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. Number, Polio vaccines, measles vaccines and anti-amariale vaccines in the facility. The Housing Index components are dummies for whether the household housing has a water tap, sanitation, garbage collection, and some energy (fuel or electricity)

D. Source and *. *. Baseline-survey, 5, and 10%. Error terms are clustered at the health area level We control for the urban/rural location of the health facility. ^Each Summary Index is the equally weighted average of z-scores of its components. The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation. The components of the Infrastructure Index are dummies of whether the health facility has a water tap, electricity, a waste disposal, a sewage disposal, and a pharmacy. The components of the Equipment Index are dummies for whether the health facility has a phone, a radio, the number of electricity generators, the number of examination tables, the number of refrigerators, the number of fuel liters, and the number of kerosene liters The Stock of Vaccines Index components are the, The components for the Medical Material Index are dummies for whether the health facility has autoclaves, tensiometers, sthetoscopes, scales, gauges, microscope, and a delivery kit