Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Lobbying under Pressure: The Effect of Salience on European Union Hedge Fund Regulation

Abstract : The virulent European Union hedge fund debate led many observers to suspect a paradigmatic battle between liberal market economies and countries in favour of tighter regulation. By contrast, this article points to the economic interests that drove government agendas. However, national preferences were not defined by the aggregate of a country's economic interests, but by very specific stakeholders only, despite the existence of opponents with considerable resources. This article argues that the unequal success of financial lobbyists depended on how their demands fitted into the government's overarching negotiation strategy. The primacy of government objectives, in turn, resulted from the high saliency of financial regulation and hedge funds in particular.
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [39 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02186537
Contributor : Spire Sciences Po Institutional Repository Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, July 17, 2019 - 12:33:25 PM
Last modification on : Friday, July 2, 2021 - 1:59:53 PM

File

jcms2314.pdf
Publisher files allowed on an open archive

Identifiers

Collections

Citation

Cornelia Woll. Lobbying under Pressure: The Effect of Salience on European Union Hedge Fund Regulation. Journal of Common Market Studies, 2013, 51 (3), pp.555 - 572. ⟨hal-02186537⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

73

Files downloads

62