Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Strategic, Sincere, and Heuristics Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study

Abstract : We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections, but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics or they just vote sincerely.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadata

https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02186615
Contributor : Spire Sciences Po Institutional Repository Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, July 17, 2019 - 12:52:28 PM
Last modification on : Friday, July 2, 2021 - 1:59:53 PM

Identifiers

Collections

`

Citation

Karine van der Staeten, Jean-François Laslier, Nicolas Sauger, André Blais. Strategic, Sincere, and Heuristics Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study. Social choice and welfare, 2010, 35 (3), pp.435 - 472. ⟨hal-02186615⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

49