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Voting and Contributing While the Group is Watching

Abstract : Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project, in particular want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between the way members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that multiple norms can emerge. We draw surprising policy implications, on the effect of group size, of supermajority rules and of the observability of actions.
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Preprints, Working Papers, ...
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https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03393121
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Submitted on : Thursday, October 21, 2021 - 9:38:09 PM
Last modification on : Monday, March 21, 2022 - 2:47:48 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Saturday, January 22, 2022 - 9:15:32 PM

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Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License

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Emeric Henry, Charles Louis-Sidois. Voting and Contributing While the Group is Watching. 2018. ⟨hal-03393121⟩

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