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Voting in Assemblies of shareholders and Incomplete Markets

Abstract : An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the ¯rst date and a ¯nite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting { one share, one vote { and at ½-majority stable equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most ½ £ 100 percent of the shareholders. It is shown that a ½-majority stable equilibrium exists provided that ½ ¸ min ½ S ¡ J S ¡ J + 1 ; B B + 1 ¾ where S is the number of states at the last date, J is the number of ¯rms and B is the dimensions of the sets of e±cient production plans for ¯rms. Moreover, an example shows that ½-majority stable equilibria need not exist for smaller ½'s.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, September 17, 2014 - 1:12:27 PM
Last modification on : Friday, August 5, 2022 - 12:31:13 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Thursday, December 18, 2014 - 11:01:14 AM


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  • HAL Id : hal-01064884, version 1
  • SCIENCESPO : 2441/10283



Mich Tvede, Hervé Crès. Voting in Assemblies of shareholders and Incomplete Markets. 2001. ⟨hal-01064884⟩



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