Accéder directement au contenu Accéder directement à la navigation
Article dans une revue

Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation

Abstract : Banks are subject to capital requirements because their privately optimal leverage is higher than the socially optimal one. This is in turn because banks fail to internalize all costs that their insolvency creates for agents who use their money-like liabilities to settle transactions. If banks can bypass capital regulation in an opaque shadow banking sector, it may be optimal to relax capital requirements so that liquidity dries up in the shadow banking sector. Tightening capital requirements may spur a surge in shadow banking activity that leads to an overall larger risk on the money-like liabilities of the formal and shadow banking institutions.
Liste complète des métadonnées

Littérature citée [17 références]  Voir  Masquer  Télécharger
Contributeur : Spire Sciences Po Institutional Repository <>
Soumis le : jeudi 25 juin 2015 - 23:30:19
Dernière modification le : mardi 18 juin 2019 - 01:11:19
Document(s) archivé(s) le : vendredi 9 octobre 2015 - 18:05:18




Guillaume Plantin. Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation. Review of Financial Studies, The, 2015, 28 (1), pp.146-175. ⟨10.1093/rfs/hhu055⟩. ⟨hal-01168494⟩



Consultations de la notice


Téléchargements de fichiers