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Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities

Abstract : A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among “interest groups”. We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.
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Submitted on : Friday, November 5, 2021 - 7:24:38 PM
Last modification on : Saturday, November 6, 2021 - 3:51:52 AM

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Olivier Bochet, Sidartha Gordon. Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities. Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2012, 74 (1), pp.52 - 67. ⟨hal-03417535⟩

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