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Ideology and existence of 50% majority equilibria in Multidimensional spatial voting Models

Abstract : When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the 'worst-case' scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super-majority rate as high as 1 -- 1/(n+1) is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower d-dimensional (d < n) linear map spans the possible candidates' platforms. These d 'ideological' dimensions imply some linkages between the n political issues. We randomize over these linkages and show that there almost surely exists a 50%-majority equilibria in the above worst-case scenario, when n grows to infinity. Moreover, the equilibrium is the mean voter.
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Hervé Crès, Utku Unver. Ideology and existence of 50% majority equilibria in Multidimensional spatial voting Models. Journal of Theoretical Politics, SAGE Publications, 2010, 22 (4), pp.431-444. ⟨10.1177/0951629810371015⟩. ⟨hal-01023800⟩

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