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Article dans une revue

Coordination of Industrial Policy in the European Union

Abstract : Spillovers from national industrial policies can cause helpful or harmful competition among policy makers and helpful or harmful interactions among the targeted industries. As a result, it is not in general possible to say whether industrial policy coordination is good or bad. However, reaching agreement at the EU level on any type of policy - trade policy, monetary policy or industrial policy - is costly in terms of time, information, and political goodwill. The contrast between the vagueness of the benefits of coordination and the surety of the decision-making costs suggests that the EU has no need to set up a new institutional structure for coordinating industrial policy. In the few cases where the merits of coordination are obvious, such as public spending on R&D, they will be obvious to all and ad hoc cooperation will work.
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Soumis le : mercredi 9 juillet 2014 - 11:06:07
Dernière modification le : mardi 18 juin 2019 - 01:11:25
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  • HAL Id : hal-01021298, version 1
  • SCIENCESPO : 2441/9321



Richard E. Baldwin, Philippe Martin. Coordination of Industrial Policy in the European Union. EIB Papers, 2006, 11 (1), pp.134-157. ⟨hal-01021298⟩



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