Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Coordination of Industrial Policy in the European Union

Abstract : Spillovers from national industrial policies can cause helpful or harmful competition among policy makers and helpful or harmful interactions among the targeted industries. As a result, it is not in general possible to say whether industrial policy coordination is good or bad. However, reaching agreement at the EU level on any type of policy - trade policy, monetary policy or industrial policy - is costly in terms of time, information, and political goodwill. The contrast between the vagueness of the benefits of coordination and the surety of the decision-making costs suggests that the EU has no need to set up a new institutional structure for coordinating industrial policy. In the few cases where the merits of coordination are obvious, such as public spending on R&D, they will be obvious to all and ad hoc cooperation will work.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [8 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Spire Sciences Po Institutional Repository Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, July 9, 2014 - 11:06:07 AM
Last modification on : Friday, September 30, 2022 - 11:28:09 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Tuesday, April 11, 2017 - 11:52:28 AM


Explicit agreement for this submission


  • HAL Id : hal-01021298, version 1
  • SCIENCESPO : 2441/9321



Richard E. Baldwin, Philippe Martin. Coordination of Industrial Policy in the European Union. EIB Papers, 2006, 11 (1), pp.134-157. ⟨hal-01021298⟩



Record views


Files downloads