Differentiating Agency Independence: Perceptions from Inside the European Medicines Agency - Sciences Po Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Contemporary European Research Année : 2013

Differentiating Agency Independence: Perceptions from Inside the European Medicines Agency

Résumé

The regulations granting the establishment of EU agencies were meant to ensure institutional independence in order to insulate everyday decision-making from political pressure, vested interests and political short-termism. However, recent events, including managerial resignations and the introduction of new rules concerning conflicts of interest, have brought renewed attention to the autonomy/independence debate. This article goes beyond the traditional de jure/de facto dichotomy of approaches to approaching the question of independence to consider perceptions of agency staff. It seeks to gauge the opinions of members of the European Medicine Agency’s Management Board with regard to agency autonomy, distinguishing between four types of independence: legal, financial, administrative, decision-making. It draws on data collected using questionnaires, and interpreted using the expert evaluation method, to rank the importance given to types of independence among sub-sets of stakeholders overseeing the EMA.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
422-2503-1-pb.pdf (249.68 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers éditeurs autorisés sur une archive ouverte
Loading...

Dates et versions

hal-02186542 , version 1 (17-07-2019)

Licence

Paternité - Pas d'utilisation commerciale - Pas de modification

Identifiants

Citer

Levan Makhashvili, Paul Stephenson. Differentiating Agency Independence: Perceptions from Inside the European Medicines Agency. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 2013, 9 (1), pp.4-23. ⟨10.30950/jcer.v9i1.422⟩. ⟨hal-02186542⟩
93 Consultations
178 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More