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Waiting to imitate: on the dynamic pricing of knowledge
Abstract : We study the problem of an inventor who brings to the market an innovation that can be legally copied. Imitators may 'enter' the market by copying the innovation at a cost or by buying from the inventor the knowledge necessary to reproduce and use the invention. The possibility of contracting affects the need for patent protection. Our results reveal that: (i) Imitators wait to enter the market and the inventor becomes a temporary monopolist; (ii) The inventor offers contracts which allow resale of the knowledge acquired by the imitators; (iii) As the pool of potential imitators grows large, the inventor may become a permanent monopolist.
https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01066198
Contributeur : Spire Sciences Po Institutional Repository <>
Soumis le : vendredi 19 septembre 2014 - 12:27:37
Dernière modification le : mardi 18 juin 2019 - 01:11:15
Document(s) archivé(s) le : samedi 20 décembre 2014 - 11:26:43
Contributeur : Spire Sciences Po Institutional Repository <>
Soumis le : vendredi 19 septembre 2014 - 12:27:37
Dernière modification le : mardi 18 juin 2019 - 01:11:15
Document(s) archivé(s) le : samedi 20 décembre 2014 - 11:26:43
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waiting-to-imitate.pdf
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