Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps

Abstract : This paper makes a first attempt at building a theory of interim Bayesian persuasion. I work in a minimalist model where a low or high type sender seeks validation from a receiver who is willing to validate high types exclusively. After learning her type, the sender chooses a complete conditional information structure for the receiver from a possibly restricted feasible set. I suggest a solution to this game that takes into account the signaling potential of the sender's choice.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadata

https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03392982
Contributor : Spire Sciences Po Institutional Repository Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, October 21, 2021 - 9:21:12 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, October 27, 2021 - 4:17:37 PM

File

2014-perez-richet-interim-baye...
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

Collections

Citation

Eduardo Perez. Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps. American Economic Review, American Economic Association, 2015, 104 (5), pp.469 - 474. ⟨10.1257/aer.104.5.469⟩. ⟨hal-03392982⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

5

Files downloads

17