 'demonstration of Alliance solidarity' continued to require 'widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements'. Nuclear forces based in Europe still provided 'an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance'.⁹⁹ This language stands in sharp contrast to the first two strategic concepts' reluctance even to mention atomic weapons and insistence that strategic missions were primarily an American responsibility.

Increased NATO emphasis on sharing risks and responsibilities for nuclear defence needs placing against the backdrop of the widespread expectation that the Cold War's end would make disarmament possible.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, the theme of 'nuclear burden sharing' – opposed to just 'burden sharing' – first appeared in the wider NATO discourse at the height of the peace movement's revival in the 1980s. For example, two senior British military officers argued in 1987 that non-nuclear allies would have to contribute to 'nuclear burden sharing' through the provision of dual-capable aircraft.¹⁰¹ After all, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was about to eliminate many of the nuclear missiles deployed to Europe. Another British officer complained one year later that the United States still bore the brunt not only of the alliance's 'resource burden', but also of the 'moral burden' of nuclear defence.¹⁰² As international conventions prohibiting biological

weapons, blinding lasers, booby traps, and chemical weapons were adopted and entered into force, it became ever more difficult for NATO's liberal democracies to justify their continued reliance on nuclear arms.¹⁰³ For NATO's nuclear-armed and nuclear-hosting states, the solution remained the same: shifting more of the moral burden of nuclear defence to the alliance as a whole. Stockpile reductions and nuclear burden sharing thus constituted two sides of the same coin: to adapt to the new normative environment, nuclear deterrence had to be reduced in size militarily and shared more widely politically.

In 2009, the incoming German coalition government decided to work for 'the withdrawal of the remaining nuclear weapons from Germany'.¹⁰⁴ Guido Westerwelle, the new foreign minister, promised to 'enter talks with our allies so that the last of the nuclear weapons stationed in Germany, the relics of the Cold War, can finally be removed'.¹⁰⁵ The weapons in question were widely regarded to offer little or no militarily utility.¹⁰⁶ But the proposal was nevertheless met with a barrage of criticism from pro-nuclear actors. In a briefing note for the Centre for European Reform published even before the coalition platform became public, three former American and British officials argued that Germany 'piously' calling for withdrawal was a selfish gambit implying that it wanted 'others to risk nuclear retaliation on its behalf'.¹⁰⁷ No doubt intending to rein the Germans back in line, the group cited liberally from the Strategic Concept's claims about the link between nuclear weapons and 'alliance solidarity' and 'common commitment'. Ahead of NATO's ministerial meeting in Tallinn in April 2010, Westerwelle co-authored a letter to the NATO secretary general with colleagues from the Benelux states and Norway urging that the alliance open a serious debate about denuclearisation. The American secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, responded that the allies ought to 'recognize that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance' and that 'as a nuclear alliance, sharing nuclear risks and responsibilities widely is fundamental'.¹⁰⁸

At meetings, symposia, and in the press, outriders of the nuclear-armed allies argued vigorously that nuclear weapons in Europe were essential to maintain alliance cohesion and solidarity. Seldom or never mentioning specific states, they argued that for 'certain allies', American nuclear weapons in Europe had become an important symbol of 'Washington's continuing commitment to stand by its NATO allies'.¹⁰⁹ For the pro-nuclear actors in NATO, reversing the nuclear sharing agenda would lead to NATO losing its 'nuclear culture' and put the three nuclear-armed allies under increased 'moral pressure' to disarm.¹¹⁰ Ending nuclear sharing, in this view, could produce an unwanted focus on the nuclear-armed allies 'as "guilty", "unenlightened" and "retrograde" parties standing in the way of disarmament'.¹¹¹ Withdrawing the remaining American nuclear weapons from Europe, in other words, would remove the material symbols of the non-nuclear allies'

moral taint and involvement, increasing the moral burden on the nuclear-armed. A former British official, Paul Schulte, argued that non-nuclear allies acting as 'ungrateful financial and moral free-loaders', forcing the nuclear-armed allies to take 'sole responsibility for distasteful deterrent possibilities', could question the very viability of the alliance.¹¹² A common presumption holds that the American nuclear weapons stationed in Europe are there to reassure the Europeans, in particular NATO members bordering Russia. However, it has been argued that the states currently most opposed to withdrawing American tactical nuclear weapons from Europe are the United States and France. According to a former official in the American delegation to NATO, the most significant obstacle to withdrawal exists in Washington: 'You can buy off the Balts and the Poles in about a week if you really wanted to get the nuclear weapons out of Europe'.¹¹³

The pushback against German denuclearisation was swift and, as it turned out, overwhelming; the weapons remained in place. At the 2010 Lisbon summit, where members negotiated the seventh strategic Concept, the nuclear-sceptic allies succeeded in having the 1991 and 1999 Concepts' lines about the necessity of nuclear deployments in Europe taken out. They also succeeded in having NATO proclaim a need 'to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons'.¹¹⁴ However, the allies simultaneously agreed to 'ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements'.¹¹⁵ Maintaining that nuclear deterrence remained a 'core element of our overall strategy',¹¹⁶ the 2010 Concept also incorporated Hillary Clinton's contention that NATO was a 'nuclear alliance' and would 'remain' so 'as long as nuclear weapons exist' in the world. The result was the creation of the rhetorical veto player of the 'nuclear alliance', which has subsequently been employed in two main ways.

First, advocates of increased spending on nuclear weapons have effectively used the description of NATO as a 'nuclear alliance' to make their case. In the United States, policy-makers have agreed to a wholesale refurbishment of the American nuclear arsenal, including a renewal of all legs of the nuclear triad: land-launched missiles, nuclear-powered submarines, and strategic aircraft carrying nuclear bombs and missiles. According to the American Arms Control Association, the United States government is currently committed to spending \$1.7 trillion, accounting for inflation, on nuclear weapon systems over the course of the next three decades.¹¹⁷ One of the key arguments justifying these enormous expenses was the American responsibility to protect NATO and its allies. Indeed, advocates of modernisation argued fervently that NATO was a 'nuclear alliance' and that the United States therefore was compelled to invest to 'reassure' its allies and honour its 'extended deterrence commitments'.¹¹⁸ As put by a Congressional Commission in 2009, alliance obligations committed America to 'retain

numbers or types of nuclear capabilities that it might not deem necessary if it were concerned only with its own defense'.¹¹⁹ Enormous expenditure on nuclear weapons could thus be justified as beyond domestic political control. This does not say that many allies do not want the American nuclear security guarantee. On the contrary, many NATO members see enduring utility in nuclear deterrence. Yet it seems uncertain that most or even a single ally would have objected to a somewhat less ambitious modernisation programme.

A similar dynamic was on display in Britain. In summer 2016, when Parliament discussed modernising Britain's Trident nuclear weapon system, Prime Minister Theresa May justified her party's pro-renewal position by referring to NATO's common nuclear policy. Maintaining that Britain's nuclear weapons were not just essential for Britain's own national security, May argued that renewal was also 'vital for the future security of our NATO allies'. In fact, disarmament would 'enfeeble' Britain's NATO allies.¹²⁰ Defence Secretary Fallon argued that nuclear weapons were 'part of our commitment to NATO, which is a nuclear alliance'.¹²¹ He later added that NATO had 'always' been a nuclear alliance and that the Opposition Labour Party's 'failure to wholeheartedly back the deterrent' was a 'continuing con-cern' for Britain's partners.¹²² As in the American case, proponents of modernisation argued that long-established alliance policy tied the government's hands – that the decision was already made elsewhere and that the government was only honouring its existing obligations.

Second, NATO's organisational identity as a nuclear alliance has been leveraged to discredit advocates of denuclearisation. For example, in 2012, a group of states including Norway initiated a 'humanitarian turn' in nuclear disarmament diplomacy.¹²³ Widely seen as the start of a campaign for a treaty banning nuclear weapons, this initiative included a series of joint statements on the 'humanitarian dimension' of nuclear disarmament and three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Initially, several NATO members associated themselves with this 'humanitarian initiative', most notably Norway.¹²⁴ However, in due course, Oslo received at least one stern démarche from Washington instructing Norway to disengage from pursuing a ban. According to the Norwegian public broadcaster, the American Embassy in Norway warned Norwegian policy-makers that advocating a ban 'conflicted with Norway's membership in NATO'.¹²⁵ On 17 October 2016, the American mission to NATO sent a letter to all NATO capitals instructing them to vote 'no' on a UN resolution mandating formal negotiations on a prohibition treaty. The United States reminded its allies that the last NATO summit had reaffirmed that nuclear deterrence remained a 'core element of NATO's overall strategy' and that NATO was 'a nuclear alliance'.¹²⁶ As of 2020, no NATO member has signed the 2017

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and only one, the Netherlands, even took part in the formal negotiations.

NATO's adoption of an explicit organisational identity as a 'nuclear alliance' has enabled pro-nuclear actors to discredit disarmament initiatives whilst advocating effectively for nuclear modernisation projects and continued nuclear deployments. In this view, denuclearisation advocates unprepared to challenge NATO as an institution have lost access to the rhetorical resources required to construct a sustainable argument, to wit, subjected to 'rhetorical coercion'.¹²⁷ To cope with the growing moral burden of nuclear defence, advocates of the status quo constructed the perfect rhetorical veto player, namely the alliance itself. Machiavelli's lesson remains valid: 'Princes should delegate to others the enactment of unpopular measures and keep in their own hands the means of winning favours'.¹²⁸

Notes

1. Michael Fallon, "Opinion: Corbyn's Nuclear Wand Waving Would Play Russian Roulette with Our Safety," Sky News September 29, 2017, <https://news.sky.com/story/opinion-corbyns-nuclear-wand-waving-would-play-russian-roulette-with-our-safety-11059316>.
2. NATO, "Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," Lisbon (2010), § 17.
3. Amy F. Woolf, "Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons," United States Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC, 2017), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf>. America continues to station nuclear weapons in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. It no longer stations them in Britain, Canada, or Greece.
4. For example, Nina Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Tom Sauer and Bob van der Zwaan, "US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO's Lisbon Summit," *International Relations* 26, no. 1 (2012): 78–100; Marianne Hanson, "Normalizing zero nuclear weapons," *Contemporary Security Policy* 39, no. 3 (2018): 464–86. Some might argue that the deepening of humanitarian and human rights law does not reflect a genuine normative development, but only the "cheap talk" of governments eager to attract foreign investment or appease domestic pressure groups. Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino, "Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran," *International Security* 42, no. 1 (2017): 41–79 find that the American public broadly accepts potential nuclear use. That may well be, but as several scholars have pointed out, the distinction between cheap talk and genuine moral beliefs is in many cases a distinction without a causal difference. If caring about their reputations, even disingenuous actors have an incentive to live by their own – empty – rhetoric. See Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," *International Organization* 55, no. 1 (2001): 47–80; Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick T. Jackson, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1 (2007): 35–66.

5. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The New Era of Counterforce," *International Security* 41, no. 4 (2017): 48.
6. Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival* 39, no. 1 (1997): 159. See also Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).
7. See Tannenwald, *Nuclear Taboo*, 370.
8. See Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, *Strategic Narratives: Communications Power and the New World Order* (London: Routledge, 2013); and Nick Ritchie, "Valuing and Devaluing Nuclear Weapons," *Contemporary Security Policy* 34, no. 1 (2013): 146–73.
9. Ernest Schanzer, "The Tragedy of Shakespeare's Brutus," *English Literary History* 22, no. 1 (1955): 6–7.
10. Marina A.L. Oshana, "Moral Taint," *Metaphilosophy* 37, no. 3–4 (2006): 353–75.
11. Edward Schiappa, "The Rhetoric of Nukespeak," *Communication Monographs* 56, no. 3 (1989): 253.
12. For example, Paul A. Chilton, *Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate* (London: Frances Pinter, 1985).
13. See Malcolm Chalmers, "NATO's Nuclear Weapons," in *NATO's Tactical Nuclear Dilemma*, ed. Malcolm Chalmers and Simon Lunn (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2010), 2.
14. For example, *Ibid.*, 1–5; and David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1998).
15. Petr Suchy and Bradley A. Thayer, "Weapons as political symbolism," *European Security* 23, no. 4 (2014): 510. Cf. Steven Pifer, *NATO, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control* (Washington DC: Brookings, 2011); Paul Schulte, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO and Beyond: A Historical and Thematic Evaluation," in *Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO*, ed. Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 61–2; Beatrice Heuser, "Difficult Europeans: NATO and Tactical/Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 28, no. 3 (2017): 454–76.
16. "Preamble," *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington DC (4 April 1949).
17. For example, *Det norske Arbeiderparti, Landsmøtet 1949: Protokoll* (Oslo: Arbeidernes Aktietrykkeri, 1950).
18. UN General Assembly, "Resolution 1: Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy", (24 January 1946).
19. Adopted by the members' heads of state or government, the alliance's strategic concepts constitute the most appropriate sources for evaluating changes to its formal strategy. There is some variation in which documents are classified as "strategic concepts" and, by extension, how to count them. This analysis follows the classification outlined in NATO, "Strategic Concepts" (12 June 2018): https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm.
20. Andrew M. Johnston, *Hegemony and Culture in the Origins of NATO Nuclear First-Use, 1945–1955* (London, 2005), 133.
21. Poul Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold* (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), 503. My translation from Danish.
22. NATO, "The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area" (DC 6/1)(1950), § 5(a).
23. *Ibid.*, § 5(b).
24. *Ibid.*, § 7(a).

25. Anthony W. Buzzard, "Massive Retaliation and Graduated Deterrence," *World Politics* 8, no. 2 (1956): 229.
26. Wallace J. Thies, *Why NATO Endures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 101.
27. NATO, "The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area" (MC 3/5)(1952), § 5(a–b).
28. *Ibid.*, I, § 7(a). After initial disapproval, successive American governments have supported Britain's retention of nuclear weapons. For a retired British officer, Britain's possession of nuclear weapons "enables NATO and the US to spread the blame associated with nuclear weapons". See Nuclear Education Trust and Nuclear Information Service, "British military attitudes to nuclear weapons and disarmament" (2015): <https://www.nuclearinfo.org/sites/default/files/Military%20attitudes%20to%20nuclear%20weapons%20-20full%20report.pdf>.
29. Tannenwald, *Nuclear Taboo*, 113. See also T.V. Paul, *The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 54–56.
30. Tannenwald, *Nuclear Taboo*, 113–22.
31. Cited in Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 190.
32. Paul, *Tradition of Non-Use*, 46.
33. Dulles cited in Tannenwald, *Nuclear Taboo*, 148, 115.
34. *Ibid.*, 143, 169–70. See also Simon J. Moody, "Enhancing Political Cohesion in NATO during the 1950s or: How it Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the (Tactical) Bomb," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 40, no. 6 (2017): 817–38.
35. NATO, "Strategic Concepts".
36. Thies, *Why NATO Endures*, 167; Villaume, *Allieret med forbehold*, 514.
37. Brian Buckley, *Canada's Early Nuclear Policy* (Montreal, Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), 116.
38. NATO, "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Five Years" (MC 48) (1954), § 3(b).
39. NATO, "Strategic Guidance" (MC 14/1) (1952), § 6.
40. Cited Moody, "Enhancing Political Cohesion," 827.
41. NATO, "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area" (MC 14/2) (1957), § 14.
42. *Ibid.*, § 13(c).
43. Britain's nuclear forces were committed to NATO in 1962 and France's in 1974. See Nick Ritchie and Benoît Pelopidas, "European Nuclear Nationalism," in *Global Nuclear Disarmament*, ed. Nik Hynek and Michal Smetana (London: Routledge, 2016), 225–49.
44. Einar Gerhardsen, *I medgang og motgang: Erindringer 1955–65* (Oslo: Tiden, 1972), 314. See also Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, *Danmark under den kolde krig. Den sikkerhetspolitiske situasjon 1945–1991*, Vol. 1 (Copenhagen: Gullanders, 2005), 293.
45. Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (NY: W. W. Norton and Company, 1957), 311.
46. Cited in Trachtenberg, *Constructed Peace*, 190.
47. Leopoldo Nuti, "'Me Too, Please': Italy and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons, 1945–1975," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 4, no. 1 (1993): 122, 139.
48. Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1955–1959* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967), 92–93, 323–34.

49. Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 125.
50. Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, Danmark under den kolde krig, 305–11.
51. Gerhardsen, I medgang og motgang, 264.
52. Det norske Arbeiderparti, Protokoll over forhandlingene på det 36. ordinære landsmøte (Oslo: D.N.A.s Hustrykkeri, 1958), 269.
53. Gerhardsen, I medgang og motgang, 265.
54. Jens O. Krag, Kamp og fornyelse (København: Fremad, 1971), 101. My translation from Danish.
55. Kjetil Skogrand and Rolf Tamnes, Fryktens likevekt (Oslo: Tiden, 2001), 232–55.
56. John E. Mueller, Canada as a Non-Nuclear Power (Los Angeles, CA: University of California, 1963), 30.
57. Lawrence S. Wittner, Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 405–06. Cf. Asa McKercher, Camelot and Canada: Canadian-American Relations in the Kennedy Era (NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 176–205.
58. Janice Cavell, “Like Any Good Wife,” *International Journal* 63, no. 2 (2008): 398.
59. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 405.
60. Gerhardsen, I medgang og motgang, 314.
61. Alastair Buchan, “The Multilateral Force,” *Adelphi Papers* 4, no. 13 (1964): 3.
62. *Ibid.*, 8.
63. Stortinget, “Lukket møte i Den utvidede utenriks- og konstitusjonskomité” (1963), 4: <https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/stortingsarkivet/duuk/1946-1965/630313u.pdf>. My translation from Norwegian.
64. *Ibid.*
65. The Norwegian Socialist Left formed in 1961 in response to the Labour Party's handling of nuclear sharing in NATO.
66. Lawrence S. Wittner, *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941–1960* (NY, London: Temple University Press, 1969), 252–54.
67. See, for example, Nevil Shute, *On the Beach* (London: Heinemann, 1959); *Dr. Strangelove* (Motion Picture, 1964); *The War Game* (BBC Television, 1965).
68. The only member that did not join any of the nuclear sharing arrangements was France, which pulled out of NATO's integrated military command structure in 1966.
69. Michael Quinlan, *Thinking about Nuclear Weapons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 42.
70. David Yost, “The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence,” *International Affairs* 87, no. 6 (2011): 1404.
71. Chalmers, “NATO's Nuclear Weapons,” 2.
72. Stortinget, “Lukket møte,” 4. My translation from Norwegian.
73. Beatrice Heuser, “The Development of NATO's Nuclear Strategy,” *Contemporary European History* 4, no. 1 (1995): 54.
74. Henry A. Kissinger, “Missiles and the Western Alliance,” *Foreign Affairs* 36, no. 3 (1958): 400.
75. *Idem.*, “Coalition Diplomacy in a Nuclear Age,” *Ibid.*, 42, no. 4 (1964): 528.
76. NATO, “Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” (MC 14/3) (1968), § 8.
77. Wittner, *Resisting the Bomb*, 442.
78. Walter Pincus, “Neutron Killer Warhead Buried in ERDA Budget,” *Washington Post*, June 6, 1977, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/06/06/neutron-killer-warhead-buried-in-erda-budget/161ae957-099f-4c5b-ad19-052699d60f4d/?utm_term=.2aaf9512817.

79. Vincent A. Auger, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Analysis* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 58.
80. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle* (NY: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1983), 304–05.
81. *Ibid.*, 302.
82. Helmut Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte* (Berlin, 1987), 230.
83. *Ibid.*, 231–32.
84. Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, 303.
85. Anker Jørgensen, *Brændingen: Fra mine dagbøger 1978–1982* (København: Fremad, 1990), 292; Oddvar Nordli, *Min vei: Minner og meninger* (Oslo: Tiden, 1985); Knut Frydenlund, *Lille land – hva nå?* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1982), 131; and Gro H. Brundtland, *Mitt Liv, 1939–1986* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1997), 236.
86. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 364.
87. New Zealand Defence Council, “Report of the Naval Board” (1981).
88. See Amy L. Catalinac, “Why New Zealand Took Itself out of ANZUS,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6, no. 4 (2010): 317–88.
89. NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept” (1991), § 56.
90. *Ibid.*, § 54.
91. Stuart Croft, “NATO and nuclear strategy,” in *Security and Strategy in the New Europe*, ed. Colin McInnes (London, 1993), 123.
92. James Steinberg and Charles Cooper, “Political and Economic Issues within the Alliance,” *Rand Note* (1990): 14. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a257675.pdf>.
93. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 364.
94. NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept” (1991), § 55.
95. *Ibid.*
96. *Ibid.*
97. *Ibid.*, § 64.
98. *Ibid.*
99. *Ibid.*, § 63.
100. Geoffrey Kemp, “Regional Security, Arms Control, and the End of the Cold War,” *Washington Quarterly* 13, no. 4 (1990): 33–49.
101. Patrick Hine and William Staveley, “The Impact of Arms Control on the Balance of Nuclear and Conventional Forces,” *RUSI Journal* 132, no. 4 (1987): 10.
102. Geoffrey Howlett, “Concepts and Future Capabilities in NATO’s Northern Region,” *RUSI Journal* 133, no. 3 (1988): 16. See also Lewis A. Dunn, “NATO After Global ‘Double Zero,’” *Survival* 30, no. 3 (1988): 195–209.
103. See Ritchie and Pelopidas, “European Nuclear Nationalism,” 225–49.
104. CDU, CSU, and FDP, “Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt: Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP” (2010), 120: <http://www.csu.de/politik/beschluesse/koalitionsvertrag-zwischen-csu-csu-und-fdp/>.
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