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%. Idem, but with respectively the Council's ability to amend unanimously and implement by qualified majority the SGP. For the sake of simplification votes have been distributed among members of the EU 12. However, more than half of those votes actually belong to the other members of the EU 25, even the implementation of the " excessive deficit " procedure (a clear symptom of the lack of

B. Romania, included in the Nice Treaty agreement, are not taken into account here

?. Ibidem, but with respectively the Council's unanimity and the Parliament's majority. The EU's annual budget is jointly determined by the Parliament and the Council. The Parliament debates in two successive readings, and the budget does not come into force until it has been signed by the President of Parliament. The budgetary procedure or the budget's content can not be amended without EU 25 members' unanimity