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Article dans une revue

Strategic, Sincere, and Heuristics Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study

Abstract : We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections, but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics or they just vote sincerely.
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Article dans une revue
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https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02186615
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Soumis le : mercredi 17 juillet 2019 - 12:52:28
Dernière modification le : vendredi 2 juillet 2021 - 13:59:53

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Karine van der Staeten, Jean-François Laslier, Nicolas Sauger, André Blais. Strategic, Sincere, and Heuristics Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study. Social choice and welfare, 2010, 35 (3), pp.435 - 472. ⟨hal-02186615⟩

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