Matching, Sorting and Wages - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Journal Articles LIEPP Working Paper Year : 2013

Matching, Sorting and Wages

(1) , (1) , (2)
1
2

Abstract

We develop an empirical search-matching model with productivity shocks so as to analyze policy interventions in a labor market with heterogeneous agents. To achieve this we develop an equilibrium model of wage determination and employment, which is consistent with key empirical facts. As such our model extends the current literature on equilibrium wage determination with matching and provides a bridge between some of the most prominent macro models and microeconometric research. The model incorporates long-term contracts, on-the-job search and counter-offers, and a vacancy creation and destruction process linked to productivity shocks. Importantly, the model allows for the possibility of assortative matching between workers and jobs, a feature that had been ruled out by assumption in the empirical equilibrium search literature to date. We use the model to estimate the potential gain from an optimal unemployment insurance scheme, as well as the redistributive effects of such a policy
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
wp11.pdf (959.96 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Explicit agreement for this submission
Loading...

Dates and versions

hal-01070442 , version 1 (01-10-2014)

Licence

Attribution - ShareAlike - CC BY 4.0

Identifiers

Cite

Jeremy Lise, Costas Meghir, Jean-Marc Robin. Matching, Sorting and Wages. LIEPP Working Paper, 2013, 11. ⟨hal-01070442⟩
170 View
445 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More