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Chris Beauchemin, Hugues Lagrange, Mirna Safi

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## Transnationalism and Immigrant Assimilation in France: Between Here and There?

*Imiscoe Annual Conference,  
Workshop 6: Integration and transnationalism: how are the two connected?  
Warsaw, Poland – 7-9 September 2011*

**Cris BEAUCHEMIN,  
Hugues LAGRANGE,  
Mirna SAFI**

# Transnationalism and immigrant assimilation in France: between here and there?

Cris Beauchemin<sup>\*</sup>, Hugues Lagrange<sup>+</sup>, Mirna Safi<sup>°</sup>

*IMISCOE ANNUAL CONFERENCE*

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## 1. Introduction

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French scholars and politicians have for long claimed that France was a perfect example of the assimilation paradigm, supposed to having transformed immigrants into Frenchmen in what Noiriel has labelled “le creuset français” (Noiriel 1988), the French melting pot. Even though the French assimilation model has been challenged in the last decades by new slogans such as the “droit à la différence” (right to be different) in the 1980s (Brubaker 2001) or a kind of recognition of the French “diversity” in the 2000s, the Jacobin-Republican model remains strong (Simon and Amiraux 2006). A good example of its strength is the never-ending debate on ethnic statistics and the fact that, so far, there is still no statistical system to monitor discrimination in the country (Simon 2008). One of the implicit and basic requirements of the assimilation model is that immigrants should not maintain strong relationships with their origin country. This belief is still widespread in France: according to the TeO survey, one third of the population living in metropolitan France agrees with the opinion that “to be accepted in France, you have to keep quiet about your origins”. Integration and transnational practices are thus widely seen as contradictory in French society. In this context, the objectives of our paper are twofold: first, to examine to what extent immigrants and their offspring maintain links with their origin country; and second –and more importantly– to study the relationships between transnationalism and integration.

So far, due to the lack of quantitative data in Europe, statistical studies on the links between assimilation and transnationalism are mainly focused on the US. In this context, a consensus seems to be emerging around the idea that transnational participation is not detrimental to immigrant incorporation. On the contrary, assimilation –especially from a socio-economic viewpoint– is believed to foster increased transnational engagement. This could be the case in relation to socio-cultural attachment to origin (Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002), entrepreneurship (Portes, Guarnizo et al. 2002), remittances (Sana 2005), as well as political participation (Guarnizo, Portes et al. 2003). On the other hand, some research suggests that maintaining high levels of transnational engagement may be a reaction to economic uncertainty, social hostility and discrimination mechanisms that some immigrants of the first and second generations experience in host societies (Fouon and Glick-Schiller 2002). In short, a form of “reactive transnationalism” may exist (Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002).

This paper aims at testing empirically these potential connection(s) between transnationalism and integration in the specific case of France. For this purpose, we use the data of the TeO

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<sup>\*</sup> INED

<sup>+</sup> CNRS/OSC-Sciences Po

<sup>°</sup> Sciences Po, OSC, CNRS et LSQ, CREST, INSEE

survey, a unique survey representative of the whole population living in metropolitan France with large numbers of immigrants and of their children, as well as individuals of the rest of the population. Throughout the paper, we explore four avenues:

1. To what extent are transnational activities (i.e activities out of the country of residence) a specificity of immigrants and their children? The idea is to compare the immigrants of first and second generations with other types of migrants, especially natives and persons born in one of the overseas dependencies (*départements*), in order to test the hypothesis that transnationalism is “just” an international version of the relationships that all migrants (including domestic ones) keep with their place of origin (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004).
2. Integration is classically conceived as a time-dependant process, with immigrants being more and more assimilated as time goes by and with second generations being more integrated than first generations. We thus search to what extent transnational activities depend on duration of stay and generation. And, among immigrants’ children, we explore the role of family transmission in the maintenance of transnationalism.
3. To some extent, transnational activities are expected to be resource-dependant. This is especially the case in the economic domain (investments at home, remittances) but it is also true, for instance, for travels when a long distance separates the sending and receiving countries. We thus seek the extent to which transnationalism is related to socio-economic integration into the host country in these domains. We also explore if this relation still holds for less concrete transnational activities, such as distant social relationships, reading of the media, etc.?
4. And finally, are transnational activities related to the experience of racism, discrimination or stigmatisation in the host country?

In the following section, we present the TeO survey and the potential of its data to study transnationalism. First descriptive results are displayed and show that transnational practices, defined in a broad sense as connections out of metropolitan France, do not exclusively concern immigrants and their children. The third section concentrates on the determinants of transnationalism among immigrants, exploring especially the roles of origin and of socio-economic variables. The fourth section is dedicated to the second generation. It seeks to explore the extent to which there is a process of transnationalism erosion across generations and investigates how rejection feelings can revive transnationalism among immigrants’ children. The final section concludes by providing answers to the four questions above mentioned.

## **2. Transnational practices in France: an overview**

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The TeO (“Trajectoire et Origines”) survey aims at filling the gap, largely acknowledged, in data availability on immigrants of first and second generations in France<sup>1</sup>. It is based on a nationally representative sample of 22,000 individuals aged 18 to 60. The sample covers all regions of metropolitan France, thus excluding overseas territories. The questionnaire covers a wide range of topics (education, employment, migration history, family formation, social

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<sup>1</sup> The TeO survey was conducted jointly by INED and INSEE. Data collection took place between September 2008 and February 2009. More details on the survey at [http://teo\\_english.site.ined.fr/](http://teo_english.site.ined.fr/) (in English) and even more details at <http://teo.site.ined.fr/fr/> (in French).

relationships, etc.), so that the data contains a great variety of integration indicators<sup>2</sup>. In addition, the questionnaire also includes three modules of special interest for this paper: discrimination, identity (with questions on subjective belonging), and relationships with the origin country. The TeO data thus offers an extraordinary variety of variables on transnational participation of both immigrants, of their children and also of other people surveyed for the purpose of comparison.

## Transnational practices in the TeO survey

Even though the TeO survey was especially designed to provide data on immigrants and their children, it is representative of the whole population living in metropolitan France. It does thus include various kinds of migrants: on one hand, foreign born immigrants of all origins and, on the other hand, people of French citizenship at birth who were born out of metropolitan France. This latter encompasses French citizens born in a DOM (*Département d'Outre-Mer*, i.e. French overseas dependencies), or French citizens repatriated from former colonies (i.e. people born in a place that became an independent country) and, finally, children of French expatriates. In addition, the sample includes the following groups: children of migrants (whatever their type of migratory experience), and people who are neither foreign-born migrants themselves nor children of foreign-born migrants (i.e. Metropolitan French at birth whose parents were also metropolitan French at birth). These various groups are presented in Table 1.

**Table 1. TeO Sample according to the migratory background of the interviewees**

Migratory status		unweighted numbers	weighted numbers	weighted %
Migrants (First Generation)	Immigrants (foreign born)	6 373	2 719 277	10%
	Migrants natives from DOM	545	235 297	1%
	Other migrants (French born abroad)	203	514 156	2%
Migrants' children (Second Generation)	At least one parent was foreign born	8 110	3 079 846	12%
	At least one parent was French DOM-native born	650	219 867	1%
	At least one parent was a French born abroad	460	1 324 195	5%
Metropolitan French whose parents are metropolitan French		2 523	18 558 616	70%
Total		18 864	26 651 253	100%
Source: Trajectories and Origins Survey, INED-INSEE, 2008.				
Scope: Individuals aged 18 to 50.				
Interpretation: Immigrants represent 10% of the population living in metropolitan France.				

The 2007 census was used as sampling frame for the TeO survey. However this data source was not sufficient to identify and select children of immigrants (the information on the place and citizenship of birth of the parents is not available in the French Census). Immigrants' children were thus randomly selected in a specially designed sampling frame based on a complex matching operation between data from the census, the *Echantillon Démographique*

<sup>2</sup> The questionnaire is available at:

[http://www.ined.fr/fichier/t\\_telechargement/26219/telechargement\\_fichier\\_en\\_questionnaire.teo\\_english.pdf](http://www.ined.fr/fichier/t_telechargement/26219/telechargement_fichier_en_questionnaire.teo_english.pdf)

*Permanent* (EDP) and the civil registration system<sup>3</sup>. Due to selection constraints, children of immigrants were aged 18 to 50 at the time of the survey, while persons of the other groups were interviewed between 18 and 60. For the sake of comparison, analyses in this paper are restricted to all people aged 18 to 50.

Specific analyses can be done on a large number of origin groups (see

Table 2). The larger immigrant groups were sufficiently numerous in France to avoid over-sampling in the sampling design. This regards individuals of first and second generation from Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) and from Europe (especially from Spain, Italy and Portugal). Some other groups were over-sampled to allow analyses on more recently arrived immigrants' populations, i.e. immigrants and their children from Turkey, sub-Saharan Africa, and South-East Asia.

**Table 2. Origin of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation foreign born migrants**

	First Generation			Second Generation		
	unweighted numbers	weighted numbers	weighted%	unweighted numbers	weighted numbers	weighted%
Algeria	673	372 302	14%	1 306	617 198	20%
Morocco/Tunisia	908	523 393	19%	1 122	473 820	15%
Sahelian Africa	558	118 483	4%	480	75 853	2%
West/Central Africa	651	211 615	8%	333	51 887	2%
Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos	529	79 748	3%	573	81 671	3%
Turkey	727	186 323	7%	447	62 874	2%
Portugal	547	269 881	10%	933	417 542	14%
Spain/Italy	219	98 448	4%	1 692	777 477	25%
Other EU 27 countries	542	284 919	10%	649	275 858	9%
Rest of the world	1 019	574 164	21%	575	245 667	8%
Total	6 373	2 719 276	100%	8 110	3 079 847	100%
Source: Trajectories and Origins Survey, INED-INSEE, 2008.						
Scope: Individuals aged 18 to 50.						

The TeO questionnaire covers a large variety of connections with outside metropolitan France. A total of 11 variables reflecting transnational practices or orientations are broken down in four domains (social, economic, political, symbolic) and are used in this chapter (see Table 3). Some questions were asked only to migrants (i.e. people born out of metropolitan France) and their children, while others were asked to all interviewees, including mainstream individuals without migratory background. Obviously, questions asked to these people cannot refer to their origin country (metropolitan France) as in usual questions on transnationalism, they thus refer to the connections to any place outside metropolitan France (this place being subsequently identified in the questionnaire). Questions reserved to migrants and their children, on the other hand, refer specifically to their place of origin (overseas dependency or country).

All in all, the TeO survey offers thus a unique opportunity to compare the transnationalism of people with very diverse background. Foreign born migrants can be compared with other kinds of migrants of French origin, offering the opportunity to differentiate the effects of citizenship and of long-distance migration. Migrants can be compared to their children, offering the opportunity to measure inter-generational assimilation. And comparisons with

<sup>3</sup> For more details on the sampling methodology, see:

[http://www.ined.fr/fichier/t\\_telechargement/26218/telechargement\\_fichier\\_en\\_teo.note.eng.pdf](http://www.ined.fr/fichier/t_telechargement/26218/telechargement_fichier_en_teo.note.eng.pdf)

people who are neither first or second generation migrants give an insight on the degree of general internationalization of economic, social, political and symbolic practices and orientations.

**Table 3. Indicators of transnationalism in the TeO survey**

	<b>Variables - Questions</b>	<b>Respondents</b>
<b>Economic domain</b>	Economic investment outside metropolitan France: “Are you the owner or have you personally invested in a store or business in a DOM, TOM or country other than France?”	All interviewees
	Ownership of property or land outside metropolitan France: “Do you own land, a house or an apartment, including one under construction, in a DOM, TOM or country other than France?”	All interviewees
	Provision of regular financial aid to a household outside metropolitan France: “During the past 12 months, have you provided regular financial aid to persons outside your household?”	Migrants and their children
	Financial contribution to a group project in the region of origin: “Have you ever given money to build a school, healthcare center or religious center or for other collective projects in your country, DOM or TOM of origin/your parents’ country, DOM or TOM of origin?”	All interviewees
<b>Political</b>	Interest in politics in the region of origin: “Are you interested in national politics in your country/politics in your DOM or TOM of origin or that of your parents?”	Migrants and their children
	Membership of an association of people from the region of origin: “Of the associations you belong to, do any of them comprise almost exclusively members who are from the same country, DOM or TOM as you or your parents?”	Migrants and their children
<b>Symbolic</b>	Wish to be buried outside metropolitan France: “Would you like to be buried in a foreign country or DOM?”	All interviewees
	Desire to go and live outside metropolitan France: “Are you planning to settle one day in a DOM, TOM or country other than France?”	All interviewees
<b>Social domain</b>	Personal contacts outside metropolitan France: “Do you maintain contact by letter, telephone or Internet with your family or friends living in a country outside France, a DOM or a TOM?”	All interviewees
	Stays in the region of origin: For migrants: “Since you have begun living in metropolitan France, have you returned to your country, DOM or TOM of origin?”; for descendants of migrants: “Have you ever been to your parents’ country, DOM or TOM of origin?”	Migrants and their children
	Consumption of media from the region of origin: “Do you read newspapers, listen to the radio, watch television or visit websites from your country, DOM or TOM of origin or your parents’ country, DOM or TOM of origin?”	Migrants and their children

Although diverse, the variables on transnationalism included in TeO form a consistent set: people who exhibit the highest rates of economic practices also have strong tendency towards transnationalism in the symbolic, social and/or political areas<sup>4</sup>. In order to capture the intensity of these practices as a whole, we constructed a synthetic indicator. It is a simple additive scale, i.e. a transnationalism score calculated for each respondent. The score is 0 for respondents who do not engage in any transnational practice, and 11 (the maximum) for respondents who engage in all transnational practices identified in the TeO survey<sup>5</sup>. We found

<sup>4</sup> An analysis of the multiple correlations on all 11 variables indicating transnational practices or orientations shows that these behaviours and attitudes represent a single dimension among migrants (the first axis absorbs more than 81% of the variance). The same picture emerges among children of migrants, for whom the practices also represent a whole. These results justify the construction and use of a synthetic indicator capturing all the domains simultaneously rather than several thematic indicators.

<sup>5</sup> The construction of this “aggregate score” simplifies the information contained in the survey because the possible answers in the questionnaire were not limited to a binary “yes”/“no” but included more qualified information, such as “often”/“sometimes”/“never”, or “very well”/“well”/“not very well”/“not at all”, as well as the possibility of not answering, or of answering “don’t know”. For the purposes of simplification, the responses “never”, “not at all”, “don’t know” and “refusal to answer” were classified as “no”.

that migrants are engaged in an average of four transnational practices out of a possible total of eleven (Figure 1). The aggregate score was only calculated for respondents who answered all the questions about transnational practices or orientations (see Table 3).

## **Transnationalism is not exclusive to migrants**

Regardless of their origin, migrants' transnational engagement covers all the domains (economic, political, symbolic and social, see Table 4). At the same time, migrants do not have a monopoly on transnational practices, nor even the highest frequency of linkages with regions outside metropolitan France.

Firstly, immigrants (i.e. foreign born migrants) are not the only group to have economic relations with regions outside metropolitan France. While these are very infrequent among people born in metropolitan France with no migratory background, they are significant among French citizens born in a DOM or abroad (repatriated citizens and children of expatriates). Nevertheless, it is in the economic domain that migrants seem to differ the most from the rest of the population, even though the frequency of economic practices is fairly low compared with the other domains.

Other types of transnational practice are indeed very common, starting with communication by telephone, letter and email with people who do not live in metropolitan France. Almost nine migrants in ten say they practise this type of long-distance interaction (85%, Table 4). The proportion is the same for French citizens born in the DOM (89%), and 67% among French citizens born abroad, and as high as 29% among French citizens born in metropolitan France who do not come from a migrant background. That result reflects the internationalization of social relations, including among French citizens who are not first- or second-generation migrants.

For French citizens who were not born in metropolitan France (non-foreign migrants), the region or country of origin (i.e. of birth) remains an important place of reference, but the propensity to return<sup>6</sup> is highly dependent on the political status of the place of birth. The vast majority of people born in a DOM (i.e. a current French dependency) have returned to visit their region of origin at least once (85%). Most of them were not only born in a DOM, they also have the bulk of their family there. The percentage is only 47% among French citizens born abroad, who are mostly repatriated citizens of former colonies or children of expatriates. Decolonization caused a profound rupture, so that repatriated citizens are less likely to return to their regions of birth, which have since become independent countries. For children of French expatriates, the experience of life abroad was usually temporary and therefore not conducive to building strong enough ties to encourage returning. With much lower frequencies, similar gaps appear with respect to linkages maintained in metropolitan France with people of the same origin through membership of associations. The percentages of people born in a DOM and their children who belong to associations in which people of their origin are involved are similar to those of the foreign-born migrants.

Attachment to the country of origin may be reflected in specific social practices based on personal interaction (telephone calls, visits, membership of associations) or in an intellectual interest in politics, the economy, culture or sports in the country of origin. For example, 68% of foreign born migrants say they read a newspaper or website, listen to a radio station or watch a television channel from their country of origin. Here again, interest in the country or

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<sup>6</sup> This variable does not indicate the length of these visits. They may be short holidays or longer stays. However, they are all nevertheless temporary stays, since the individuals were living in metropolitan France at the time of the survey.



region of birth is not exclusive to international migrants and their children. Some 69% of migrants from the DOM and 59% of their children say they read, watch or listen to a media source from their region of origin. These high frequencies can probably be attributed to the availability of dedicated media sources (notably France Ô and Radio Ô, that are public television and radio companies).

**Table 4. Percentage of people involved in transnational practices by migration experience**

	First Generation			Second Generation			Metropolitan French whose parents are metropolitan French
	Immigrants (foreign born)	Migrants from DOM-TOM	Other migrants (French born)	International migrants	Migrants from DOM-TOM	Other migrants	
<b>Economic domain</b>							
Economic investment outside metropolitan France	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ownership of land or a home outside metropolitan France	17	11	8	4	4	0	1
Regular financial assistance provided to a household outside metropolitan France	14	6	1	3	1	2	1
Financial contribution to a collective project in the region of origin	9	7	4	7	3	3	-
<b>Political domain</b>							
Interest in politics in the region of origin	67	64	47	50	58	35	-
Membership of an association of people of the same origin	5	4	1	4	3	0	-
<b>Symbolic domain</b>							
Wish to be buried outside metropolitan France	32	37	9	14	11	3	1
Plan to settle outside metropolitan France	14	44	18	13	22	12	7
<b>Social domain</b>							
Personal communication outside metropolitan France	88	89	67	58	73	39	29
Visits to the region of origin	85	86	47	84	85	18	-
Consumption of media from the region of origin	68	69	23	39	59	8	-

Source: Trajectories and Origins Survey, INED-INSEE, 2008.

Scope: Individuals aged 18 to 50.


Interpretation: 32% of migrants wish to be buried outside metropolitan France.

NB: The results for migrants broken down by origin are available upon request.

That brief overview of transnational practices clearly shows that foreign born migrants and their children do not have a monopoly on linkages with spaces outside metropolitan France. Firstly, our results show that people with no recent migratory background also have –to some extent– linkages outside metropolitan France. This indicates an internationalization of exchanges, however more in the social than in the material domain. Secondly, a large percentage of French citizens born in a DOM or abroad also maintain linkages outside metropolitan France. That result shows that being born outside metropolitan France predisposes people to an external orientation, even when the connection to the region of origin seems slim. Thirdly, the results for French citizens who were born in a DOM support the idea that transnationalism is strongly associated with the region of origin for both international and internal migrants (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). Furthermore, people born in a DOM have a higher aggregate score than international migrants (Figure 1). In detail, the score of DOM natives is concentrated in the symbolic and social domains, where they sometimes have much higher scores than immigrants of first and second generation (Table 4). At the same time, the breakdown of origins shows clearly that international migrants are not a homogeneous group in terms of transnational practices. With an average of almost five

transnational practices, migrants from the Sahel are twice as transnational as migrants from South-East Asia, who have an average aggregate score of 2.5 (Figure 1).

**Figure 1. Average transnationalism score of first- and second-generation migrants by group of origin**



### 3. Does origin have an impact on the transnationalism of international migrants?

The variation in aggregate transnationalism scores (Figure 1) among international migrants suggests that the intensity of transnational practices is highly dependent on origin. This idea is also supported by the results for children of migrants, who also exhibit sharp differences by origin, even if the intensity of transnationalism is lower in the second generation. For instance, children of migrants from South-East Asia are still half as transnational as children of migrants from the Sahel. However, this result has several limitations. The aggregate score is a useful summary of the diverse practices but it smooths over “specializations” by origin, that are expected in light of the literature on different population groups. Another limitation is that the results presented so far leave out many factors other than origin involved in transnationalism. The origin effect, apparently demonstrated by the average scores in Figure 1, depends at least partly on the socio-demographic characteristics or migration histories of the different populations. The low transnationalism of immigrants from South-East Asia might thus have much more to do with their migration experience (a migration of exile causing a strong rupture with their country) than with their origin *per se*. Similarly, the intensity of transnationalism could depend on the age at which migrants left their countries of origin. The low transnationalism of people born in Spain or Italy might be due to the fact that they came to France at a very young age (70% arrived before 16). This section of the paper therefore seeks to clarify the specific role of origin in the intensity and nature of migrants’ transnationalism, taking into account the groups specificities.

In order to identify the specific impact of origin on transnational practices and isolate the influence of socio-economic or socio-demographic variables, we tested logistic models for each of the 11 transnational practices and performed linear regressions on the aggregate

transnationalism scores. Table 5 shows the results of the linear regressions of the aggregate score, and Appendix 2 contains the results of the logistic regression estimations for each of the transnational practices. In this section, we first analyse the effects of the variables that influence the intensity of immigrants' transnationalism (demographic and socio-economic characteristics and migration experience), then investigate whether origin still has an impact on transnationalism, all other things being equal.

## **Transnational practices: the role of migration conditions, sociodemographic characteristics and socioeconomic status**

The descriptive results (Figure 1) show that the intensity of transnationalism varies with origin. However, as above suggested, those results may be dependent on the migration experience and on the demographic or socio-economic structure of the different groups. We will now attempt to isolate those structural effects. Apart from origin, which characteristics tend to increase the intensity of transnationalism among first- and second-generation migrants? Below we examine the role of the conditions of migration, socio-demographic characteristics and socio-economic status.

### *The migration experience*

In accordance with the hypotheses advanced above, the migration experience appears to be a powerful determinant of the intensity of migrants' transnationalism. It is approached in our models by a variable indicating immigration status on entry into France. Unsurprisingly, refugees, who have gone into exile, have often broken with their countries of origin (Table 5, Model I3). Depending on the domain, refugees are between 17% and 75% less likely to be engaged in transnational practices than immigrants who came to France under family reunification (Appendix 3). A precarious immigration status also seems to restrict transnational practices: respondents who said they were applying for legalization, or who were unable or unwilling to specify their immigration status, or who said they came to France on a tourist visa, all have much lower transnationalism scores across all the domains. The results for the impact of immigration status are also indicative of the impact of mixed marriage on some practices: people who migrated to France as the spouse of a French citizen are 20% less likely than those who came under family reunification (i.e. as the spouse of an immigrant) to consume media from their country of origin, to wish to be buried there, to own land or a house there, or to participate in collective investments there. The only practice they are more likely to engage in (more than twice as likely, in fact) is personal contact with people in their country of origin by telephone, letter and email, etc.

Does age at arrival in France affect migrants' transnational practices? We would expect transnationalism to increase with age on entry, since people who left their countries of origin when they were young had less time to form strong ties there<sup>7</sup>. Arrival in France after the age of 12 is associated with a higher transnationalism score (Table 5, Model I3). And the itemized results show that transnationalism increases with age on entry for 7 of the 11 practices analysed across the four domains (see Appendix 3).

### *The impact of demographic characteristics*

After controlling for age on entry, does age in general have an impact? According to the results of the regression performed on the aggregate score (Table 5, Model I3), the answer is no. This result nevertheless needs to be qualified since the influence of age depends on the type of transnational practice. Older people are more involved in the economic domain and

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<sup>7</sup> This hypothesis has rarely been tested, since most analyses focus on the effect of length of residence in the host country, with highly variable results (Carling, 2008). Our models do not test the impact of that variable.

are much more likely to visit their country of origin and to belong to associations of people of the same origin. This age effect may reflect the fact that older people are more available and have had more time to accumulate financial capital. Conversely, older people are less likely to engage in long-distance communication, to consume media, to be interested in politics or to want to leave France before or after they die (Appendix 3). Some of those results may be due to older people's lower competence in new communications technologies. They also suggest that it is not among older people that nostalgia and symbolic linkages are the most frequent, contrary to what might be expected.

Lastly, gender plays an important role. Men exhibit a higher intensity of transnational practices (Table 5). A careful examination of the different practices show that men's aggregate result is concentrated in economic and political activities, whereas the gender gap is not significant in the social and symbolic domains (Appendix 3).

To sum up, the impact of demographic variables depends on the domain of transnationalism. The economic domain displays a low sensitivity to age but a high sensitivity to gender, whereas the reverse is true of the symbolic and social domains.

#### *The impact of socio-economic status*

Is transnationalism sensitive to international migrants' socio-economic status? In the literature, two conflicting hypotheses are developed. One hypothesis is that transnationalism depends on migrants' financial capacity, particularly in the material and political domains. That assumption is to some extent fairly banal: you can only invest if you have resources. The other hypothesis is that transnationalism is "reactive", driven primarily by a sense of exclusion, possibly fuelled by problems of socio-economic integration, particularly for some discriminated groups. How valid are these hypotheses? To answer that question, we analysed the impact of two socio-economic indicators: education and income.

On the whole, compared with people who have no education, transnational practices are more frequent among people with a low education level (primary schooling) or with a very high level (tertiary), and less frequent among people with an intermediate level (Table 5, Models I2 and I3). While the impact of education varies with practices (Appendix 3), there is a constant result worthy of note: in almost all the domains, the people with the highest education level (two or more years of higher education) are the most likely to be transnational. The only exception is the wish to be buried outside metropolitan France, on which education has either a neutral or a negative influence. Conversely, an interest in politics in the country of origin increases sharply with education level. Lastly, in the economic area (except for collective investment), transnational activities are not especially sensitive to education level (few significant results).

The intensity of aggregate transnationalism increases with income (Table 5, Models I2 and I3). Some individual practices are not sensitive to income, however: consuming media from the country of origin, wishing to be buried outside France, belonging to an association of people of the same origin, and participating in collective investments. Overall, despite the few exceptions mentioned, transnational practices are fairly socio-economically selective: the most educated and affluent respondents are the most transnational, which suggests that transnationalism is not incompatible with migrants' socio-economic integration.

**Table 5. Factors associated with the transnationalism score of first- and second-generation migrants**

	1st generation			2nd generation		
	Model I1	Model I2	Model I3	Model D1	Model D2	
Origin	Ref = Algeria	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00	0,00
	Morocco/Tunisia	0,280***	0,27***	0,23***	0,437***	0,30***
	Sahelian Africa	0,900***	0,87***	0,80***	1,045***	0,90***
	West/Central Africa	0,084	0,08	0,07	0,319***	0,13
	Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos	-1,277***	-1,33***	-0,58***	-0,794***	-1,04***
	Turkey	0,758***	0,76***	0,86***	1,564***	1,46***
	Portugal	-0,326***	-0,26***	0,02	-0,087	-0,14**
	Spain/Italy	-0,422***	-0,44***	-0,19	-0,343***	-0,27***
	Other EU 27 countries	0,138	-0,04	-0,17*	-0,422***	-0,45***
	Rest of world	0,019	-0,10	-0,04	0,303***	0,12
Sex	Ref = female		0,00	0,00		0,00
	male		0,21***	0,23***		-0,03
Age	Ref = 18-25		0,00	0,00		0,00
	26-35		0,28***	0,07		-0,19***
	36-45		0,38***	0,12		-0,37***
	46+		0,35***	0,07		-0,59***
education level	Ref = No education		0,00	0,00		0,00
	Primary education		0,44***	0,32***		0,08
	Junior secondary education		0,17**	0,17**		0,30***
	Two-year vocational secondary		-0,27***	-0,01		0,25***
	Three-year vocational secondary		0,12	0,31***		0,42***
	Secondary education		0,23***	0,15**		0,54***
	Two years of higher education		0,39***	0,41***		0,48***
Occupation	More than two years of higher education		0,60***	0,44***		0,71***
	Ref = Manual worker		0,00	0,00		0,00
	Farmer		0,06	0,31		-0,75
	Self-employed, businessperson		0,16*	0,23**		0,13
	Manager		-0,22**	-0,06		0,15*
	Intermediate occupations		-0,13*	0,06		0,05
	Clerical/sales		-0,05	0,01		0,01
Income per consumption unit	Not working		0,14**	0,13*		0,01
	Less than €79		0,00	0,00		0,00
	€79-€900		0,18**	0,16**		-0,02
	€900-€1,309		0,26***	0,26***		0,04
	€1,309-€1,833		0,28***	0,29***		-0,19**
	€1,833-€2,500		0,15	0,25**		-0,09
	More than €2,500		0,55***	0,50***		-0,04
Immigration status on entry	Not reported		0,07	0,08		-0,22***
	Ref = family reunification			0,00		
	Refugee or refugee family member			-0,98***		
	Student			-0,01		
	Work			-0,05		
	Spouse of French citizen			-0,09		
	Other			-0,12		
	French/EU			-0,13		
	Applying for legalization			-0,92***		
	Don't know			-0,58***		
Age on entry	visa			-0,60***		
	Unspecified document			-0,49***		
	Ref = came before 12			0,00		
	Btw 12 and 20			0,79***		
Age on entry	Btw 21-27			0,97***		
	Over 27			1,03***		
Constant	3,975***	3,22***	2,87***	2,801***	2,73***	
Number of observations	6 190	6 190	5 787	8 102	8 102	

Source: Trajectories and Origins Survey, INED-INSEE, 2008.

Scope: 1st generation migrants (Models I1 to I3) and 2nd generation migrants (Models D1 and D2) aged 18 to 50.

Methodology: Linear regressions of the aggregate transnationalism score. All the explanatory variables from the models are shown in the table.

Interpretation: The results for each variable can be used to compare different parameters with the reference parameter (ref). All other things being equal, a value above 0 indicates that a variable tends to increase an individual's aggregate transnationalism score, while a value below 0 indicates a negative impact. The stars on the right of the values indicate whether the differences between the value of the observed category and the value of the reference category (by definition 0) is statistically significant. The more stars, the more significant the result. No stars means that the difference with the reference category is not statistically significant. Legend: \*\*\*: p<0.01; \*\*: p<0.05; \*: p<0.10.

NB: detailed results of the logistic regressions performed on each transnational practice are reported in appendix 3.

## **The determinant impact of origin on migrants' transnationalism**

Do these explanatory variables account for all of the differences in transnationalism between groups of different origins highlighted by the descriptive statistics (Figure 1)? The answer is no. A comparison of the results of Models I1 and I2 for migrants shows that the coefficients of the groups of origin change little when the variables of gender, age and education level are introduced (Table 5). Conversely, the introduction of the migration experience variables does have some impact. A comparison of Models I2 and I3 confirms the hypotheses advanced earlier. The low transnationalism of immigrants from South-East Asia is largely due to their experience of exile: their coefficient is considerably lower when the "immigration status on entry" variable is introduced into the model. When age on entry is controlled (Model I3), migrants from Spain, Italy and Portugal become as transnational as migrants from Algeria, the reference group in the models, with coefficients close to zero and not significant (while their coefficient was significantly negative in Model I1). Although these factors do narrow the gaps, significant differences between groups of different origins persist. Coming from Sahelian Africa or Turkey considerably increases the intensity of transnational practices, which remains higher than among North Africans and Europeans, and much higher than among South-East Asians (Table 5). Looking at itemized transnational practices, the differences by origin reappear (Appendix 3). We even observe forms of "specialization" by certain groups in specific domains: sub-Saharan Africans in the economic domain; Turks in the social and symbolic domains; and Europeans in visits to the country of origin.

### *Sub-Saharan Africans' economic transnationalism*

Compared with the other groups, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa exhibit strong economic transnationalism. In this area, they systematically exhibit much higher probabilities than immigrants of other origins, all other things being equal (Appendix 3). They are the only group more likely than the reference group (Algeria) to invest in a business or shop; they have record levels of personal monetary transfers (almost six times more than Algerians); they are among the groups that most frequently own land or homes outside metropolitan France; and they are highly likely to participate in collective investments. What are the reasons for these results? Social structures probably play a major role in tying sub-Saharans – and Sahelians in particular – to their countries of origin and fostering collective and interpersonal solidarity across borders. The community of origin (usually the village of origin) is commonly an important place of reference in West African Sahel. The organization of village-based migrants' associations in France is an illustration of this. We know that these associations play a major role in channelling collective investments into building schools, health centres, places of worship and even irrigation systems to expand cropping (Quiminal 1991; Lavigne-Delville 2000). We also know that they exert powerful social control, reminding migrants of their social and economic obligations to relatives still living in the home country (Chort, Gubert et al. 2010). It should be stressed that the sub-Saharan concept of family does not follow the nuclear model: the basic socio-economic unit remains the extended family (Findley 1997), which considerably increases the number of people to whom migrants can send financial aid (Attias-Donfut, Wolff et al. 2005). Especially as migration can be viewed as an income diversification strategy for family groups, with migrants being "sent" abroad in order to maximize the family's resources and diversify the risks incurred by its members (Guilmoto 1997). Lastly, sub-Saharans' substantial remittances can probably also be attributed to the expression of greater needs in the countries of origin: African households are among the poorest in the world (even if migrants rarely come from the most destitute families), they rarely benefit from social insurance systems, and governments themselves appeal to migrants for assistance. Regarding personal investment, the sub-Saharans' "specialization" lies in

“businesses” (or shops) more than in home ownership<sup>8</sup>. They are three to five times more likely to invest in a business or a shop than Algerians. This type of investment is nevertheless rare, concerning only 2% to 3% of sub-Saharanans (Appendix 1), a result that suggests that migrants are far from being the regular investors that co-development policies would have them be.

#### *Turks’ social and symbolic transnationalism*

Migrants of Turkish origin stand out with a much higher propensity than other groups to engage in transnational practices in the social and symbolic domains. Compared with Algerians, they are six times more likely to consume media from their country of origin, practically three times more likely to maintain personal contact with people who live in the country of origin and almost twice as likely to want to be buried in their country of origin. What are the factors behind these results? Here again, we can see the influence of social structures and particularly the importance of the extended family, which Turks manifest more through long-distance communication (telephone calls, letters, the Internet) than through financial transfers (Autan and Manry 1998), unlike the sub-Saharan population. We can also see, particularly in the symbolic domain, the influence of a strong national identity, related to the history of the Turkish nation-state and its promotion of national culture and values, including among migrants (Kastoryano 1998). There is also the effect of “transnational supply” from the country of origin. Indeed, in order for migrants to consume media from their country of origin, those media have to exist. The supply of Turkish media outside Turkey seems to be unmatched (De Tapia 1998; Hopkins 2009). To a certain extent, interest in politics follows a similar logic. People are more interested in politics when their country of origin has a democratic political system with regular elections in which migrants are allowed to participate. That is the case of Turkish migrants and many sub-Saharan migrants (who have also high levels of political interest) who have access in Europe to political associations from their countries of origin (Amelina and Faist 2008; Lacroix, Sall et al. 2008).

#### *Europeans’ visits to their countries of origin*

And a final “specialization”: although overall they have a low level of transnationalism, European migrants are far more likely than the other populations to visit their countries of origin. Spaniards and Italians are ten times more likely and Portuguese four times more likely to visit their countries than Algerians (the reference population in the model in Appendix 3). This is partly because these countries neighbour France. A gradient seems to emerge, which decreases with geographical distance and degree of political freedom of the country of origin. Europeans travel back more often than North Africans and Turks, who travel back more often than sub-Saharanans, who travel back more often than South-East Asians. A counter-intuitive result also appears. We might expect transnationalism to increase with visits to the home country, but the results show that this is not necessarily the case. The most transnational groups (sub-Saharanans and Turks) have low probabilities of visiting their countries of origin, while the least transnational group (Europeans) has a high propensity to return to the country of origin.

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<sup>8</sup> Sub-Saharan Africans differ little from Turks or Portuguese with respect to investment in land or houses, where Turkish and Portuguese migrants also score highly. The advantage of investing in real estate is that it is gradual (construction usually takes years). It facilitates trips to the country by providing a place to stay; it represents a preparation for a permanent return to the country (a wish expressed by many migrants) while conferring on migrants social prestige in their society of origin (De Villanova, Leite, et al., 1994). But investment in real estate can also be an economic strategy: land and houses are highly profitable sectors in the cities of the South and migrants participate actively in speculation (Tall, 1994). It is also a type of investment that requires less expertise and less presence than a business (or shop).

### *Diffuse transnationalism*

These transnational “specialities” should not obscure more diffuse or less intense forms of transnationalism, however. Firstly, there is little difference between the groups for some practices, such as membership of associations of people of the same origin (even if sub-Saharan are ahead of the others) and the wish to settle outside France, which is found in all groups, albeit with varying intensity, with the exception of Algerian migrants. They are probably deterred by the political context and unsafe conditions in Algeria in recent decades. Secondly, even the least transnational groups have a high probability of engagement in some transnational practices. For example, migrants from South-East Asia have a high propensity to make collective investments (three times more than Algerians) and – in a correlated way – to belong to associations of people from the same origin (four times more than Algerians). Although of low-intensity, South-East Asian transnationalism is mainly of a different type: it seems more focused on collective organization, probably even within the host country, than on personal relationships and interactions, such as through visits or remittances.

## **4. Transnationalism in second-generation migrants: family transmission and/or social reaction?**

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Origin does not only influence the transnationalism of first-generation migrants. The descriptive results (Figure 1 and Table 4) have already clearly shown that children of migrants maintain transnational linkages in relatively high proportions and that these linkages vary with origin. The transnational ranking by origin is similar between the two generations. However, the social mechanisms that influence the nature and intensity of the transnational practices of second-generation migrants, who were born and socialized in France, may differ from the factors involved in the transnationalism of their parents. The relationship between first-generation migrants and their countries of origin is based mainly on the fact that they lived there. In the second generation, that relationship is mediated by parents, who choose to transmit – or not to transmit – their material, social and symbolic attachment to their country of origin. We propose the hypothesis that the transmission of transnationalism from one generation to the next depends on identification with their parents’ culture of origin. However, we also propose the hypothesis that the transnationalism of second-generation migrants is not only dependent on family but at least partly on their own experiences of life in France. Previous studies have shown that the most transnational individuals are also those that most frequently report having experienced discrimination. Indeed, the rate of reported discrimination in the past five years is 10% among second-generation immigrants who have no linkages with abroad, but six times higher (60%) among second-generation migrants who engage in nine or more transnational practices (Beauchemin, Lagrange et al. 2010). If one cannot exclude that a negative perception of the host country influences both the score of transnationalism and the perception of discriminations, these results suggest that transnationalism in the second generation could reflect, more than in the first, a reaction against discrimination experienced in French society. This hypothesis will be examined in the next section.

### **Inter-generational erosion or transmission of transnationalism?**

According to conventional assimilationist theory, the behaviour of migrants’ children shifts away from that of their parents and converges with that of the mainstream population. Consequently, some authors contest the use of the concept of transnationalism for second-generation immigrants. In the United States, the low rate of transmission of the language of



the country of origin, combined with extremely rare intentions of returning to their parents' countries have prompted some scholars to express strong doubts about the existence of transnationalism in the second generation (Portes 1996; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Nevertheless, despite weaker tangible linkages with the country of origin in the second generation, some empirical studies have highlighted the transmission of some transnational practices from one generation to the next, particularly among certain groups (Levitt and Waters 2002). The idea of an absolute break with the country of origin does not seem to apply any more to the second generation than to the first. Through their socialization, the children of migrants may acquire the social connections and skills – such as knowledge of the language and cultural codes – to forge these linkages if they feel a need or use for them during their lifetimes. The country of origin apparently remains a potential reference point for the children of migrants, which may be particularly mobilized in certain circumstances. By asking both migrants and migrants' children about their linkages with the country of origin, the TeO survey can be used to test these two hypotheses, namely the erosion or the transmission of transnational practices from one generation to the next<sup>9</sup>.

The descriptive results provide initial support for an inter-generational erosion of transnationalism in almost all domains (Table 4). The decline in transnational behaviour also seems to occur across all origins and is sharper than among the children of French citizens born out of metropolitan France (Figure 1). Despite this apparent erosion process, children of international migrants often maintain linkages with abroad. For example, 59% consume media from their parents' country of origin, 73% maintain long-distance communication with people living outside metropolitan France, and 85% have travelled to their parents' country. Erosion thus seems to be only partial, whereas at least some transnational practices are transmitted. However, as for first-generation migrants, the aggregate scores are influenced by structural effects: they do not show the specific impact of origin or generation, but do reflect the fact that not all groups have the same profile (age, occupational category, etc.).

We control for these effects in Model D2 (Table 5)<sup>10</sup>. A comparison of Models I2 and D2 reveals few common factors in the two generations' transnationalism. Firstly, in the second generation, gender differences in participation are minimal and non-significant. The effects of being born and growing up in France seem to cancel the gender gap observed in first-generation migrants. For some practices – personal contact, monetary transfers, wanting to be buried in the country of origin – women are actually more transnational than men. Secondly, transnational practices generally decrease with age after 25, with two exceptions in the economic domain: sending money to a household abroad, and ownership of property. A third difference is that while the transnationalism of first-generation migrants increases with household income level, the transnationalism of second-generation immigrants seems fairly

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<sup>9</sup> It is important to stress that inter-generational transmission unfortunately cannot be tested directly in the TeO, because the second-generation migrants surveyed are not the children of the first-generation migrants surveyed. To analyse transmission in the strict sense, we would have to put the questions about transnational practices to migrants and their own children. However, assuming that the differences observed in the transnational practices of migrants are relatively stable over time, we can nevertheless advance the hypothesis of transmission as an explanation for the similarity of results concerning the impact of origin on transnational practices in the first and second generations (for example, Sahelian Africans are the most transnational of first-generation migrants, and the children of Sahelian Africans are also the most transnational of second-generation migrants).

<sup>10</sup> We performed the same steps for second-generation migrants as for first-generation migrants. To identify the specific effects of origin on transnational practices and isolate the influence of socio-economic or socio-demographic variables, we constructed a series of models in which a logistic model is dedicated to each of the 11 transnational practices and a linear regression is performed on the aggregate transnationalism score. Table 5 shows the results of the linear regressions of the aggregate score. Appendix 3 contains all the results of the logistic regressions performed on each transnational practice.

insensitive to income. Ultimately, there is only one factor shared by both generations: transnationalism generally increases with education level.

Once the effects of these demographic and socio-economic variables have been controlled, a comparison of Model I2 and Model D2 shows that the differences in intensity of transnational practices between different origins endure from one generation to another (Table 5). Having been born and having grown up in France does not eliminate references to the country of origin. On the contrary even in the case of second-generation Turkish migrants. While Turkish migrants exhibit a lower level of transnationalism than Algerians (Model I2), children of Turkish migrants show a higher level of transnationalism than children of Algerian migrants (Model D2). Furthermore, the forms of transnationalism shift from one generation to the next towards a homogenization of practices. In particular, we observe a convergence of the practices of the most transnational groups (sub-Saharanans and Turks). The “specialities” observed in some migrant groups tend to blur. For example, in the second generation, economic transnationalism is no longer confined to the children of sub-Saharanans, who have been caught up by the children of Turkish migrants. Meanwhile, children of Turkish migrants no longer have the pre-eminent position their parents displayed in the social and symbolic domains as they have been caught up by children of sub-Saharan Africans. The children of Italian, Spanish and Portuguese migrants are not either the only group to be much more likely than Algerians (reference population) to visit their parents’ country of origin.

To identify the impact of generation on transnational practices more clearly, we included migrants and children of migrants in the same models. Again, we estimate the probability of practising one of the eleven transnational activities or to increase the global score (the itemized results are shown in Appendix 5). In each model, we introduced an interaction term for origin and generation, after controlling for gender, age, education level, income and occupational category. The ratio of the interaction term can show, for each origin, whether a second-generation migrant is more or less likely to engage in transnational practices than a first-generation migrant. The first striking result is that the vast majority of ratios are significant and below 1. They thus reflect a decline – in some cases steep – in transnational practices in the second generation compared with the first. The results of the linear regression on the aggregate score are also stark: the probability of transnationalism remains much lower in the second-generation than in the first, across all origins. However, when we look more closely at the differences, indicator by indicator, we find some cases where the ratios are significant and higher than 1. Three domains stand out with increased transnationalism in the second generation.

The first is visits to the country of origin: the children of Turkish and sub-Saharan migrants are more likely to visit the country of origin than first-generation migrants of the same origins (Appendix 5). In that respect, the results of the model support the descriptive results in Appendix 1. This probably reflects specific upbringing practices. Various qualitative studies, particularly of Turkish families, suggest that parents seek to limit the acculturation of children born in France in order to facilitate a permanent return to the country (Kastoryano 1998). Children’s visits to the country are part of this strategy. These visits, which can last several years (Beauchemin, Hamel et al. 2010), are also seen by parents from these origins as having a positive influence on upbringing and are facilitated by family systems where caring for children is as much the responsibility of the extended family – uncles, aunts and grandparents – as of the parents themselves (Barou 2001).

The second domain where transnationalism increases is collective transnational practices, measured either by collective investment or by membership in associations in which people of the same origin are involved. Here again, the children of Turkish migrants stand out, but on a par with children of North African migrants. That result reflects an inter-generational shift in transnationalism, which is more collective among children of migrants from the southern and

eastern Mediterranean, who are also developing new forms of collective organization (Kaya and Baglioni 2008). That change is indicative of an ongoing attachment to the country of origin and the developing of new types of investment as opportunities for personal transfers are fewer (the children of migrants have fewer close relatives in the country of origin than migrants).

Lastly, one of the most surprising results is the wish to leave France, with estimated ratios often close to 1. The ratios are even significantly higher than 1 among children of Algerian migrants. Those results lend themselves to two types of interpretation. They may reflect the second generation's enduring affective attachment to the country where their parents were born. However, the wording of the question – which asks about the wish to leave France but not specifically to “return” to the parents' country – does not enable us to fully validate that hypothesis. A wish to live outside France might also reflect discomfort felt by children of migrants, or even a sense of exclusion due to a disadvantaged position on the labour market and discrimination, which they relatively frequently report having experienced.

### **Transnationalism, discrimination and sense of belonging**

In order to examine the influence of family transmission and/or experiences of rejection (discrimination, racism and stigmatization) on the transnational practices of second-generation migrants, we applied a series of dedicated nested models to that population. To Model D2 (Table 5) we first added a block of variables that indicates identification with the parents' culture of origin (Model D3, Table 6). The block includes both a variable that describes an ascribed characteristic (whether the parents' marriage is mixed or not) and two other achievement variables that reflect choices made, wholly or partly, by the respondent: a spouse from the same origin, and competence in the parents' language<sup>11</sup>. Model D4 incorporates a block of variables that measure several types of experiences of discrimination (discrimination experienced in the past five years; racism experienced during one's lifetime) or stigmatization (perception of not being considered French; living in an area classified as a “sensitive urban area”<sup>12</sup>). Lastly, Model D5 adds another synthetic variable of identification based on the responses to the sentence pair: “I feel French” and “I feel [parents' nationality of origin]”. Two methodological reservations should be taken into account when interpreting these models. Firstly, since the variables introduced into models D3 to D5 are correlated with each other, we have to be attentive to the variation in coefficients between the models. Secondly, except for the parents' marriage variable, which is a prior determinant of the practices included the transnationalism score, it is not possible to infer relationships of causality from the results of the models. Rather the results can be used to measure the varying correlations between transnationalism, maintenance of the culture of origin, discrimination/stigmatization and sense of belonging.

#### *Identification with the parents' culture*

All other things being equal, respondents both of whose parents are migrants exhibit higher transnationalism scores than descendants of mixed marriages, i.e. individuals with a French mother or father (Model D3, Table 6). Partly this is an automatic effect: people both of whose parents are migrants have more opportunities to be involved in transnational relations, to travel to the country of origin, and to maintain various linkages with maternal and paternal grandparents living outside France. That “automatic” effect is also found in the results for the

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<sup>11</sup> While the mother tongue spoken is typically an inherited characteristic, the level of competence (“What is your level in [language]?”) is an ideal-type indicator of performance.

<sup>12</sup> “Sensitive urban areas (*zones urbaines sensibles* in French) form an administrative category for areas that receive targeted public policy support, and that are consequently stigmatized.

respondent's spouse: second-generation migrants whose spouse is a second-generation migrant of the same origin have higher transnationalism scores than second-generation migrants whose spouse is French or French parents. The gap is even bigger when the spouse is a first-generation migrant. To sum up, family composition can create opportunity effects for transnational practices. These are even more frequent if the second-generation speaks the language of their parents' country.

Knowledge of the parents' language plays a mediating role by enabling transnational linkages. It also reflects an interest in maintaining the culture of origin by the respondent (who keeps up his/her knowledge of the language) and by his/her parents (who first transmitted their language). Furthermore, the coefficients associated with origin of spouse and competence in the language of origin are particularly high, which suggests that these performative aspects of identification with the culture of origin are directly correlated with our measure of transnationalism.

In fact, the results for the variables of identification with the parents' culture cannot be attributed solely to an "automatic" effect of exposure. A comparison of Model D3 and Model D5 (Table 6) shows that the level of transnationalism is highly correlated with the sense of belonging conferred by the family heritage. In Model D5, the impact of the parents' marriage (mixed or not) is considerably reduced (the difference between the two categories becomes almost zero). It is absorbed by the variable for sense of belonging. To conclude, transnational behaviour can be attributed both to an "automatic" exposure to the country of origin and to a transnational sensibility constructed over a lifetime by maintaining competence in the language transmitted by the parents and/or by choosing a spouse who is a first- or second-generation migrant (not necessarily of the same origin).

#### *Discrimination and stigmatization*

Regardless of the intensity of the linkages that people maintain with their culture of origin, the experience of discrimination in the past five years and, to an even greater extent, of racist treatment during their lifetime is associated with high transnationalism (Models D4 and D5, Table 6). The increase in transnationalism is the highest for children of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, who seem to most strongly embody "reactive" transnationalism<sup>13</sup>. Stigmatization does not seem to play as big a role as the tangible experience of racism, and can even have the opposite effect to what we might expect from a reactive perspective. On one hand, living in a sensitive urban area – in other words, not in the kind of area where "everyone lives" – increases the intensity of transnationalism (Models D4 and D5, Table 6)<sup>14</sup>. On the other hand, people who perceive they are considered to be French tend to be more transnational than people who perceive they are considered to be foreign. This result suggests that transnationalism is not only reactive, but is also practised by people who do not feel foreign in French society. That idea is corroborated by the results about sense of belonging.

#### *Sense of belonging*

Non surprisingly, respondents who say they feel they belong exclusively to their parents' country have much higher transnationalism scores than respondents who say they feel exclusively French. However, feeling equally French and foreign (either because the respondent has a dual sense of belonging, or because he/she expresses no sense of belonging) is also associated with an increased intensity of transnational practices. These results show

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<sup>13</sup> This result comes from a series of models that tests the impact of discrimination on each migrant group separately (detailed results not shown).

<sup>14</sup> It is possible that the impact of this variable is lowered by its precise date, namely the place of residence at the time of the survey, whereas the factors that encourage transnational practices the most are those that take place over a lifetime (identification with the culture of origin, racism experienced during one's lifetime, etc.).

that transnationalism is not incompatible with a sense of belonging to France, even if it logically increases when people also feel they belong to another place.

The way people self-identify – as French and/or the nationality of origin – is highly correlated with the intensity of transnationalism (coefficients among the highest in Model D5, Table 6). The sense of belonging is constructed by adding all the life experiences. The sense of belonging variable thus automatically absorbs most of the impact of the variables previously introduced into the models (identification with the parents’ culture, experiences of discrimination, racism or stigmatization).

**Table 6. Effects of identification with the culture of origin, discrimination, stigmatization and sense of belonging on transnationalism in second-generation migrants**

		D3	D4	D5
<b>Variables of identification with parents' culture</b>				
Parents' marriage: mixed	Ref = parents of same origin	0,00	0,00	0,00
	mixed marriage_parents	-0,28***	-0,23***	-0,07*
Respondent's marriage: mixed	Ref = married to French spouse whose parents are French (including DOM-TOM)	0,00	0,00	0,00
	not married	0,17***	0,17***	0,14***
	migrant from same country	1,14***	1,11***	0,99***
	migrant from another country	0,65***	0,64***	0,62***
	2nd gen same country	0,56***	0,54***	0,47***
	2nd gen another country	0,20***	0,18***	0,10
Language used at home during childhood	French only	0,00	0,00	0,00
	Foreign language basic	0,40***	0,34***	0,22***
	Foreign language - fluent (oral and/or written)	1,10***	1,04***	0,81***
<b>Variables on experiences of discrimination, racism or stigmatization</b>				
Has experienced discrimination in the past 5 years	No		0,00	0,00
	Yes		0,16**	0,10
Has experienced racism during his/her lifetime	No		0,00	0,00
	Yes		0,32***	0,28***
Living in a sensitive urban area in 2008	No		0,00	0,00
	Yes		0,15***	0,09*
Perception that not considered French	No		0,00	0,00
	Yes		0,33***	0,20***
<b>Variable of self-identification</b>				
Sense of belonging	Ref = belong in France only			0,00
	country of origin only			1,44***
	both countries			0,94***
	no country			0,85***
Constant		1,91***	1,56***	0,90***
Number of observations		8 102	8 102	8 102
Source: Trajectories and Origins Survey, INED-INSEE, 2008.				
Scope: Second-generation migrants aged 18 to 50				
Methodology: Linear regressions of the aggregate transnationalism score. Control variables not show n: origin, gender, age, education, socio-occupational category, income (see Appendix 6 for detailed coefficients).				
Interpretation: The results for each variable can be used to compare different parameters with the reference parameter (ref). All other things being equal, a value above 0 indicates that a variable tends to increase an individual's aggregate transnationalism score, while a value below 0 indicates a negative impact. The stars on the right of the values indicate whether the differences between the value of the observed category and the value of the reference category (by definition 0) is statistically significant. The more stars, the more significant the result. No stars means that the difference with the reference category is not statistically significant. Legend: ***: p<0.01; **: p<0.05; *: p<0.10.				

## 5. Conclusion

Immigrants’ transnationalism is an inflamed political topic. It often fuels a discourse of suspicion about the allegiance of first- and second-generation migrants and is sometimes considered to impede the integration of migrants’ children. Transnationalism is also the subject of major academic debate in the sociology of migration. Is it a relevant concept? Does it apply to modern forms of migration? Does it endure? In France, those academic and political debates have rarely had an opportunity to present empirical evidence describing and

analysing the transnational phenomenon as a whole. That is the fundamental contribution of this research: it provides the first elements of a quantitative framework for transnational activities in French society by measuring the political, economic, social and symbolic linkages that the whole population of metropolitan France engages in outside that space. These data and results are original under several respects;

The data enable us to inventory transnational practices and the populations that engage in them. That inventory reveals the diversity of transnational linkages and their configurations and highlights three main results. Firstly, migrants and their children do not have a monopoly on transnationalism. The other segments of the French population also engage in transnational practices, especially French citizens born out of metropolitan France, DOM or abroad, and their children. Transnationalism therefore seems more connected to migration history (individual and family, or even collective in reference to migration associated with colonization and decolonization) than to citizenship at birth. Secondly, even if the intensity of transnationalism varies with domain, it is hardly a massive phenomenon in migrant populations. And, paradoxically, it is precisely the transnational practices that attract the most attention in the political and theoretical debates on transnationalism – namely economic and business activities – that are the least common. Thirdly, while geographical origin plays a determinant role in the intensity of transnationalism, no single group concentrates all types of transnational linkages. On the contrary, some groups specialize in certain practices (sub-Saharan Africans in the economic domain, Turks in the symbolic and political domains, and Europeans in the social domain). We sought explanations for these transnational profiles in the objective elements of the migration history of these groups and in the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of their societies of origin.

This article makes another contribution by proposing a discussion, supported by statistical evidence, on the relationship between the transnationalism of migrants and their children and their integration into the host society. That issue, central to contemporary sociology of migration, particularly in the United States, is especially thorny as the literature develops contradictory hypotheses. In this chapter, we have treated that link between integration and transnationalism from two different angles, which reflect these hypotheses.

The first involves exploring whether transnationalism on the individual level is a practice that requires a certain type of integration into the host society, particularly socio-economic, or whether in fact it reflects a failure of the integration process that encourages migrants (or their children) to turn reactively towards their country of origin or their parents' one. The data support both hypotheses. On the one hand, our analyses consistently show that transnational practices are socio-economically selective. The individuals engaged in these practices have more resources, both in terms of human capital and income, than individuals who do not engage in transnationalism. On the other hand, the results also highlight a reactive transnationalism, particularly among the children of migrants, who tend to be more transnational when they report having been victims of discriminations or racism.

The second angle of analysis looks more broadly at the link between transnationalism and the integration process. In absolute terms, longitudinal data, monitoring individuals over the course of their lifetimes, are required to investigate this issue in more depth. The Trajectories and Origins Survey nevertheless makes it possible to explore the extent to which transnationalism is a phenomenon that endures over time and across generations. Regarding the first generation, the empirical data presented in this chapter do not seem to show a decline in transnationalism with age or time spent in France. They do, however, reveal a decrease in transnational practices from one generation to the next. Transnationalism is nevertheless still transmitted across generations, even though it tends to change in nature (more collective than individual, more symbolic than economic). Our last analyses of the second generation show that their transnationalism can be ascribed both to heritage (degree of exposure to

transnational practices depending on whether one or both parents are migrants, learning and transmission of their parents' language, etc.) and to an identification strategy (correlated with the choice of a spouse according to his/her origin, experience of discrimination, and a sense of belonging to the country of origin).

These various analyses can probably be summarized by one main idea: far from being the source (or consequence) of "failures" (a failure to integrate or belong in France), transnationalism could be described as a set of resources embedded in the structural conditions of the individual's migration history. These resources may be symbolic or material and are used by individuals living here or there.

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## Percentage of people with connections out of metropolitan France according to origin

	Symbolic Domain		Political Domain		Social Domain			Economic Domain				Global score of transnationalism
	Wish to be buried outside metropolitan France	Plan to settle outside metropolitan France	Interest in politics in the region of origin	Membership of an association of people of the same origin	Personal communication outside metropolitan France	Visits to / sojourns in the region of origin	Consumption of media from the region of origin	Economic investment outside metropolitan France	Ownership of land or a home outside metropolitan France	Regular financial assistance provided to a household outside metropolitan France	Financial contribution to a collective project in the region of origin	
All migrants (born out of metropolitan France)	32%	14%	67%	5%	88%	85%	68%	1%	17%	14%	9%	4,0
All migrants' children	14%	13%	50%	4%	58%	84%	39%	0%	4%	3%	7%	2,8
Metropolitan French whose parents at	1%	7%	-	-	29%	-	-	0%	1%	1%	-	-
<b>First Generation</b>												
Algeria	40%	7%	67%	2%	86%	92%	67%	1%	11%	10%	7%	3,9
Morocco/Tunisia	47%	10%	62%	3%	89%	95%	71%	1%	17%	15%	9%	4,2
Sahelian Africa	48%	29%	73%	16%	93%	74%	71%	2%	22%	39%	21%	4,9
West/Central Africa	26%	21%	68%	9%	91%	60%	61%	3%	14%	32%	15%	4,0
Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos	4%	9%	45%	4%	65%	53%	43%	0%	2%	9%	14%	2,5
Turkey	53%	11%	72%	9%	93%	92%	89%	0%	20%	8%	13%	4,6
Portugal	28%	19%	54%	4%	79%	98%	59%	0%	22%	5%	4%	3,7
Spain/Italy	19%	18%	66%	2%	79%	99%	61%	1%	6%	2%	3%	3,6
Other EU 27 countries	19%	16%	77%	5%	94%	94%	70%	2%	16%	9%	5%	4,1
Rest of the world	21%	16%	74%	6%	90%	72%	68%	2%	20%	16%	11%	4,0
DOM	37%	44%	64%	4%	89%	86%	69%	0%	11%	6%	7%	4,2
French citizens born abroad	9%	18%	47%	1%	67%	47%	23%	0%	8%	1%	4%	-
<b>Second Generation</b>												
Algeria	23%	11%	56%	3%	52%	76%	38%	0%	4%	3%	9%	2,8
Morocco/Tunisia	31%	17%	47%	3%	69%	86%	45%	0%	6%	5%	12%	3,2
Sahelian Africa	32%	25%	62%	9%	72%	78%	54%	1%	9%	11%	23%	3,8
West/Central Africa	8%	27%	62%	4%	66%	62%	38%	0%	5%	7%	5%	2,9
Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos	2%	17%	45%	3%	53%	35%	24%	0%	1%	2%	10%	1,9
Turkey	48%	17%	64%	12%	76%	96%	73%	0%	6%	3%	17%	4,1
Portugal	6%	9%	42%	4%	60%	95%	42%	0%	4%	2%	4%	2,7
Spain/Italy	2%	9%	48%	2%	51%	92%	32%	0%	2%	1%	1%	2,4
Other EU 27 countries	3%	11%	49%	5%	54%	78%	27%	0%	1%	2%	2%	2,3
Rest of the world	9%	25%	59%	5%	68%	75%	43%	1%	6%	4%	10%	3,1
DOM	11%	22%	58%	3%	73%	85%	59%	0%	4%	1%	3%	3,2
French citizens born abroad	3%	12%	35%	0%	39%	18%	8%	0%	0%	2%	3%	-

Source: Trajectories and Origins Survey, INED-INSEE, 2008.

Scope: Individuals aged 18 to 50.

## Appendix 2

## Socio-demographic factors associated with transnational practices of immigrants

	Social Domain						Symbolic Domain			
	Personal communication outside metropolitan France		Visits to / sojourns in the region of origin		Consumption of media from the region of origin		Wish to be buried outside metropolitan France		Plan to settle outside metropolitan France	
	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se
<b>Ref = Algeria</b>										
Morocco/Tunisia	1,38*	0,23	1,97***	0,45	1,18	0,13	1,24**	0,13	1,41*	0,27
Sahelian Africa	1,78***	0,38	0,25***	0,05	1,02	0,14	1,16	0,14	3,92***	0,73
West/Central Africa	1,50**	0,28	0,12***	0,02	0,74**	0,09	0,44***	0,06	3,13***	0,57
Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos	0,28***	0,04	0,08***	0,01	0,40***	0,05	0,09***	0,02	1,48*	0,31
Turkey	2,16***	0,42	1,17	0,25	4,94***	0,80	1,53***	0,17	1,72***	0,33
Portugal	0,59***	0,10	4,07***	1,51	0,77**	0,10	0,56***	0,07	3,35***	0,65
Spain/Italy	0,51***	0,11	5,89**	4,29	0,92	0,15	0,41***	0,08	2,40***	0,60
Other EU 27 countries	2,03***	0,47	1,00	0,25	1,21	0,16	0,42***	0,06	1,98***	0,39
Rest of world	1,17	0,19	0,19***	0,03	0,96	0,11	0,42***	0,05	2,05***	0,36
<b>Ref = female</b>										
male	0,86	0,08	0,84**	0,07	1,08	0,07	1,05	0,07	1,25***	0,11
<b>Ref = No education</b>										
Primary education	1,79**	0,42	1,10	0,23	1,31*	0,21	1,27*	0,18	1,51**	0,26
Junior secondary education	1,24	0,19	1,36**	0,19	1,20	0,13	0,71***	0,08	1,15	0,17
Two-year vocational secondary	0,69***	0,08	0,99	0,13	0,68***	0,06	0,65***	0,06	0,77*	0,11
Three-year vocational secondary	1,00	0,17	1,06	0,17	0,98	0,12	0,67***	0,09	1,06	0,18
Secondary education	2,17***	0,39	1,37**	0,19	1,04	0,11	0,74***	0,08	1,02	0,15
Two years of higher education	1,73***	0,31	1,39**	0,22	1,29**	0,15	0,84	0,10	1,21	0,19
More than two years of higher education	2,45***	0,41	1,79***	0,25	1,47***	0,15	0,75***	0,08	1,67***	0,22
<b>Ref = 18-25</b>										
26-35	1,33*	0,19	1,40***	0,18	1,17	0,13	1,09	0,11	0,83	0,10
36-45	1,36**	0,19	2,11***	0,27	1,04	0,11	0,87	0,09	0,65***	0,08
46+	1,33*	0,21	2,38***	0,36	1,03	0,12	0,61***	0,07	0,52***	0,08
<b>Ref = Manual worker</b>										
Farmer	0,61	0,42	2,55	2,85	1,59	1,07	0,15*	0,16	1,41	1,11
Self-employed, businessperson	1,47*	0,29	1,38*	0,27	0,87	0,12	0,82	0,11	1,15	0,21
Manager	0,75	0,15	1,00	0,19	0,68***	0,09	0,79	0,12	1,09	0,18
Intermediate occupations	0,71**	0,10	1,16	0,17	0,77**	0,08	0,73***	0,08	1,01	0,14
Clerical/sales	0,97	0,12	1,00	0,11	0,84**	0,07	0,91	0,08	1,22*	0,15
Not working	0,91	0,13	0,98	0,13	1,12	0,11	1,24**	0,12	1,80***	0,23
<b>Less than €579</b>										
€579-€900	1,44**	0,21	1,30**	0,17	1,11	0,12	0,97	0,10	0,98	0,14
€900-€1,309	1,42**	0,21	1,84***	0,25	1,05	0,12	1,01	0,11	1,01	0,14
€1,309-€1,833	1,46**	0,23	1,78***	0,26	0,90	0,10	0,84	0,10	1,33*	0,20
€1,833-€2,500	1,47**	0,28	1,67***	0,30	0,84	0,11	0,71**	0,10	0,99	0,18
More than €2,500	2,45***	0,61	2,94***	0,65	1,02	0,15	0,93	0,15	1,61***	0,30
Not reported	0,99	0,17	1,48**	0,25	0,95	0,13	0,81	0,11	1,15	0,20
_cons	3,71***	0,86	4,49***	1,06	1,97***	0,34	1,06	0,18	0,07***	0,02
Number of observations	6 190		6 190		6 190		6 190		6 190	

note: \*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

## Appendix 2

## Socio-demographic factors associated with transnationalism

	Economic Domain								Political Domain				Global score of transnationalism	
	Economic investment outside metropolitan France		Ownership of land or a home outside metropolitan France		Regular financial assistance provided to a household outside metropolitan France		Financial contribution to a collective project in the region of origin		Interest in politics in the region of origin		Membership of an association of people of the same origin			
	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	coef	se
<b>Ref = Algeria</b>														
Morocco/Tunisia	0,84	0,47	1,80***	0,28	1,82***	0,29	1,37*	0,26	0,70***	0,08	1,07	0,34	0,27***	0,08
Sahelian Africa	2,62*	1,36	2,75***	0,46	6,41***	1,07	3,40***	0,65	1,49***	0,21	6,81***	1,92	0,87***	0,10
West/Central Africa	3,98***	1,92	1,52**	0,26	5,19***	0,83	2,42***	0,45	0,90	0,11	4,06***	1,16	0,08	0,09
Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos	0,17	0,19	0,24***	0,07	0,82	0,16	2,36***	0,45	0,37***	0,05	2,82***	0,86	-1,33***	0,09
Turkey	0,29	0,24	2,11***	0,34	0,99	0,19	2,15***	0,40	1,33**	0,16	4,34***	1,22	0,76***	0,09
Portugal	0,39	0,32	1,68***	0,29	0,33***	0,08	0,58**	0,15	0,58***	0,07	1,95**	0,64	-0,26***	0,10
Spain/Italy	1,08	0,79	0,59*	0,16	0,13***	0,07	0,36**	0,15	0,80	0,14	1,45	0,64	-0,44***	0,13
Other EU 27 countries	1,92	1,00	1,16	0,21	0,80	0,16	0,76	0,18	1,09	0,15	2,14**	0,69	-0,04	0,10
Rest of world	1,51	0,74	2,15***	0,32	1,72***	0,27	1,40*	0,26	0,98	0,11	2,26***	0,64	-0,10	0,08
<b>Ref = female</b>														
male	2,10***	0,56	1,24**	0,10	1,49***	0,13	1,46***	0,14	1,17**	0,08	1,89***	0,24	0,21***	0,05
<b>Ref = No education</b>														
Primary education	0,83	0,65	1,63***	0,25	1,43*	0,27	1,11	0,24	1,35**	0,18	1,36	0,33	0,44***	0,10
Junior secondary education	1,08	0,53	0,93	0,13	1,41**	0,19	1,31*	0,21	1,31***	0,13	1,16	0,24	0,17**	0,08
Two-year vocational secondary	0,89	0,42	0,71***	0,09	0,62***	0,09	1,26	0,18	1,26***	0,11	0,98	0,19	-0,27***	0,07
Three-year vocational secondary	0,82	0,49	0,84	0,15	1,06	0,18	1,72***	0,31	1,70***	0,22	1,64**	0,37	0,12	0,09
Secondary education	0,94	0,45	1,18	0,16	1,06	0,15	1,06	0,18	1,77***	0,19	1,11	0,24	0,23***	0,08
Two years of higher education	0,41	0,28	0,86	0,13	1,28*	0,19	1,54**	0,26	2,27***	0,27	1,60**	0,35	0,39***	0,09
More than two years of higher education	1,81	0,72	1,34**	0,17	1,03	0,14	1,49***	0,22	3,25***	0,36	1,58**	0,30	0,60***	0,08
<b>Ref = 18-25</b>														
26-35	1,68	0,89	1,98***	0,34	2,41***	0,43	1,65***	0,29	0,89	0,09	1,54**	0,34	0,28***	0,08
36-45	1,94	1,02	3,57***	0,59	3,04***	0,53	2,10***	0,37	0,92	0,09	1,75**	0,38	0,38***	0,07
46+	2,34	1,28	4,43***	0,77	3,12***	0,58	1,95***	0,37	0,92	0,11	2,17***	0,51	0,35***	0,08
<b>Ref = Manual worker</b>														
Farmer			2,05	1,25	0,67	0,72	1,99	1,56	1,24	0,75	1,22	1,29	0,06	0,43
Self-employed, businessperson	4,26***	1,75	1,16	0,18	1,32*	0,21	1,25	0,22	1,03	0,13	1,39	0,29	0,16*	0,09
Manager	0,91	0,44	0,69**	0,11	1,06	0,18	0,94	0,18	1,01	0,14	0,49***	0,13	-0,22**	0,10
Intermediate occupations	0,92	0,42	0,73**	0,10	0,89	0,12	1,21	0,17	1,14	0,12	1,10	0,20	-0,13*	0,08
Clerical/sales	0,92	0,39	0,88	0,10	1,04	0,12	0,91	0,12	1,01	0,09	0,96	0,16	-0,05	0,06
Not working	2,03	0,89	1,29**	0,16	0,60***	0,09	1,05	0,16	1,05	0,10	1,14	0,21	0,14**	0,07
<b>Less than €579</b>														
€79-€90	0,77	0,37	1,16	0,16	1,23	0,19	1,00	0,16	1,27**	0,13	1,13	0,22	0,18**	0,08
€90-€1,309	0,87	0,40	1,22	0,17	1,63***	0,25	1,20	0,19	1,17	0,12	0,96	0,19	0,26***	0,08
€1,309-€1,833	1,18	0,55	1,47***	0,22	1,95***	0,31	1,20	0,20	1,22*	0,14	0,80	0,17	0,28***	0,08
€1,833-€2,500	1,63	0,82	1,42**	0,25	2,01***	0,37	0,87	0,18	1,17	0,16	0,64*	0,17	0,15	0,10
More than €2,500	2,44*	1,23	1,70***	0,31	2,73***	0,53	1,22	0,26	1,30*	0,20	1,35	0,36	0,55***	0,11
Not reported	0,61	0,39	1,19	0,20	1,03	0,21	0,81	0,17	1,31**	0,17	0,68	0,18	0,07	0,10
_cons	0,00***	0,00	0,03***	0,01	0,02***	0,01	0,03***	0,01	1,26	0,21	0,01***	0,00	3,22***	0,13
Number of observations	6 176		6 190		6 190		6 190		6 190		6 190		6 190	

note: \*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

## Socio-demographic and migration related factors associated with transnational practices of immigrants

	Social Domain						Symbolic Domain			
	Personal communication outside metropolitan France		Visits to / sojourns in the region of origin		Consumption of media from the region of origin		Wish to be buried outside metropolitan France		Plan to settle outside metropolitan France	
	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se
Ref = Algeria										
Morocco/Tunisia	1,31	0,24	1,91***	0,48	1,18	0,14	1,19	0,13	1,47*	0,29
Sahelian Africa	1,11	0,26	0,26***	0,05	0,92	0,13	1,14	0,15	4,18***	0,83
West/Central Africa	1,11	0,24	0,14***	0,03	0,67***	0,09	0,44***	0,06	3,09***	0,60
Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos	0,52***	0,11	0,21***	0,05	0,62***	0,10	0,17***	0,04	2,34***	0,57
Turkey	2,80***	0,59	1,37	0,31	6,04***	1,04	1,69***	0,20	1,91***	0,39
Portugal	0,93	0,17	3,96***	1,58	1,17	0,16	0,64***	0,09	3,44***	0,72
Spain/Italy	0,78	0,19	10,08**	10,28	1,27	0,24	0,47***	0,10	2,53***	0,68
Other EU 27 countries	1,51	0,41	1,43	0,41	1,03	0,15	0,37***	0,06	1,91***	0,41
Rest of world	1,07	0,21	0,26***	0,05	0,93	0,11	0,43***	0,05	2,25***	0,43
Ref = family reunification										
Refugee or refugee family member	0,47***	0,08	0,17***	0,03	0,52***	0,07	0,34***	0,05	0,58***	0,10
Student	1,20	0,22	1,07	0,19	0,82*	0,10	0,94	0,11	1,20	0,17
Work	0,95	0,16	1,02	0,19	0,68***	0,08	1,02	0,11	1,28*	0,17
Spouse of French citizen	2,27***	0,63	1,25	0,22	0,80*	0,10	0,81**	0,09	0,96	0,14
Other	1,42	1,06	0,96	0,39	1,02	0,37	0,68	0,23	0,90	0,37
French/EU	1,00	0,17	0,74	0,14	0,85	0,10	0,97	0,12	1,26	0,19
Applying for legalization	0,73	0,36	0,09***	0,03	0,42***	0,13	0,53**	0,17	0,23**	0,14
Don't know	0,83	0,14	0,64**	0,12	0,49***	0,06	0,55***	0,08	0,69*	0,13
visa	0,75	0,29	0,82	0,23	0,38***	0,08	0,73	0,16	0,58*	0,19
Unspecified document	1,08	0,35	0,63*	0,17	0,66**	0,13	0,78	0,16	0,51**	0,16
Ref = came before 12										
Btw 12 and 20	4,25***	0,54	1,35**	0,18	2,63***	0,24	1,74***	0,17	1,17	0,14
Btw 21-27	6,44***	1,03	1,30*	0,19	3,13***	0,31	2,11***	0,21	1,24	0,16
Over 27	7,68***	1,38	0,67***	0,10	3,90***	0,42	2,17***	0,23	1,19	0,17
Ref = female										
male	0,88	0,10	0,94	0,09	1,14*	0,08	1,05	0,08	1,15	0,11
Ref = No education										
Primary education	1,26	0,31	1,23	0,28	1,14	0,19	1,16	0,17	1,49**	0,27
Junior secondary education	1,31	0,22	1,51**	0,24	1,29**	0,15	0,68***	0,08	1,19	0,18
Two-year vocational secondary	1,10	0,14	1,06	0,16	0,91	0,09	0,81**	0,08	0,77*	0,12
Three-year vocational secondary	1,30	0,25	1,34	0,25	1,14	0,16	0,76*	0,11	1,19	0,22
Secondary education	1,90***	0,39	1,41**	0,22	1,00	0,12	0,71***	0,08	0,96	0,15
Two years of higher education	2,05***	0,43	1,48**	0,26	1,40**	0,19	0,84	0,11	1,25	0,21
More than two years of higher education	1,95***	0,38	1,77***	0,29	1,33**	0,16	0,65***	0,08	1,51***	0,22
Ref = 18-25										
26-35	0,80	0,14	1,49**	0,23	0,86	0,11	0,94	0,11	0,86	0,12
36-45	0,71**	0,12	2,88***	0,47	0,68***	0,09	0,71***	0,08	0,70**	0,10
46+	0,66**	0,13	3,56***	0,68	0,66***	0,09	0,50***	0,07	0,56***	0,09
Ref = Manual worker										
Farmer	1,07	1,18	3,61	4,76	4,12	4,39	0,15*	0,17	1,56	1,26
Self-employed, businessperson	1,84***	0,41	1,22	0,26	0,98	0,14	0,88	0,12	1,09	0,21
Manager	1,09	0,26	0,90	0,20	0,89	0,13	0,89	0,14	1,13	0,20
Intermediate occupations	0,94	0,15	1,02	0,17	0,98	0,11	0,84	0,10	1,06	0,16
Clerical/sales	1,17	0,16	0,88	0,11	0,93	0,09	0,97	0,09	1,22	0,15
Not working	0,91	0,14	0,84	0,12	1,12	0,12	1,29**	0,13	1,80***	0,24
Less than €579										
€579-€900	1,49**	0,24	1,11	0,16	1,13	0,13	0,93	0,10	0,94	0,14
€900-€1,309	1,67***	0,27	1,57***	0,23	1,10	0,13	0,98	0,11	1,01	0,15
€1,309-€1,833	1,76***	0,31	1,49**	0,24	0,98	0,12	0,82	0,10	1,28	0,20
€1,833-€2,500	1,99***	0,43	1,56**	0,32	0,97	0,14	0,72**	0,11	0,96	0,18
More than €2,500	2,29***	0,64	2,24***	0,56	1,08	0,18	0,88	0,15	1,44*	0,28
Not reported	1,04	0,20	1,45*	0,28	1,03	0,15	0,80	0,11	1,04	0,19
_cons	1,83**	0,50	4,88***	1,35	1,35	0,27	0,85	0,16	0,06***	0,02
Number of observations	5 787		5 787		5 787		5 787		5 787	

note: \*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

## Socio-demographic and migration related factors associated

	Economic Domain								Political Domain				Global score of transnationalism	
	Economic investment outside metropolitan France		Ownership of land or a home outside metropolitan France		Regular financial assistance provided to a household outside metropolitan France		Financial contribution to a collective project in the region of origin		Interest in politics in the region of origin		Membership of an association of people of the same origin			
	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	coef	se
Ref = Algeria														
Morocco/Tunisia	1.28	0.77	1.86***	0.30	1.79***	0.30	1.27	0.25	0.67***	0.08	1.01	0.33	0.23***	0.08
Sahelian Africa	3.68**	2.08	2.47***	0.44	5.90***	1.02	3.54***	0.71	1.40**	0.21	6.60***	1.95	0.80***	0.10
West/Central Africa	4.97***	2.64	1.40*	0.25	4.91***	0.82	2.68***	0.53	0.80*	0.11	4.14***	1.24	0.07	0.09
Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos	0.31	0.35	0.37***	0.11	1.23	0.28	2.89***	0.66	0.48***	0.07	4.13***	1.40	-0.58***	0.11
Turkey	0.38	0.33	2.37***	0.40	1.01	0.20	2.02***	0.39	1.38**	0.18	4.24***	1.23	0.86***	0.09
Portugal	0.59	0.52	2.28***	0.42	0.46***	0.12	0.57**	0.15	0.72**	0.10	2.21**	0.76	0.02	0.10
Spain/Italy	1.10	0.85	0.78	0.22	0.16***	0.09	0.42**	0.18	0.99	0.19	1.90	0.86	-0.19	0.13
Other EU 27 countries	1.39	0.81	0.93	0.18	0.68*	0.14	0.79	0.20	1.02	0.16	1.96*	0.68	-0.17*	0.10
Rest of world	1.69	0.91	2.02***	0.32	1.57***	0.26	1.51**	0.30	0.96	0.12	2.22***	0.67	-0.04	0.08
Ref = family reunification														
Refugee or refugee family member	0.99	0.50	0.64***	0.10	0.75*	0.12	0.52***	0.09	0.75**	0.09	0.57***	0.12	-0.98***	0.08
Student	0.42*	0.20	0.84	0.12	1.04	0.15	0.69**	0.11	1.21	0.15	1.11	0.22	-0.01	0.08
Work	0.58	0.28	1.13	0.14	1.02	0.15	0.98	0.15	0.87	0.09	0.79	0.15	-0.05	0.07
Spouse of French citizen	0.80	0.37	0.78*	0.10	1.25	0.17	0.64***	0.11	1.02	0.12	0.84	0.18	-0.09	0.07
Other			1.39	0.48	1.75*	0.59	0.95	0.41	0.53**	0.17	0.46	0.34	-0.12	0.22
French/EU	2.09*	0.89	0.77*	0.12	0.65**	0.12	0.70*	0.13	0.88	0.10	0.72	0.17	-0.13	0.08
Applying for legalization	0.73	0.80	1.08	0.37	0.70	0.27	0.92	0.37	0.73	0.22	1.77	0.73	-0.92***	0.21
Don't know	1.26	0.66	0.73*	0.13	0.60**	0.13	0.55***	0.12	0.65***	0.08	0.62*	0.17	-0.58***	0.09
visa			0.92	0.23	0.69	0.18	0.64	0.20	0.68*	0.14	0.26**	0.16	-0.60***	0.15
Unspecified document			0.74	0.18	0.81	0.21	0.26***	0.11	0.83	0.16	0.32**	0.17	-0.49***	0.13
Ref = came before 12														
Btw 12 and 20	1.28	0.63	2.33***	0.31	2.12***	0.31	1.18	0.16	1.63***	0.14	1.33	0.23	0.79***	0.06
Btw 21-27	2.38*	1.11	2.48***	0.34	2.96***	0.43	1.14	0.16	1.90***	0.18	1.11	0.21	0.97***	0.07
Over 27	4.05***	1.85	3.52***	0.49	3.07***	0.47	1.01	0.16	2.01***	0.21	1.10	0.22	1.03***	0.07
Ref = female														
male	2.38***	0.68	1.17*	0.11	1.50***	0.14	1.44***	0.15	1.20**	0.09	1.98***	0.27	0.23***	0.05
Ref = No education														
Primary education	0.76	0.60	1.45**	0.23	1.25	0.24	1.16	0.25	1.25	0.17	1.38	0.34	0.32***	0.10
Junior secondary education	0.93	0.48	0.85	0.12	1.41**	0.20	1.33*	0.22	1.30**	0.14	1.31	0.27	0.17**	0.08
Two-year vocational secondary	1.13	0.55	0.95	0.13	0.77*	0.12	1.28	0.20	1.47***	0.14	0.91	0.19	-0.01	0.07
Three-year vocational secondary	0.86	0.52	0.96	0.18	1.22	0.22	2.04***	0.38	1.86***	0.26	1.95***	0.46	0.31***	0.09
Secondary education	0.90	0.44	1.18	0.16	0.98	0.14	1.08	0.19	1.64***	0.18	1.11	0.25	0.15**	0.08
Two years of higher education	0.46	0.31	0.87	0.14	1.29*	0.20	1.56**	0.28	2.32***	0.30	1.75**	0.40	0.41***	0.09
More than two years of higher education	1.97	0.82	1.24	0.17	0.85	0.13	1.64***	0.27	2.93***	0.36	1.56**	0.33	0.44***	0.08
Ref = 18-25														
26-35	1.13	0.69	1.76***	0.34	1.75***	0.34	1.81***	0.37	0.74**	0.09	1.81**	0.45	0.07	0.08
36-45	0.91	0.57	2.90***	0.55	2.11***	0.41	2.41***	0.49	0.71***	0.08	2.08***	0.52	0.12	0.08
46+	1.28	0.81	3.53***	0.70	2.05***	0.43	2.20***	0.48	0.68***	0.09	2.57***	0.69	0.07	0.09
Ref = Manual worker														
Farmer			2.08	1.35	0.66	0.73	2.29	1.82	1.38	0.95	1.42	1.51	0.31	0.44
Self-employed, businessperson	5.08***	2.14	1.27	0.20	1.50**	0.25	1.21	0.22	1.11	0.15	1.40	0.30	0.23**	0.09
Manager	1.48	0.74	0.82	0.14	1.33	0.23	0.80	0.16	1.18	0.18	0.40***	0.12	-0.06	0.10
Intermediate occupations	1.28	0.59	0.88	0.12	1.18	0.17	1.18	0.18	1.34**	0.16	1.06	0.20	0.06	0.08
Clerical/sales	1.17	0.50	0.92	0.11	1.10	0.13	0.89	0.12	1.07	0.10	0.97	0.17	0.01	0.06
Not working	2.22*	1.01	1.30**	0.16	0.62***	0.09	0.96	0.15	1.04	0.11	1.10	0.21	0.13*	0.07
Less than €579														
€579-€900	0.74	0.36	1.15	0.16	1.21	0.19	1.01	0.17	1.27**	0.14	1.19	0.23	0.16**	0.08
€900-€1,309	0.88	0.42	1.25	0.18	1.68***	0.26	1.27	0.21	1.19	0.13	0.96	0.19	0.26***	0.08
€1,309-€1,833	1.27	0.60	1.56***	0.23	2.04***	0.33	1.21	0.21	1.29**	0.15	0.73	0.16	0.29***	0.08
€1,833-€2,500	1.98	1.02	1.63***	0.29	2.22***	0.42	1.00	0.21	1.27*	0.18	0.68	0.19	0.25**	0.10
More than €2,500	2.75*	1.44	1.75***	0.33	2.79***	0.56	1.17	0.27	1.40**	0.24	1.43	0.39	0.50***	0.11
Not reported	0.64	0.41	1.13	0.20	0.96	0.20	0.87	0.19	1.43***	0.20	0.70	0.19	0.08	0.09
_cons	0.00***	0.00	0.02***	0.01	0.01***	0.00	0.03***	0.01	1.04	0.20	0.01***	0.00	2.87***	0.13
Number of observations	5 455		5 787		5 787		5 787		5 787		5 787		5 787	

note: \*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

## Appendix 4

## Socio-demographic factors associated with the transnational practices of immigrants' children

	Social Domain						Symbolic Domain			
	Personal communication outside metropolitan France		Visits to / sojourns in the region of origin		Consumption of media from the region of origin		Wish to be buried outside metropolitan France		Plan to settle outside metropolitan France	
	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se
<b>Ref = Algeria</b>										
Morocco/Tunisia	1,71***	0,15	1,78***	0,20	1,15	0,10	1,42***	0,14	1,29**	0,16
Sahelian Africa	2,48***	0,31	1,01	0,14	1,80***	0,20	1,44***	0,18	2,21***	0,31
West/Central Africa	1,76***	0,24	0,55***	0,08	0,97	0,12	0,28***	0,06	2,46***	0,38
Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos	0,73***	0,08	0,13***	0,01	0,47***	0,05	0,10***	0,02	1,37**	0,20
Turkey	3,95***	0,55	7,05***	1,78	5,02***	0,66	2,52***	0,30	1,21	0,19
Portugal	1,32***	0,12	5,93***	1,01	1,18*	0,11	0,24***	0,04	0,71**	0,11
Spain/Italy	1,03	0,08	4,32***	0,51	0,97	0,08	0,07***	0,01	0,95	0,12
Other EU 27 countries	0,93	0,09	1,22	0,15	0,71***	0,08	0,10***	0,03	1,08	0,17
Rest of world	1,60***	0,18	0,84	0,10	1,15	0,12	0,31***	0,05	2,14***	0,29
<b>Ref = female</b>										
male	0,82***	0,04	1,08	0,08	0,95	0,05	0,78***	0,06	1,09	0,08
<b>Ref = No education</b>										
Primary education	1,23	0,34	0,70	0,22	1,32	0,38	1,07	0,49	0,68	0,37
Junior secondary education	1,40***	0,14	1,45***	0,19	1,26**	0,13	0,81	0,11	1,11	0,16
Two-year vocational secondary	1,27***	0,11	1,58***	0,17	1,13	0,10	0,84	0,09	1,04	0,13
Three-year vocational secondary	1,51***	0,14	1,99***	0,25	1,35***	0,13	0,93	0,12	0,81	0,11
Secondary education	2,06***	0,21	2,27***	0,30	1,09	0,11	0,73**	0,10	1,34**	0,18
Two years of higher education	1,72***	0,18	1,77***	0,24	1,34***	0,14	0,70**	0,10	0,93	0,14
More than two years of higher education	2,45***	0,26	2,40***	0,33	1,25**	0,13	0,62***	0,10	1,33**	0,19
<b>Ref = 18-25</b>										
26-35	0,78***	0,05	1,15	0,10	0,71***	0,05	0,86*	0,07	0,61***	0,05
36-45	0,69***	0,05	0,85	0,09	0,62***	0,05	0,49***	0,06	0,44***	0,05
46+	0,51***	0,05	0,70**	0,10	0,42***	0,05	0,24***	0,07	0,22***	0,05
<b>Ref = Manual worker</b>										
Farmer	0,75	0,57	0,46	0,39					1,99	2,20
Self-employed, businessperson	1,29*	0,19	0,99	0,21	1,02	0,15	1,16	0,24	1,14	0,26
Manager	1,44***	0,17	1,15	0,18	0,99	0,11	0,64**	0,13	0,96	0,16
Intermediate occupations	1,20**	0,10	1,08	0,13	0,98	0,09	0,64***	0,08	1,25*	0,16
Clerical/sales	1,13	0,09	1,01	0,11	0,93	0,07	0,75***	0,08	1,21*	0,14
Not working	1,15*	0,10	1,16	0,13	1,04	0,09	0,74***	0,08	1,14	0,13
<b>Less than €579</b>										
€579-€900	1,10	0,11	0,87	0,11	0,98	0,10	0,85	0,10	1,00	0,13
€900-€1,309	1,28**	0,13	0,98	0,13	0,97	0,09	1,00	0,12	0,77**	0,10
€1,309-€1,833	1,09	0,11	0,72**	0,09	0,75***	0,07	0,68***	0,09	0,87	0,11
€1,833-€2,500	1,20	0,14	0,86	0,13	0,83*	0,09	0,71**	0,12	0,97	0,14
More than €2,500	1,29**	0,17	0,87	0,15	0,78*	0,10	0,50***	0,11	1,25	0,20
Not reported	1,08	0,12	0,93	0,13	0,76***	0,08	0,82	0,11	0,80*	0,11
_cons	0,83	0,11	2,18***	0,37	0,85	0,11	0,88	0,15	0,17***	0,03
<b>Number of observations</b>	8 102		8 102		8 094		8 094		8 102	

note: \*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Appendix 4

Socio-demographic factors associated with

	Economic Domain								Political Domain				Global score of transnationalism	
	Economic investment outside metropolitan France		Ownership of land or a home outside metropolitan France		Regular financial assistance provided to a household outside metropolitan France		Financial contribution to a collective project in the region of origin		Interest in politics in the region of origin		Membership of an association of people of the same origin			
	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	coef	se
<b>Ref = Algeria</b>														
<b>Morocco/Tunisia</b>	0,42	0,48	1,60**	0,30	1,93***	0,39	1,23	0,17	0,60***	0,05	1,14	0,27	0,30***	0,06
<b>Sahelian Africa</b>	5,47**	4,37	2,30***	0,51	4,45***	1,03	2,21***	0,36	1,27**	0,14	3,71***	0,87	0,90***	0,09
<b>West/Central Africa</b>	3,27	3,07	1,82**	0,47	2,40***	0,68	0,75	0,18	1,34**	0,18	1,43	0,45	0,13	0,10
<b>Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos</b>	0,81	0,96	0,40**	0,14	0,63	0,22	1,12	0,19	0,47***	0,05	1,07	0,30	-1,04***	0,08
<b>Turkey</b>	1,11	1,31	2,05***	0,48	1,55	0,46	2,52***	0,41	1,59***	0,19	5,39***	1,22	1,46***	0,09
<b>Portugal</b>	0,42	0,49	1,00	0,22	0,48**	0,14	0,42***	0,08	0,52***	0,05	1,13	0,28	-0,14**	0,07
<b>Spain/Italy</b>	0,80	0,63	0,41***	0,09	0,11***	0,04	0,16***	0,03	0,68***	0,05	0,81	0,19	-0,27***	0,06
<b>Other EU 27 countries</b>	0,53	0,62	0,21***	0,09	0,41***	0,14	0,25***	0,06	0,62***	0,06	1,94***	0,47	-0,45***	0,08
<b>Rest of world</b>	6,31***	4,48	1,50*	0,34	1,05	0,30	1,05	0,18	0,91	0,10	1,62*	0,41	0,12	0,08
<b>Ref = female</b>														
<b>male</b>	1,34	0,58	1,03	0,13	0,70**	0,10	1,07	0,10	1,05	0,05	1,52***	0,18	-0,03	0,04
<b>Ref = No education</b>														
<b>Primary education</b>			1,03	0,77			0,86	0,64	1,26	0,34	1,80	1,36	0,08	0,21
<b>Junior secondary education</b>			1,20	0,29	1,06	0,32	1,30	0,26	1,45***	0,15	1,94**	0,52	0,30***	0,08
<b>Two-year vocational secondary</b>	1,34	1,14	0,96	0,20	1,08	0,27	1,50**	0,25	1,39***	0,11	1,78**	0,42	0,25***	0,06
<b>Three-year vocational secondary</b>	2,47	2,10	1,57**	0,35	1,21	0,33	1,40*	0,26	1,76***	0,17	1,53	0,40	0,42***	0,07
<b>Secondary education</b>	1,24	1,22	1,49*	0,36	0,97	0,31	1,58**	0,31	2,16***	0,22	1,91**	0,52	0,54***	0,08
<b>Two years of higher education</b>	1,12	1,10	1,15	0,29	1,44	0,40	1,89***	0,36	1,99***	0,20	2,57***	0,67	0,48***	0,08
<b>More than two years of higher education</b>	1,38	1,29	1,45	0,36	1,55	0,44	1,98***	0,38	2,89***	0,30	2,60***	0,69	0,71***	0,08
<b>Ref = 18-25</b>														
<b>26-35</b>	2,46	1,52	1,06	0,16	1,83***	0,32	1,14	0,12	0,95	0,06	0,73**	0,10	-0,19***	0,05
<b>36-45</b>	2,67	1,86	1,31	0,24	1,87***	0,40	1,03	0,14	0,95	0,07	0,68**	0,12	-0,37***	0,06
<b>46+</b>	2,46	2,35	1,88**	0,50	2,06**	0,68	0,77	0,20	1,01	0,11	0,69	0,19	-0,59***	0,08
<b>Ref = Manual worker</b>														
<b>Farmer</b>			4,04	4,52					0,18	0,19			-0,75	0,56
<b>Self-employed, businessperson</b>	5,29*	4,55	0,72	0,28	0,76	0,32	1,23	0,31	1,13	0,16	1,19	0,37	0,13	0,11
<b>Manager</b>	1,82	1,70	1,18	0,32	0,97	0,28	1,17	0,23	1,31**	0,15	1,24	0,31	0,15*	0,09
<b>Intermediate occupations</b>	1,54	1,21	0,86	0,18	0,78	0,18	0,93	0,15	1,15*	0,10	1,14	0,22	0,05	0,06
<b>Clerical/sales</b>	0,81	0,66	0,91	0,17	0,71	0,15	1,05	0,15	1,10	0,08	0,79	0,15	0,01	0,06
<b>Not working</b>	1,73	1,46	0,96	0,19	0,39***	0,10	0,73**	0,11	1,05	0,09	0,87	0,17	0,01	0,06
<b>Less than €579</b>														
<b>€579-€900</b>	1,77	2,06	1,07	0,24	1,82*	0,56	0,83	0,14	0,97	0,10	1,27	0,32	-0,02	0,08
<b>€900-€1,309</b>	2,61	2,88	1,07	0,23	1,94**	0,58	1,05	0,17	0,94	0,09	1,84**	0,44	0,04	0,07
<b>€1,309-€1,833</b>	1,52	1,74	0,89	0,20	1,29	0,41	1,02	0,17	0,80**	0,08	1,56*	0,38	-0,19**	0,07
<b>€1,833-€2,500</b>	0,86	1,11	0,79	0,21	2,16**	0,71	0,89	0,17	0,88	0,10	1,34	0,37	-0,09	0,08
<b>More than €2,500</b>	3,39	3,98	1,03	0,30	1,53	0,56	0,96	0,21	0,93	0,12	1,34	0,40	-0,04	0,09
<b>Not reported</b>	0,99	1,23	0,94	0,22	0,55	0,22	0,49***	0,10	0,86	0,09	0,88	0,24	-0,22***	0,08
<b>_cons</b>	0,00***	0,00	0,03***	0,01	0,02***	0,01	0,07***	0,02	0,85	0,11	0,01***	0,00	2,73***	0,10
<b>Number of observations</b>	7 268		8 102		8 034		8 094		8 102		8 094		8 102	

note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Factors associated to transnational practices among immigrants and their children. Interaction effects of origin and generation.

	Social Domain						Symbolic Domain			
	Personal communication outside metropolitan France		Visits to / sojourns in the region of origin		Consumption of media from the region of origin		Wish to be buried outside metropolitan France		Plan to settle outside metropolitan France	
	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se
Ref = Algeria										
Morocco/Tunisia	1,34*	0,22	1,89***	0,43	1,17	0,13	1,23*	0,13	1,40*	0,26
Sahelian Africa	1,74***	0,37	0,24***	0,04	1,03	0,14	1,15	0,14	3,89***	0,72
West/Central Africa	1,41*	0,26	0,12***	0,02	0,72***	0,08	0,43***	0,05	3,05***	0,55
Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos	0,29***	0,04	0,09***	0,02	0,41***	0,05	0,09***	0,02	1,50*	0,32
Turkey	2,14***	0,41	1,09	0,23	4,88***	0,79	1,48***	0,17	1,70***	0,32
Portugal	0,63***	0,10	5,12***	1,89	0,76**	0,09	0,55***	0,07	3,29***	0,63
Spain/Italy	0,54***	0,11	7,57***	5,50	0,92	0,15	0,41***	0,08	2,44***	0,61
Other EU 27 countries	2,00***	0,46	1,08	0,27	1,22	0,16	0,43***	0,06	2,07***	0,40
Rest of world	1,17	0,19	0,19***	0,03	0,98	0,11	0,42***	0,05	2,11***	0,37
Interaction G2*other EU 27 countries	0,07***	0,01	0,25***	0,05	0,16***	0,02	0,09***	0,03	0,66**	0,12
Interaction G2*rest of the world	0,21***	0,03	1,16	0,15	0,32***	0,04	0,29***	0,05	1,33**	0,18
Interaction G2*Algeria	0,15***	0,02	0,26***	0,04	0,28***	0,03	0,41***	0,04	1,36*	0,24
Interaction G2*Morocco or Tunisia	0,20***	0,03	0,26***	0,05	0,28***	0,03	0,49***	0,05	1,25	0,18
Interaction G2*Sahelian Africa	0,23***	0,05	1,26	0,20	0,52***	0,07	0,55***	0,08	0,78	0,12
Interaction G2*West or Central Africa	0,20***	0,04	1,30*	0,19	0,38***	0,05	0,27***	0,06	1,08	0,17
Interaction G2*Vietnam or Cambodia or Laos	0,40***	0,05	0,42***	0,06	0,33***	0,04	0,48**	0,15	1,20	0,22
Interaction G2*Turkey	0,29***	0,06	1,89**	0,54	0,30***	0,06	0,78*	0,10	0,99	0,18
Interaction G2*Portugal	0,33***	0,04	0,30***	0,11	0,45***	0,05	0,19***	0,03	0,29***	0,05
Interaction G2*Spain or Italy	0,28***	0,05	0,12***	0,09	0,28***	0,04	0,07***	0,02	0,50***	0,11
Ref = female										
male	0,83***	0,04	0,98	0,05	0,99	0,04	0,91*	0,05	1,14**	0,06
Ref = No education										
Primary education	1,66***	0,28	1,11	0,19	1,38**	0,19	1,30**	0,17	1,41**	0,23
Junior secondary education	1,31***	0,11	1,40***	0,13	1,20**	0,09	0,75***	0,06	1,11	0,11
Two-year vocational secondary	1,04	0,07	1,26***	0,10	0,91	0,06	0,74***	0,05	0,93	0,08
Three-year vocational secondary	1,35***	0,11	1,59***	0,15	1,21**	0,09	0,84*	0,07	0,88	0,09
Secondary education	2,05***	0,18	1,87***	0,18	1,06	0,08	0,73***	0,06	1,21*	0,12
Two years of higher education	1,67***	0,14	1,57***	0,16	1,30***	0,10	0,77***	0,07	1,03	0,11
More than two years of higher education	2,41***	0,21	2,12***	0,21	1,35***	0,10	0,72***	0,06	1,50***	0,14
Ref = 18-25										
26-35	0,82***	0,05	1,09	0,08	0,80***	0,04	0,93	0,06	0,66***	0,05
36-45	0,77***	0,05	1,18**	0,09	0,71***	0,04	0,67***	0,05	0,50***	0,04
46+	0,67***	0,06	1,22**	0,12	0,64***	0,05	0,47***	0,04	0,37***	0,04
Ref = Manual worker										
Farmer	0,66	0,34	0,95	0,64	0,71	0,33	0,13*	0,14	1,43	0,92
Self-employed, businessperson	1,35***	0,15	1,20	0,17	0,95	0,09	0,90	0,10	1,14	0,16
Manager	1,17	0,12	1,04	0,12	0,82**	0,07	0,73***	0,08	1,00	0,12
Intermediate occupations	1,03	0,08	1,08	0,10	0,87**	0,06	0,70***	0,06	1,15	0,11
Clerical/sales	1,06	0,07	0,99	0,08	0,88**	0,05	0,84**	0,06	1,21**	0,10
Not working	1,05	0,08	1,09	0,09	1,05	0,07	0,97	0,07	1,38***	0,12
Less than €579										
€579-€900	1,19**	0,10	1,05	0,10	1,03	0,08	0,91	0,07	0,98	0,09
€900-€1,309	1,33***	0,11	1,33***	0,12	1,00	0,07	0,99	0,08	0,87	0,08
€1,309-€1,833	1,17*	0,10	1,08	0,10	0,80***	0,06	0,76***	0,07	1,04	0,10
€1,833-€2,500	1,26**	0,12	1,17	0,13	0,83**	0,07	0,70***	0,08	0,99	0,11
More than €2,500	1,46***	0,16	1,44***	0,19	0,86	0,08	0,74**	0,09	1,40***	0,17
Not reported	1,08	0,10	1,21*	0,12	0,83**	0,07	0,82**	0,08	0,93	0,10
_cons	5,61***	0,87	7,08***	1,35	2,90***	0,36	1,54***	0,21	0,10***	0,02
Number of observations	14 292		14 292		14 292		14 292		14 292	

note: \*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1



## Factors associated to transnational practices among immigrants

	Economic Domain								Political Domain				Global score of transnationalism	
	Economic investment outside metropolitan France		Ownership of land or a home outside metropolitan France		Regular financial assistance provided to a household outside metropolitan France		Financial contribution to a collective project in the region of origin		Interest in politics in the region of origin		Membership of an association of people of the same origin			
	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	exp(b)	se	coef	se
Ref = Algeria														
Morocco/Tunisia	0,83	0,47	1,78***	0,27	1,81***	0,29	1,35	0,25	0,71***	0,08	1,05	0,34	0,25***	0,08
Sahelian Africa	2,75*	1,42	2,70***	0,45	6,45***	1,06	3,29***	0,62	1,50***	0,21	6,70***	1,88	0,86***	0,10
West/Central Africa	3,90***	1,87	1,47**	0,25	5,11***	0,81	2,29***	0,42	0,89	0,11	3,85***	1,09	0,02	0,09
Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos	0,17	0,18	0,25***	0,07	0,83	0,16	2,36***	0,45	0,37***	0,05	2,71***	0,82	-1,31***	0,09
Turkey	0,29	0,24	2,10***	0,34	1,01	0,19	2,21***	0,41	1,34**	0,16	4,48***	1,25	0,76***	0,09
Portugal	0,39	0,33	1,75***	0,30	0,34***	0,09	0,60**	0,15	0,60***	0,07	1,94**	0,63	-0,19**	0,09
Spain/Italy	1,11	0,80	0,60*	0,17	0,13***	0,07	0,37**	0,15	0,82	0,14	1,40	0,62	-0,40***	0,13
Other EU 27 countries	1,88	0,97	1,15	0,21	0,80	0,16	0,73	0,17	1,11	0,15	1,98**	0,63	-0,04	0,09
Rest of world	1,51	0,74	2,11***	0,31	1,71***	0,27	1,35*	0,25	0,99	0,11	2,20***	0,62	-0,10	0,08
Interaction G2*other EU 27 countries	0,08**	0,08	0,08***	0,03	0,18***	0,06	0,44***	0,13	0,31***	0,04	1,22	0,31	-1,65***	0,09
Interaction G2*rest of the world	1,16	0,52	0,34***	0,06	0,23***	0,06	1,10	0,19	0,50***	0,06	0,98	0,23	-0,94***	0,09
Interaction G2*Algeria	0,31	0,22	0,45***	0,09	0,38***	0,08	1,35*	0,24	0,56***	0,06	1,18	0,36	-1,17***	0,08
Interaction G2*Morocco or Tunisia	0,15*	0,16	0,45***	0,10	0,43***	0,07	1,31*	0,20	0,47***	0,05	1,38	0,37	-1,08***	0,07
Interaction G2*Sahelian Africa	0,62	0,38	0,47***	0,10	0,27***	0,05	0,97	0,17	0,47***	0,07	0,71	0,15	-1,04***	0,11
Interaction G2*West or Central Africa	0,23*	0,18	0,62*	0,15	0,18***	0,05	0,47***	0,12	0,82	0,12	0,50**	0,15	-1,01***	0,11
Interaction G2*Vietnam or Cambodia or Laos	1,37	1,96	0,84	0,34	0,30***	0,10	0,72*	0,13	0,69***	0,09	0,56**	0,16	-0,85***	0,10
Interaction G2*Turkey	1,30	1,61	0,53***	0,11	0,66	0,18	1,66***	0,28	0,66***	0,09	1,52**	0,30	-0,39***	0,10
Interaction G2*Portugal	0,35	0,43	0,26***	0,05	0,53**	0,17	1,00	0,26	0,47***	0,05	0,78	0,22	-1,10***	0,09
Interaction G2*Spain or Italy	0,21**	0,17	0,27***	0,08	0,29**	0,18	0,55	0,24	0,45***	0,07	0,68	0,27	-1,12***	0,12
Ref = female														
male	1,85***	0,42	1,15**	0,08	1,19**	0,09	1,23***	0,08	1,09**	0,04	1,65***	0,14	0,06*	0,03
Ref = No education														
Primary education	0,80	0,62	1,67***	0,24	1,37*	0,25	1,13	0,23	1,33**	0,16	1,55*	0,35	0,45***	0,09
Junior secondary education	0,86	0,41	0,97	0,12	1,30**	0,16	1,28**	0,16	1,39***	0,10	1,34*	0,21	0,21***	0,05
Two-year vocational secondary	1,00	0,39	0,75***	0,08	0,74**	0,09	1,34***	0,14	1,34***	0,08	1,18	0,17	0,01	0,05
Three-year vocational secondary	1,33	0,58	1,09	0,14	1,09	0,15	1,48***	0,18	1,74***	0,12	1,34*	0,22	0,29***	0,06
Secondary education	1,00	0,43	1,25**	0,14	1,05	0,14	1,28*	0,16	2,01***	0,14	1,33*	0,21	0,41***	0,05
Two years of higher education	0,61	0,31	0,92	0,12	1,31**	0,17	1,69***	0,21	2,07***	0,15	1,88***	0,30	0,42***	0,06
More than two years of higher education	1,76	0,64	1,37***	0,15	1,16	0,14	1,70***	0,20	3,04***	0,22	1,85***	0,28	0,67***	0,05
Ref = 18-25														
26-35	2,14*	0,86	1,33***	0,14	2,09***	0,25	1,25**	0,11	0,93	0,05	0,95	0,11	-0,10**	0,04
36-45	2,43**	1,01	2,25***	0,24	2,55***	0,32	1,42***	0,14	0,94	0,05	1,02	0,13	-0,12***	0,04
46+	2,86**	1,27	2,90***	0,35	2,67***	0,38	1,29**	0,16	0,97	0,07	1,24	0,19	-0,18***	0,05
Ref = Manual worker														
Farmer			2,23	1,21	0,58	0,62	1,48	1,13	0,69	0,31	0,94	0,97	-0,29	0,34
Self-employed, businessperson	4,59***	1,70	1,09	0,15	1,23	0,18	1,24	0,18	1,08	0,10	1,34*	0,23	0,16**	0,07
Manager	1,09	0,47	0,79*	0,11	1,04	0,15	1,03	0,14	1,18*	0,10	0,81	0,14	-0,04	0,06
Intermediate occupations	1,10	0,43	0,76**	0,09	0,88	0,10	1,05	0,11	1,13*	0,07	1,12	0,15	-0,04	0,05
Clerical/sales	0,92	0,34	0,88	0,08	0,94	0,09	0,97	0,09	1,05	0,06	0,87	0,11	-0,04	0,04
Not working	1,98*	0,77	1,16	0,12	0,52***	0,07	0,85	0,09	1,05	0,06	0,97	0,13	0,04	0,05
Less than €579														
€579-€900	0,89	0,39	1,12	0,13	1,33**	0,19	0,91	0,11	1,09	0,08	1,20	0,18	0,07	0,05
€900-€1,309	1,11	0,46	1,17	0,14	1,70***	0,23	1,12	0,12	1,04	0,07	1,24	0,19	0,15***	0,05
€1,309-€1,833	1,21	0,51	1,27**	0,16	1,75***	0,25	1,10	0,13	0,95	0,07	1,05	0,17	0,01	0,06
€1,833-€2,500	1,36	0,64	1,19	0,17	2,09***	0,33	0,89	0,13	1,00	0,08	0,90	0,17	0,02	0,06
More than €2,500	2,47**	1,12	1,45**	0,22	2,28***	0,39	1,06	0,16	1,07	0,10	1,22	0,24	0,20***	0,07
Not reported	0,65	0,35	1,13	0,15	0,86	0,15	0,61***	0,09	1,02	0,08	0,74*	0,14	-0,08	0,06
_cons	0,00***	0,00	0,05***	0,01	0,03***	0,01	0,04***	0,01	1,40***	0,17	0,01***	0,00	3,75***	0,09
Number of observations	14 270		14 292		14 292		14 292		14 292		14 292		14 292	

note: \*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

# Documents de Travail

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Effects of identification with the culture of origin, discrimination, stigmatization and sense of belonging on transnationalism in second-generation migrants

	Modèle D2		Modèle D2.1		Modèle D3		Modèle D3.1		Modèle D3.2		Modèle D3.3		Modèle D4		Modèle D5	
	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se
Ref = Algeria																
Morocco/Tunisia	0,30***	0,06	0,23***	0,06	0,11*	0,06	0,11*	0,06	0,11*	0,06	-0,02	0,05	0,10*	0,06	0,17***	0,06
Sahelian Africa	0,90***	0,09	0,78***	0,08	0,72***	0,08	0,71***	0,08	0,70***	0,08	0,54***	0,07	0,65***	0,08	0,64***	0,07
West/Central Africa	0,13	0,10	0,15	0,09	0,48***	0,09	0,48***	0,09	0,48***	0,09	0,31***	0,09	0,42***	0,09	0,40***	0,08
Vietnam/Cambodia/Laos	-1,04***	0,08	-1,05***	0,08	-0,99***	0,07	-0,98***	0,07	-0,97***	0,07	-1,11***	0,07	-0,97***	0,07	-0,89***	0,07
Turkey	1,46***	0,09	1,21***	0,09	0,75***	0,08	0,76***	0,08	0,77***	0,08	0,68***	0,08	0,81***	0,08	0,80***	0,08
Portugal	-0,14**	0,07	-0,16**	0,07	-0,17***	0,06	-0,15**	0,06	-0,13**	0,06	-0,17***	0,06	0,00	0,06	-0,08	0,06
Spain/Italy	-0,27***	0,06	0,01	0,06	0,08	0,06	0,09*	0,06	0,11**	0,06	0,10*	0,05	0,26***	0,06	0,19***	0,05
Other EU 27 countries	-0,45***	0,08	0,04	0,08	0,04	0,07	0,05	0,07	0,07	0,07	0,06	0,07	0,21***	0,07	0,29***	0,07
Rest of world	0,12	0,08	0,33***	0,08	0,28***	0,07	0,29***	0,07	0,30***	0,07	0,23***	0,07	0,37***	0,07	0,36***	0,07
Ref = female																
male	-0,03	0,04	-0,03	0,04	0,03	0,04	0,03	0,04	0,03	0,04	0,01	0,03	0,01	0,03	0,03	0,03
Ref = No education																
Primary education	0,08	0,21	0,15	0,20	0,18	0,19	0,19	0,19	0,19	0,19	0,21	0,19	0,23	0,19	0,31*	0,18
Junior secondary education	0,30***	0,08	0,32***	0,07	0,31***	0,07	0,32***	0,07	0,33***	0,07	0,30***	0,07	0,31***	0,07	0,34***	0,07
Two-year vocational secondary	0,25***	0,06	0,24***	0,06	0,26***	0,06	0,27***	0,06	0,28***	0,06	0,28***	0,05	0,27***	0,06	0,30***	0,05
Three-year vocational secondary	0,42***	0,07	0,39***	0,07	0,40***	0,06	0,41***	0,06	0,42***	0,06	0,43***	0,06	0,41***	0,06	0,44***	0,06
Secondary education	0,54***	0,08	0,58***	0,07	0,61***	0,07	0,63***	0,07	0,64***	0,07	0,60***	0,07	0,62***	0,07	0,68***	0,07
Two years of higher education	0,48***	0,08	0,49***	0,07	0,48***	0,07	0,49***	0,07	0,50***	0,07	0,46***	0,07	0,47***	0,07	0,53***	0,07
More than two years of higher education	0,71***	0,08	0,75***	0,08	0,75***	0,07	0,75***	0,07	0,77***	0,07	0,74***	0,07	0,76***	0,07	0,82***	0,07
Ref = 18-25																
26-35	-0,19***	0,05	-0,21***	0,05	-0,29***	0,04	-0,29***	0,04	-0,30***	0,04	-0,29***	0,04	-0,32***	0,04	-0,25***	0,04
36-45	-0,37***	0,06	-0,43***	0,05	-0,48***	0,05	-0,48***	0,05	-0,48***	0,05	-0,47***	0,05	-0,47***	0,05	-0,32***	0,05
46+	-0,59***	0,08	-0,63***	0,08	-0,62***	0,07	-0,61***	0,07	-0,61***	0,07	-0,60***	0,07	-0,58***	0,07	-0,38***	0,07
Ref = Manual worker																
Farmer	-0,75	0,56	-0,35	0,54	-0,33	0,51	-0,32	0,51	-0,30	0,51	-0,25	0,50	-0,27	0,50	-0,21	0,48
Self-employed, businessperson	0,13	0,11	0,14	0,10	0,08	0,10	0,08	0,10	0,09	0,10	0,08	0,10	0,08	0,10	0,15	0,09
Manager	0,15*	0,09	0,16**	0,08	0,25***	0,08	0,25***	0,08	0,26***	0,08	0,27***	0,07	0,26***	0,08	0,28***	0,07
Intermediate occupations	0,05	0,06	0,07	0,06	0,12**	0,06	0,12**	0,06	0,13**	0,06	0,14**	0,06	0,12**	0,06	0,15***	0,06
Clerical/sales	0,01	0,06	0,02	0,06	0,06	0,05	0,06	0,05	0,07	0,05	0,08	0,05	0,06	0,05	0,08	0,05
Not working	0,01	0,06	0,01	0,06	0,03	0,06	0,03	0,06	0,04	0,06	0,05	0,05	0,04	0,06	0,05	0,05
Less than €579																
€579-€900	-0,02	0,08	-0,02	0,07	0,00	0,07	0,02	0,07	0,02	0,07	0,02	0,07	0,04	0,07	0,09	0,06
€900-€1,309	0,04	0,07	0,06	0,07	0,05	0,07	0,06	0,07	0,07	0,07	0,08	0,06	0,09	0,07	0,13**	0,06
€1,309-€1,833	-0,19**	0,07	-0,13*	0,07	-0,05	0,07	-0,02	0,07	-0,01	0,07	0,02	0,07	0,02	0,07	0,08	0,06
€1,833-€2,500	-0,09	0,08	-0,01	0,08	0,08	0,08	0,10	0,08	0,12	0,08	0,14*	0,07	0,15*	0,08	0,24***	0,07
More than €2,500	-0,04	0,09	0,08	0,09	0,14	0,09	0,16*	0,09	0,18**	0,09	0,19**	0,08	0,21**	0,09	0,29***	0,08
Not reported	-0,22***	0,08	-0,23***	0,08	-0,18**	0,07	-0,16**	0,07	-0,14**	0,07	-0,09	0,07	-0,11	0,07	-0,10	0,07
Parents' marriage																
Ref = parents of same origin																
mixed marriage_parents			-0,92***	0,04	-0,28***	0,04	-0,27***	0,04	-0,27***	0,04	-0,31***	0,04	-0,23***	0,04	-0,07*	0,04
Respondent's marriage																
Ref = mar'd to Fr. spouse whose parents are Fr.																
not married					0,17***	0,04	0,16***	0,04	0,15***	0,04	0,22***	0,04	0,17***	0,04	0,14***	0,04
migrant from same country					1,14***	0,07	1,12***	0,07	1,12***	0,07	1,13***	0,07	1,11***	0,07	0,99***	0,06
migrant from another country					0,65***	0,09	0,64***	0,09	0,64***	0,09	0,65***	0,09	0,64***	0,09	0,62***	0,08
2nd gen same country					0,56***	0,07	0,55***	0,07	0,55***	0,07	0,53***	0,07	0,54***	0,07	0,47***	0,07
2nd gen another country					0,20***	0,07	0,20***	0,07	0,19***	0,07	0,18**	0,07	0,18***	0,07	0,10	0,07
Language used at home during childhood																
French only																
Foreign language basic					0,40***	0,05	0,40***	0,05	0,39***	0,05	0,34***	0,05	0,34***	0,05	0,22***	0,05
Foreign language - fluent (oral and/or written)					1,10***	0,04	1,10***	0,04	1,09***	0,04	1,04***	0,04	1,04***	0,04	0,81***	0,04
Living in a sensitive urban area in 2008																
No																
Yes							0,15***	0,05	0,15***	0,05	0,17***	0,04	0,15***	0,05	0,09*	0,04
Has experienced discrimination in the past																
No																
Yes								0,37***	0,07	0,26***	0,07	0,16**	0,07	0,10	0,07	
Has experienced racism during his/her																
No																
Yes										0,38***	0,03	0,32***	0,03	0,28***	0,03	
Perception that not considered French																
No																
Yes												0,33***	0,04	0,20***	0,04	
Sense of belonging																
Ref = belong in France only																
country of origin only															1,44***	0,07
both countries															0,94***	0,04
no country															0,85***	0,10
_cons															0,90***	0,10
Number of observations	2,73***	0,10	3,01***	0,10	1,91***	0,10	1,85***	0,10	1,80***	0,10	1,75***	0,10	1,56***	0,10	0,90***	0,10
	8 102		8 102		8 102		8 102		8 102		8 752		8 102		8 102	

note: \*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1