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Journal Articles Social choice and welfare Year : 2010

Strategic, Sincere, and Heuristics Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study

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Abstract

We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections, but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics or they just vote sincerely.
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hal-02186615 , version 1 (17-07-2019)

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Karine van Der Staeten, Jean-François Laslier, Nicolas Sauger, André Blais. Strategic, Sincere, and Heuristics Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study. Social choice and welfare, 2010, 35 (3), pp.435 - 472. ⟨hal-02186615⟩
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