Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps

Eduardo Perez (1)

1 CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research

This paper makes a first attempt at building a theory of interim Bayesian persuasion. I work in a minimalist model where a low or high type sender seeks validation from a receiver who is willing to validate high types exclusively. After learning her type, the sender chooses a complete conditional information structure for the receiver from a possibly restricted feasible set. I suggest a solution to this game that takes into account the signaling potential of the sender's choice.

Domains: Humanities and Social Sciences; Economics and Finance

Eduardo Perez. Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps. American Economic Review, 2015, 104 (5), pp.469 - 474. ⟨10.1257/aer.104.5.469⟩. ⟨hal-03392982⟩