Production externalities: internalization by voting - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year :

Production externalities: internalization by voting

(1) , (2)


We study internalization of production externalities in perfectly competitive markets where production plans are decided by majority voting. Since shareholders want firms to maximize dividends of portfolios rather than profits, they are interested in some internalization. Two governances, namely the shareholder governance (one share, one vote) and the stakeholder democracy (one stakeholder, one vote), are compared. We argue that perfect internalization is more likely to be the outcome of the stakeholder democracy than the shareholder governance.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
externalityrr.pdf (210.92 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-00972983 , version 1 (03-04-2014)



Hervé Crès, Mich Tvede. Production externalities: internalization by voting. 2011. ⟨hal-00972983⟩
138 View
133 Download


Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More